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The State Politics of Congressional and Judicial
Reform: Implementing Criminal Records Policy
Thomas Carlyle Dalton, B.A., Ohio University
M.A., Ohio University, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Kenneth M. Dolbeare
This study examines Supreme Court civil liberties and
Congressional criminal records policies in order to understand the
politics of state implementation of federal criminal justice guide-
lines. Analysis of state responses to the Mapp and Mi randa decisions
leads to identification of salient interests and factors influencing
policy outcomes. Evidence of these interests and factors is sought in
the analysis of national patterns of state response to the criminal
records privacy mandate established by a 1973 amendment to the Crime
Control Act. The author presents an intensive case study of implemen-
tation of the mandate in Washington state, using interviews to probe
factors raised by national patterns. Overall, the state implementation
of the criminal records privacy guidelines parallels the response to
Mapp and Mi randa in that there was extensive procedural compliance
but little change in performance.
Alternative conceptual frameworks are used to explain these
consequences of LEAA's attempt to regulate criminal justice processes.
If the apparent lack of success is explained by unclear laws involving
the delegation of too much discretion to state and local officials,
then the outcomes are easily understood using existing pluralist frame-
works stressing dissagregation
, interest group conflict and compromise.
A better explanation lies in the dynamics of power structural conflict
which stresses elite indifference, under-enforcement and constitutional
constraints to changing criminal justice processes. The underlying
political realities uncovered in this explanation involve judicial
opposition to executive encroachment and local law enforcement resistance
to state regulation. Recognizing these realities provides greater
purchase in understanding the common factors influencing Congressional
and Court originated criminal justice reform.
Procedural policies with structural implications threaten to
alter underlying patterns of power and preference, producing non-
compliance and efforts by implementing organizations to restore the
political status quo. This means the preservation of control by
criminal justice officials over the process. Factors internal to the
criminal justice system contributing to these outcomes include main-
tenance of organizational autonomy and stability. External factors
involve the separation of powers and public sentiment for law and order
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CHAPTER I
REGULATING CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS:
THE LIMITS TO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGICAL REFORM
Over the last fifteen years, the federal government has
undertaken new, ambitious initiatives to reduce crime through exper-
imentation and innovation, involving the creation of state and local
agencies to plan and coordinate criminal justice policy. The Mapp
(1961) and Miranda (1966) decisions and the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act (1968) noted the onset of a period in which the
Supreme Court, and Congress through the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA), greatly enlarged their role in policy develop-
ment and oversight of the administration of criminal justice.
Significantly, the Crime Control Act was used not only to
advance a reform agenda (e.g., through appropriation of block grant
money for allocation to the states), but to bring about increased
innovation and coordination and limited regulatory control (through
conditions of aid) of criminal justice processes. Congressional
regulation of criminal justice information systems was initiated by
an amendment in the early 1970's to improve the management, increase
the quality, and control the exchange of criminal records. A central
purpose of that policy is the enlargement of privacy protections and
due process rights for subjects of criminal records.
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In many respects, this intervention parallels similar efforts
by the Supreme Court in the 1960's and early 1970's to enunciate
national policies for defendent
' s due process protections in the
criminal justice process. Both Court and Congressional policies were
a part of a broader movement to strengthen policy making and account-
ability mechanisms at the state and local level. Yet, the policies
were initiated in contrasting political environments, involving
different underlying institutional relationships and functions. The
Supreme Court decisions involving suspects' and defendants' rights
in the 1960's were made in spite of widespread opposition to the
increased "federalization" of state court procedure. The Supreme
Court civil liberties decisions were intended to increase federal
control as well as to strengthen state court authority over lower
court behavior.
In contrast, the regulation of criminal records management
was one of many conditions of aid which accompanied a widely supported
injection of resources to state and local criminal justice agencies
through state block grants. These grants were intended not only to
stimulate innovation but increase state and local discretion and
control of policy making processes.
A significant feature shared by the federal criminal history
records policy and Supreme Court decisions protecting due process
rights is that they mark the federal government's first attempt to
regulate the administration of criminal justice. This has presented
some novelty for intergovernmental relations in criminal justice over
the last two decades. On the one hand, the Department of Justice has
assumed a de facto regulatory role through LEAA, and, on the other,
the Supreme Court and lower courts have greatly enlarged their policy-
making and supervisory role over the administration of criminal
justice. Thus, to the extent that both LEAA (following Congressional
mandate) and the courts have exercised regulatory control over the
administration of justice, they have become involved in the implemen-
tation of intergovernmental policy.
In addition, these Congressional and Court initiatives are
broadly rooted in the administrative reform tradition. The primary
strategy of this tradition, which dates back to Woodrow Wilson and
the Populist and Progressive reform movements, has been to strengthen
the professional management of government agencies and make them more
accountable to the public. While the focus of past reforms has been
on structural change (e.g., at-large elections, council -manager form
of government, executive budgeting, judicial appointment and court
unification), contemporary reforms place greater reliance upon
technological change (e.g., computer processing of information) as
the vehicle for reform. Recent observers have suggested that, like
previous reform movements, information technological reforms serve
political as well as technical agendas (Kraemer and Dutton, 1979).
Those who control the implementation of information technologies
are thought to exert leverage over the distribution of power and
impacts associated with such innovations and, thus, serve some
interests as opposed to others.
It is evident from the literature on information technological
reform, that although the adoption of information innovations in
criminal justice has not intended to change the intergovernmental,
interjurisdictional relations, policy management and governance
structures, nonetheless, the effects of information technological
innovations may bring about such changes (Laudon, 1974). Moreover,
a combination of political and organizational factors has influenced
the level of support or resistance by criminal justice agencies to
criminal justice policy innovations at the federal, state and local
level and, thus, may suggest factors likely to affect the creation
and regulation of national criminal justice information systems.
Study Focus: State Implementation of the Federal
Criminal Records Privacy Amendment
In 1973, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 was amended to provide for privacy, security and dissemination
controls and safeguards of criminal history record information.
Federal guidelines promulgated by the LEAA in 1975 mandated that
each state initiate a planning process and strategy to bring state
and local criminal justice agencies into compliance with federal
requirements. The state of Washington responded to federal law
through passage of comprehensive legislation in 1977 which invested
administrative authority in the State Planning Agency. Thus, the
state privacy law set in motion the implementation of an inter-
governmental policy.
This study undertakes a close examination of the implementa-
tion of privacy guidelines for criminal justice information systems
in order to address several related issues: What are the politics of
5state implementation of federal guidelines in the criminal justice
area? What are the interests involved and what factors influence out-
comes? And finally, what do such findings imply for a more general
understanding of policy implementation?
This study bears a close relationship to and is rooted in
studies about the politics of implementation and regulation of infor-
mation technological reforms (e.g., automation of records systems) in
criminal justice and other policy areas; studies which assess the
implementation and impact of federal legislative and Supreme Court
policy regulating law enforcement activities and the administration
of criminal justice; and studies of policy implementation which explore
the role and significance of guideline development as a variable in
explanatory theories of policy implementation processes.
The policy implementation literature has identified several
factors which may increase the likelihood of compliance to policies
originated by legislatures and courts. The state implementation of
Supreme Court civil liberties decisions in Mapp and Miranda provides
the closest policy analog to understanding factors likely to affect
federal regulation of criminal justice processes. Therefore, salient
findings of Court impact studies are briefly summarized as they bear
upon the conditions of effective implementation and their significance
for understanding the politics of intergovernmental regulation.
The remainder of Chapter I consists of a discussion of the
importance of the criminal record in relation to the growth of infor-
mation technology in criminal justice, a description of judicial and
legislative attempts to regulate that technology and efforts by LEAA
to underwrite and influence the direction of information technological
reforms undertaken by criminal justice agencies to satisfy federal
regulations. A variety of political factors are identified which now
constrain the full development and comprehensive regulation of a
national, computerized criminal history record system. Finally, at
the end of this chapter, a method is specified in more detail of how
state and local performance under the federal privacy mandate will be
assessed and explained.
The subsequent analysis of state implementation of federal
criminal history records regulation consists of four parts. First,
national patterns of state response are presented in order to determine
how performance in Washington compares to that of other states. Second,
a case study of the processes by which the state of Washington converted
federal regulations into state policy is presented in order to identify
interests and factors shaping outcomes. Third, the case forms the
basis for a subsequent analysis interpreting the significance of
political factors which contribute to an explanation of national pat-
terns of state response. Finally, common factors are identified which
influence the politics of state implementation of Court and legislative
policies designed to regulate the administration of criminal justice.
The Growth of Criminal Justice
Information Systems
All criminal justice agencies have common information needs
because of the interdependence involved in processing cases to con-
clusion. Importantly, information needs continue after cases reach
7final dispositions and thus reinforce interdependence. The criminal
history record, among other criminal justice case documents, is in-
tended to serve an important short-hand function to satisfy some of
these common information needs.
The criminal history record (or rap sheet, as it is commonly
known) consists of a summary of an individual's contacts with the
criminal justice system. As such, it contains a record of arrest
charges and court disposition or sentencing information. The criminal
record is used for a variety of purposes: pre-arrest investigation by
police and prosecutors (the most frequent use), arrest and bail deci-
sions (based on the severity of police charges), plea bargaining,
court case preparation, witness verification, juror qualification,
corrections assignment, and probation and parole decisions to estimate
likelihood of escape. The criminal record is not limited to these
uses. It is also used for employment purposes, licensing of particular
professions and security investigations. Almost 20 percent of requests
to states for criminal record information come from non-criminal
justice organizations. While this constitutes the extent of legal
uses, there is also a black market of uncertain proportions for such
material (Laudon, 1980; OTA, 1982a).
The number of criminal records maintained in the United States
is enormous and growing at an alarming rate. SEARCH Group, Inc. (1976a)
estimated that there were approximately 195,000 criminal records in
1975. In a recent study by Laudon, estimates were placed at 216 million
records (1980: 52). As local criminal history files are automated, the
number is expected to increase by another 10 to 15 percent by 1985.
8Perhaps nearly half of these files are inactive (e.g., because of age
of data subject or lack of contact with the system). Yet, the Depart-
ment of Labor estimates that 30 percent of the labor force has a
criminal record.
Criminal history records are maintained in differential propor-
tions between federal, state and local agencies. Of the 216 million
records, 21.4 million are held by the FBI and 195 million are held by
more than 64,000 state and local criminal justice agencies. Of these,
29.2 million are held by state repositories with only 4 million of that
number computerized. Approximately 150 million, or three-fourths of
state and local files, are held solely by local criminal justice
agencies (largely police departments) and in manual files (Laudon,
1980: 52).
Although numerous opportunities have arisen as a result of the
introduction of information technology in criminal justice, it is also
evident that these innovations increase the potential risks to in-
dividual privacy. Such risks stem principally from the enhanced
capabilities of the speed of exchange and proliferation of dissemina-
tion of data enabled by computer technology.
What makes the capability of speed damaging is the slowness of
update processes compared to the rapidity and frequency of dissemina-
tion. This creates the potential for injustice in a variety of
criminal justice decision-making contexts before the stale or otherwise
incomplete data is updated or corrected. By introducing factual or
contextual inaccuracies the criminal record may convey an erroneous
impression of the data subject's past or present conduct which may
result in false arrest, inappropriate sentences, and so forth.
9The combination of remote terminal access and message switching
capabilities (e.g., inquiries to a given location may be routed through
a central switching point to another user) now make it possible to send
and receive messages through multiple ports of entry. If the informa-
tion is inaccurate or incomplete, exchanges between criminal justice
users can create a spreading effect to perpetuate unjust decisions,
lost time and inefficiency.
Federal court antecedents to
Congressional action
Federal and, particularly, state courts have shown a reluctance
to intrude upon police discretion in the use of criminal records.
Judicial review has been largely confined to issues pertaining to
identification and record maintenance. Much less attention has been
focused upon exchange and dissemination practices, record reporting
responsibilities and utilization of records in case-related decision
making contexts. Thus, court review of criminal records management
has differed from those decisions by the Supreme Court (e.g., Mapp and
Mi randa ) which regulate the methods by which convictions are obtained.
Moreover, federal and state courts have been unable to agree upon
standards which should govern records handling practices, nor have they
clearly enunciated where the balance should be struck between the pro-
tection of individual privacy and due process rights and effective law
enforcement.
In many ways, Menard vs. Mitchell (1971), typified these
difficulties. In its decision, the Federal District Court in
Washington, D.C., acknowledged the problems inherent in the dissemination
of incomplete and inaccurate records in the conduct of police work.
While a student at UCLA, Dale Menard was arrested for burglary, finger-
printed, detained and subsequently released without charge. The FBI
subsequently received a record of the detention but failed to note his
release without charge. Menard demanded that the record be expunged
from both local and FBI files thereby preventing both the maintenance
and dissemination of the record. The Federal District Court ruled
that an arrest alone did not justify maintenance of fingerprints or
records by either the state repository or the FBI and that the FBI
must limit disclosure of such records to law enforcement agencies
only (Marchand, 1980: 139).
What was exceptional about the Menard decision was its willing
ness to question the propriety of commonly accepted records management
practices in a period of time when rapidly expanding computer tech-
nologies not only made these practices anachronistic but greatly magni
fied the potential adverse impact of the exchange and dissemination
of inaccurate and incomplete information. It was precisely the recog-
nition of the complexity of information systems in record management
processes that prompted the federal court in this decision to insure
adequate protections for the data subject's privacy rights.
Unlike previous court rulings addressing the issues pertaining
to criminal records, the Menard decision was particularly unequivocal
about enunciating the rights of the subject of a criminal record.
Importantly, in drawing a firm legal distinction between a record of
arrest and conviction, the federal court challenged law enforcement
conventions which heretofore had drawn no such clear-cut distinction.
Not only have arrest records always been considered an important tool
in police investigative work, but the private sector (e.g., banks,
insurance companies, credit companies and employers) have considered
access to police records essential to the security of their businesses.
Yet, at least at the federal level, the court found no statute which
authorized FBI dissemination of arrest records for non-criminal justice
purposes (Marchand, 1980: 140).
Given the potential adverse impact upon privacy and reputation,
Judge Gezell argued in Menard that the FBI must show a "compelling
necessity" to disseminate a record that revealed episodes of doubtful
authenticity in a person's life. The determination of "public necessity"
was considered by Judge Gezell to rest not with the executive branch but
with the Congress. A case by case approach was not considered accept-
able and had so far not solved the problem. Rather, Judge Gezell
considered that Congress was more properly responsible and uniquely
capable (Marchand, 1980: 140).
Interestingly, the Menard decision did not apply to internal
criminal justice use of arrest and conviction records. Thus, in
contrast to Mapp and Miranda decisions, Judge Gezell did not really
challenge the adequacy of procedures available to insure the integrity
of records exchange practices. Rather, he concluded that any misuse
of criminal records within the criminal justice system could be
rectified by the courts. In subsequent regulations (1975), however,
LEAA broadened the term "dissemination" to include the exchange of
information between criminal justice agencies. Consequently, criminal
justice agencies can now be held liable for the quality of information
12
exchanged between agencies for decision making purposes. As subsequent
chapters indicate, the control of dissemination of criminal history
record information within the criminal justice system has proven to be
extraordinarily difficult to achieve.
There have been two other decisions after Menard which suggest
increased intervention by federal courts in police record use in
decision-making.
In Tarlton vs. Saxbe (1974) the Court of Appeals in Washington,
D.C., further amplified the Menard decisions by declaring that the FBI
was not just a passive recipient of records supplied by state and
local agencies but had a duty to prevent the dissemination of inaccurate
arrest and conviction records. In addition, the FBI was ordered to take
administrative steps to insure the accuracy and completeness of criminal
history record materials submitted to the National Crime Information
Center by state and local justice agencies (OTA, 1982a).
A federal court in New York in Tatum vs. Rogers (1979) has shown
a willingness to review the effects of the utilization of incomplete
criminal record information (arrest data) in law enforcement internal
decision making processes. The U.S. District Court cited violations
of Constitutional rights when incomplete criminal records information
was used in setting bail decisions (OTA, 1982a).
Significantly, there have been no cases which have focused on
the extent of responsibility that state and local agencies have for
insuring accuracy and completeness of criminal history record informa-
tion. However, it is inevitable, given increased state regulation of
criminal record management practices that civil suites will be brought
to test the states' commitment to implement federal regulations.
Although the Menard decision constituted an important step in
the direction of defining data subject rights with respect to public
dissemination and avenues available to protect these rights (i.e.,
access and review), it deferred to Congress for the resolution of
complex administrative issues involved in the regulation of the manage-
ment and utilization of criminal history records.
In short, with increasing availability of fingerprints,
technological developments, and the enormous increase in
population, the system is out of effective control. The
Bureau needs legislative guidance and there must be a
national policy developed in this area which will have
built into it adequate sanctions and administrative safe-
guards. It is not the function of the courts to make these
judgments, but the courts must call a halt until the
legislature acts (Marchand, 1980: 140-141).
Yet, because of unresolved conflicts between federal bureaucracies
competing for control of a national criminal history records system,
and tensions regarding the distribution of federal and state respon-
sibilities. Congress has been unable to reach a consensus on a
comprehensive approach to criminal records privacy policy. Instead,
a temporary measure was devised in which LEAA's responsibilities under
the Crime Control Act were expanded to include implementation of a
privacy mandate in which brevity of detail invited extensive adminis-
trative interpretation and conflict.
The amendment reads as follows:
All criminal history information collected, stored, or
disseminated through support under this title shall contain,
to the maximum extent feasible, disposition as well as
arrest data where arrest data is included therein. The
collection, storage, and dissemination of such information
shall take place under procedures reasonably designed to
ensure that all such information is kept current therein;the Admimstration shall ensure that the security andprivacy of all information is adequately provided for
and that information shall only be used for law enforce-
ment m criminal justice and other lawful purposes In
addition, an individual who believes that criminal
history information concerning him contained in an
automated system is inaccurate, incomplete or maintained
in violation of this title, shall, upon satisfactory
verification of his identity, be entitled to review suchinformation and to obtain a copy of it for the purpose
of challenge or correction. Any person violating the
provisions of this section, or any rule, regulation, or
order issued thereunder, shall be fined not to exceed
$10,000 in addition to any other penalty imposed by law
(Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968-
Section 524B).
The passage of the amendment constituted a limited victory for
LEAA and a substantial setback for the FBI in the struggle for control
over standards designed to govern the management of state and local
criminal records information systems. While the Bureau retained
management control over the computerized criminal history program,
it was now subject to LEAA regulations (Title 28). Moroever, both
the Menard decision and criminal records privacy mandate have provided
important levers to LEAA in its efforts to fund and influence the
direction of information technological reforms undertaken in criminal
justice.
Improving information technological capacity
of criminal justice agencies
LEAA attempted to increase the extent of informational coor-
dination between criminal justice agencies in order to improve the
quality of criminal records exchanged and disseminated in the criminal
justice process. The success of that effort depended upon LEAA's
capacity to influence at least three factors: the processes by which
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information innovations are diffused; the organizational structures,
practices and interorganizational relations involved in the criminal
justice process; and intergovernmental relationships. These efforts
have had only limited results and have exacerbated problems of
record quality, privacy protection and Constitutional rights.
The infusion of LEAA assistance between 1968 and 1980 appears
to have greatly accelerated the diffusion of information technology
in criminal justice. Marchand reports, for example, that in 1968
only ten states had automated, state-level criminal justice informa-
tion systems. By 1972, forty-seven states had automated at least one
component of their criminal justice systems. At that time, 46 percent
of the computerized systems were state-level and 54 percent local
(Marchand, 1980: 73). By 1980, there had been substantial growth in
local computerized systems: 66 percent (of a survey of over 600
systems) were local and only 34 percent involved state-level applica-
tions. Importantly, 73 percent of the computerized criminal history
files added since 1976 are in local rather than state systems (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1980: 2-3).
In addition, LEAA encouraged state and local criminal justice
systems which include joint use or participation by two or more
components of the criminal justice system. In a national survey in
1972, LEAA determined that nearly 28 percent of the total systems
surveyed (151) had automated information systems which served two or
more organizations. In a follow-up survey in 1976, a slightly larger
sample of systems surveyed showed a small decline in combined systems
to 25 percent. However, a third survey completed in 1980 showed a
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significant decline in the number of shared or combined systems. Of
a little over 600 systems included in this survey, only sixty (10
percent) combined two or more functions (U.S. Department of Justice,
1980: 4).
Organizational effects
LEAA has attempted to influence the organizational contexts
within which information technology is utilized by police, offices of
prosecution and state courts through special demonstration programs
designed to alter the ways in which information is collected, exchanged
and utilized in decision making. These efforts had to contend with
important differences in organizational structures, transactions and
informational needs.
Computerization has progressed unevenly in criminal justice
agencies and has had differential organizational effects (see Table 1).
LEAA had a somewhat stronger influence over the use of information
technology in law enforcement than in other components of the criminal
justice system, but this has resulted in unintended effects. Police
organizations have demonstrated a willingness to use identification
and criminal history information in applications closely related to
functions central to organizational purposes (e.g., investigation,
apprehension, arrest). However, there is some limited evidence that
such applications reinforce "legalistic" approaches to law enforce-
ment, depersonalize patrol activity, and narrow the scope of judgment
and discretion, and thus magnify problems resulting from the reliance
upon incomplete and inaccurate criminal records. Significantly,
automation of police arrest records has greatly outstripped the
availability of court disposition information, making law enforcement





Utilization of Information Technology
Information Systems Pol ice Prosecutor State Courts
Extent of diffusion Extensive Moderate Limited
Integration Extensive Limited Limited
Number of uses Extensive Moderate Moderate










^Colton, 1978; MITRE, 1977a.
^SEARCH Group, 1976a; Weimer, 1980.
^Hays, 1978; SEARCH Group, 1975.
LEAA also sponsored and funded information innovations in
offices of prosecution. These initiatives have been advanced in order
to increase the effectiveness of prosecution by increasing clearance
rates, structuring discretion (i.e., plea bargaining) and focusing
resources on the trial and conviction of repeat offenders. These
efforts have had little success because of organizational resistance,
inability to reduce complex decisional factors to data contained in
18
criminal records, and the strength of informal collaboration between
prosecutors and police in charging and case disposal (Jacoby, 1980;
Weimer, 1980).
Attempts to influence state and lower court organizational
structures through information innovations have proven to be equally
ineffective. Not only does the complexity of tasks and court struc-
ture constrain the possibilities of information-based organizational
change, but resistance by lower courts to centralization of manage-
ment, which state court information systems represent, make acceptance
difficult to achieve. Moreover, state and lower courts do not appear
to consider criminal record information a priority data element for
case management and thus do not consider information coordination with
police or the central state repository a compelling priority (Berkson,
Hays and Carbon, 1977; Hays, 1978; SEARCH Group, 1975).
Enlarging state and local
participation in NCIC
Along with its efforts to influence the growth and use of
information technology, LEAA attempted to standardize and centralize
the collection of criminal history offender data. This LEAA program
consisted of a two-pronged strategy to upgrade the capabilities of
central state repositories and to develop a national network capable
of routing inquiries between federal and state systems which fit
within the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC).
First, LEAA assistance greatly improved and increased state
repository record maintenance capabilities. As Table 2 indicates, in
1969 when this LEAA program commenced on a demonstration basis, none
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of the states had established automated name indexes and the same
number had computerized all criminal history records. By 1982, twenty-
seven states had fully operational computerized criminal history records
with seven having automated name indexes. There is evidence to in-
dicate that the twenty-seven states with complete computerized records
generated far more record disseminations than states with manual re-
cords (OTA. 1982a: 46). In 1979, for example, disseminations from
states with automated criminal history files constituted more than half
of all records maintained by state repositories, but less than one-fifth
of all state records.
Table 2. Development of Central State Repository.
Completely Automated
Automated Index Manual File
1969 0 0 50
1975^ 17 17 16
1982'^ 27 7 16
^SEARCH Group, 1976a: 8, 25,
"^OTA, 1982a: 48.
Second, LEAA reinforced the fledgling development of the NCIC
through grants to the FBI, states and localities designed to upgrade
records collection and exchange capabilities. The NCIC consists
principally of two major files: an Identification and Criminal History
File. The Identification file consists of arrests, warrants, stolen
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property and other data. It is considered a "hot" file and used to
facilitate investigative and police field work. The Criminal History
file consists of records of arrests and convictions submitted by
central state repositories.
The number of NCIC automated Identification files and the
number of users has grown extensively since its inception largely with
the assistance of LEAA. For example, the NCIC data base has grown from
23,000 records in two files consisting of wanted persons and stolen
property with approximately ten thousand daily inquiries in 1967, to
ten files which contained over nine million records by 1981 (OTA,
1982a: 33-34). In addition, the NCIC averaged 342,000 daily inquiries
and over ten million information exchanges per month.
Similarly, the number of user agencies has increased from
fifteen in 1967 to an estimated 64,000 federal, state and local agencies
in 1981 (see Figure 1). Although only seventy-nine state and federal
agencies have a direct line to the NCIC, numerous other criminal
justice agencies are entitled to the information. In a 1979 survey,
OTA found that thirty-four states reported a total of 900 terminals at
state and local levels with access to state records and to NCIC/CCH
data (1982a: 49). Indirect access to NCIC files is facilitated primar-
ily by a message-switching service provided by the National Law
Enforcement Telecommunications Network to other state and local users.
An OTA state sample shows that access is widely, although unevenly,
distributed between police, prosecutors and courts. For example, court
access to NCIC files ranges from as much as 47 percent in New York to













49 State identification bureaus,
o1 which 27 have a CCH file


















Figure 1. Overview of Criminal History Records System.
SOURCE: OTA, 1982a: 23.
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In contrast to the NCIC Identification file, the computerized
criminal history file component (CCH) has grown at a much slower rate.
There are currently only 1.5 million computerized criminal histories
in the NCIC/CCH. As of 1981, CCH message traffic accounted for 3.5
percent of the NCIC total monthly traffic while transactions for
stolen property and wanted persons accounted for nearly 90 percent of
the monthly NCIC totals. The maximum number of states who have chosen
to participate in the NCIC/CCH has never exceeded thirteen; in 1981,
only eight states were participating. Thus, in the OTA 1981 survey,
the eight states fully participating in the NCIC/CCH accounted for only
about 24 percent of all criminal fingerprint cards submitted to the
Identification Division. Moreover, 67 percent of the message traffic
from state and local agencies originated from these eight states, thus
further limiting the value of the CCH file to the vast majority of
states. Thus, an important reason for the limited participation by
the states in the NCIC/CCH is the inability of most states to provide
complete and accurate records, making utilization of the NCIC/CCH of
limited usefulness to states and localities.
Competing proposals for up-
grading the national CCH
The exact network configuration, administrative and account-
ability mechanisms of a national computerized criminal history record
system (CCH) has been the subject of a protracted policy conflict
between LEAA, the FBI and Congress. That debate, discussed in detail
elsewhere by Marchand (1980), has directly impinged upon the substance
of criminal history regulatory policy.
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Beginning in 1969, LEAA sponsored a program for the interstate
collection and exchange of computerized criminal history records.
Instead of funding the random development of local criminal history
systems (precluded by fund limitations), LEAA decided to fund a
demonstration project (called Project SEARCH) by which to test the
feasibility of a computerized criminal offender file which involved
the exchange of standardized data between the states. Even though the
project successfully demonstrated the feasibility of the concept,
conflicts arose as to what infomration should be maintained in the
system and who should operate it. Although evaluation and debate was
inconclusive, in December 1970 the Attorney General decided that the
FBI should manage the system.
Although numerous hearings have been held, several legislative
proposals advanced and successive studies conducted since 1970 to
determine technical feasibility costs and possible safeguards, Congress
has been unable to reach a consensus on a national policy and compre-
hensive legislation. Bureaucratic conflicts in the Justice Department
between the FBI and LEAA with respect to system configuration and
governance have largely accounted for this impasse.
Both the FBI and LEAA have advocated proposals for a nationwide
computerized criminal history system which differ in several respects.
The most salient differences pertain to record maintenance and control
responsibilities; standards governing data quality and privacy; and,
importantly, system governance.
First, the FBI proposal involves maintenance of records per-
taining to all federal offenders and data subjects with multi -state
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offenses in the NCIC central repository. Currently, the FBI maintains
records of single state, multi-state and federal offenders of fully
participating states. Under the single-state, multi-state plan, the
states would retain possession of single-state offender records while
the FBI would maintain multi-state records and utilize a "pointer" or
index system and a message switching capability which would enable
the NCIC to route inquiries from one state to another for single-state
records. The index file would consist of only the name or equivalent
identification of individuals with an arrest record. Complete
criminal history records information would be provided by the state
from which the record originated. Second, the Bureau proposes
voluntary state and local compliance to privacy, security and other
measures to ensure the integrity and quality of criminal history data.
Third, the FBI suggests that its NCIC Policy Advisory Board (currently
composed primarily of federal and state law enforcement officials)
exercise policy and management control over CCH.
Two recent developments with respect to FBI proposals are
noteworthy. First, Congress was officially advised by the FBI in 1980
of a project to test a national CCH index using the Florida central
state repository as the message switching point for inquiries to the
NCIC files. Congress approved the demonstration as long as the FBI/
NCIC did not operate message switching during the demonstration.
However, when it was discovered that the Florida computer equipment
was unable to handle widely divergent request formats of participating
states, the FBI subsequently utilized its NCIC/CCH in a message
switching role (OTA, 1982a: 114).
The OTA has challenged the FBI's authority to operate message
switching even for the purposes of a demonstration (OTA, 1982a: 115-117).
Moreover, it is not entirely clear, according to a discussion in 1982
with a staff member involved in the OTA study, that the FBI has ceased
using the message switching capability. Therefore, it is possible
that the FBI may be retrieving criminal history record information
from state repository files without the knowledge of state officials.
In addition, the FBI has also significantly increased the
amount of duplication between Ident and CCH files. For example, the
NCIC/CCH records also held in Ident increased from 44 to 58 percent
from 1979 to 1982 (OTA, 1982a: 196). While this duplication between
files reflects the FBI's need to develop an automated fingerprint
capability, such duplication would also enable the development of a
computerized criminal history file technically outside Congressional
control
.
It is evident from these two related instances of FBI dis-
cretionary decisions that there may be a variety of ways that Con-
gressional control over a national CCH may be circumvented.
The LEAA/CCH concept differed substantially from the FBI
version. One important difference resides in its concept of federalism.
LEAA has insisted that the NCIC maintain only criminal records for
federal offenses; central state repositories would maintain single and
multi-state offense records. Second, LEAA has favored a central NCIC
national index or "pointer" system maintained by the states by which
inquiries are routed from the index to the originator of the record.
The National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) currently
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operates a message switching system which routes inquiries received by
the NCIC index back to the appropriate state. LEAA contended that the
FBI proposal to operate message switching is tantamount to giving the
Bureau the capability to develop a central criminal history file be-
cause it would give the Bureau access to state and local files. The
FBI has tried unsuccessfully (in 1973 and 1979) to persuade Congress to
authorize implementation of a message switching capability but so far
has been refused because of unresolved policy issues regarding impact
on federal-state relations and surveillance potential. More recently,
the FBI has been willing to reconsider its support for a single-state,
multi-state plan for a national index, if the latter enables the FBI
to retain control over message switching.
Next, LEAA has consistently promoted (through SEARCH Group,
Inc.)^ decentralized, state control of a CCH system. In essence, each
state would establish an independent commission to develop, monitor
and enforce criminal records management and privacy regulations. In
addition, each participating state would be represented on a board
which would formulate national policy and user standards (SEARCH
Group, 1978).
LEAA first used the term SEARCH to label its 1969 demonstra-
tion project for the development of a national computerized criminal
history system.
"The acronym 'SEARCH' originally stood for 'System for
Electronic Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories.' That expan-
sion of the acronym was dropped in 1972, when it ceased to be
descriptive of the corsortium's range of activities, but the acronym
itself was retained. In March 1974, the consortium became a non-
profit California corporation called 'SEARCH Group Incorporated'"
(Zenk. 1979: 3).
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There have been several reasons why LEAA has proposed an
essentially decentralized CCH. Its control over block grant money
(now limited to state statistical programs funded by the Bureau of
Criminal Justice Statistics) facilitated close contact and observa-
tion of state records system problems, needs and capabilities. LEAA
has long contended that the lack of participation by the states in
the FBI/CCH system stems from both political as well as technical
constraints. States and localities are not eager to surrender manage-
ment control to federal authorities. Moreover, a decentralized records
management system has made good political sense because it has been
consistent with the revenue sharing strategy of devolving decision
making to the state and local governments.
Comparisons of surveys conducted over a ten year period to
determine support for various technical configurations has shifted
markedly from centralized approaches (single-state, multi-state) to
decentralized, state-focused approaches (national index only) (see
Table 3). Significantly, the emergent consensus concerns only
technical configuration
.
Opinion is still divided on issues per-
taining to management, regulation. Constitutional rights and
governance processes.
All proposed alternative configurations of a national CCH
(i.e., national repository; single-state, multi-state; National Index
or Regional System) require the development of a policy-making and
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Thus far, the NCIC Policy Advisory Board is composed of twenty
elected and six appointed members. The twenty elected members represents
state and local law enforcement: nine from state police or patrols;
seven from state bureaus of identification; and four local (city or
county) police. The six appointed members include two members each
from judicial, prosecutorial and correctional components. Thus, about
three-fourths of the representation is law enforcement. The LEAA and
others have challenged the restrictiveness of representation and have
suggested much broader representation within and outside the criminal
justice system.
The FBI favors a slightly altered NCIC Policy Advisory Board
whereas LEAA and SEARCH Group prefer an independent federal infor-
mation board. Most state and local officials appeared to support
the FBI proposal at that time. Since that time, surveys of state
criminal justice officials (conducted by the Department of Justice)
(OTA, 1978) and Office of Technology Assessment (1982a) indicate that
support for two alternative governance configurations has become in-
creasingly divided.
The Department of Justice survey found that state officials
considered an agency other than the FBI to be a more viable governance
entity in the long term and criticized organizational separation be-
tween IDENT and CCH components of the NCIC (OTA, 1982a: 171). An OTA
survey in 1979 indicated that while twenty-two state repository
officials favored FBI management control, there was extensive varia-
tion in support for governance configurations. Respondents urged
that states be given increased policy control and that some other
entity such as NLETS, SEARCH Group or board be given policy and
enforcement powers. Table 4 on the following page presents the re-
sults of the OTA 1979 survey, showing the relationship between system
structure and policy control.
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Totals 15 7 7 4 i ]
SOURCE: OTA, 1982a: 1972.
NOTE: Forty- two states responding by telephone and/or mail to an
OTA survey conducted in mid-1979.
Political Constraints to Regulating Criminal
Justice Information Systems
The foregoing discussion has shown that it is now technically
possible to create a national, computerized criminal history record
system. In fact, the United States already has a national criminal
history network, partly manual and partly computerized, which includes
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(1) criminal records; (2) fingerprints and repository maintained by the
NCIC/IDENT and forty-nine state identification bureaus; (3) twenty-seven
state CCH files; and (4) an interstate exchange system utilizing the
U.S. mail, the NCIC and the NLETS communication networks. Thus, many
of the necessary elements of the computerized criminal history system
are already operational.
Nonetheless, there are several political factors which have
prevented the complete development of that system thus far. These
factors are important to examine in that they reflect larger political
issues and interests involved in the regulation of criminal justice
information systems:
1. Constitutional rights and discrimination--surveillance
potential
;
2. Law enforcement practices--the conduct of investigations
versus individual access to records;
3. Privacy versus the public right to know;
4. Separation of powers--executi ve regulation of the courts;
5. Federal ism--the balance of authority between federal, state
and local government;
6. System governance--system accountability and representation
processes; and
7. Record content, management and oversight.
Constitutional rights
and discrimination
There has been a longstanding concern by civil rights interests
that the creation of a national CCH might be used by law enforcement
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agencies-particularly the FBI, for monitoring or surveillance of lawful
activities of individuals and organizations. This concern was rein-
forced by revelations of FBI conduct of domestic political, intelligence
and surveillance activities against anti-Vietnam war leaders and groups.
In fact, the NCIC had been used for intelligence purposes for which it
had no Congressional authorization. Although the FBI has assured
critics that these practices were anomolous and have ceased, the Justice
Department and FBI have most recently (in September 1982) approved but
not yet implemented use of the NCIC/CCH for intelligence and surveil-
lance of persons judged by the U.S. Secret Service to represent a
potential threat to the President (OTA, 1982b: 25). The American Civil
Liberties Union, National Lawyers Guild, other civil liberties groups,
and those advocating a variety of political views critical of the
status quo who often use public demonstrations as a method of drama-
tizing their views, are strongly opposed to police collection of
intelligence on such activities and have steadfastly opposed the
expansion of the NCIC for this reason.
The investigation and intelligence applications of criminal
records also tend to have a discriminatory effect on minority popula-
tions, especially blacks. Studies in Philadelphia by Miller (1979)
and in California by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics (1981) show that
blacks are more likely than whites to be arrested and account for a
disproportionate number of releases without charges. Moreover, NCIC
records indicate that in 1980 blacks accounted for nearly 29 percent
of all records in this CCH file, almost triple the percentage of blacks
in the population (OTA, 1982a: 141-142).
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Private sector use of criminal history records in a wide
variety of employment and licensing decisions is of uncertain but
evidently extensive proportions. An American Bar Association survey
in 1974 identified 1,948 separate federal and state statutes governing
the licensing of persons with arrests or convictions (OTA, 1982a: 193).
Also, it has been estimated that between 40 and 80 percent of private
sector employers request criminal history information in job applica-
tions (Miller, 1979: 20-23). Federal Title 28 regulations now permit
dissemination of federal criminal history records if permitted by
state and local law. As Chapter III indicates, there are extensive
variations in state and local laws covering access to such information.
Yet, a SEARCH Group study (1981) suggests that access to such infor-
mation held by local police is rarely denied.
Limiting job opportunities on the basis of a criminal record
(especially a simple arrest without conviction) involves added punish-
ment for conduct for which the subject may have been vindicated. Thus,
in response to such issues of potential discrimination from the pre-
employment use of arrest records, state Human Rights Commissions, under
pressure from national black organizations such as the NAACP, Urban
League and local affiliates, have adopted state policies limiting the
use of such information.
Law enforcement practices
The implementation of criminal justice policy necessarily
involves reconciling conflicting values. For example, implementation
of Supreme Court civil liberties decisions has had to strike the
balance between the individuaTs right to fairness, due process and
effective law enforcement. Similarly, while the national CCH concept
greatly enhances records collection and exchange capabilities essential
to investigative activity, it also presents special problems of record
access, dissemination and confidentiality. While the national CCH
would facilitate an extensive exchange of criminal records between
state and local jurisdictions, the data subject must have access to
that data for the purposes of review and/or challenge and correction
of inaccurate information.
Law enforcement officials contend that data subject access to
criminal records should be limited to "rap" sheet information only.
This is so because access to a variety of intelligence information
would tend to undermine the efficacy of the investigative process.
Importantly, criminal history information retrieved from other juris-
dictions in the process of an investigation is considered privileged
and confidential (American Friends Service Committee, 1979-, and O'Toole
1978). The effect of this operating presumption is to deny access to
records pertaining to the data subject other than those originated by
the agency. Consequently, the data subject is unable to challenge or
correct erroneous information exchanged between criminal justice
agencies used as a basis for decision making. Civil liberties groups
oppose these limitations on an individual's access to his own record
in part because of their concern that information from inappropriate
police surveillance might be included in such files without the sub-
ject being aware of it.
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Privacy versus the public
right to know
Another contested issue which constrains efforts to limit access
to federal, state and local criminal history records is the conflict
between individual privacy and the public right to know. Policies for
the protection of privacy rights with respect to information systems
and other areas have been preceded by at least a decade of federal
policies designed to greatly enlarge the accessibility of governmental
records. It is therefore not surprising that efforts to limit certain
information made accessible to the public by prior policy would be
controversial. Given policies with cross-cutting objectives such as
these, the conditions of compliance are uncertain and policy success is
problematic (O'Brien, 1980).
The Menard decision (1971) and other similar cases involving
the adverse effects of the publication of inaccurate record information
underscored the need to control the dissemination of information
utilized in the administration of criminal justice. Federal and state
courts are divided, however, as to an appropriate policy response to
the problem. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Paul vs. Davis (1976) held
that police have a right to publicize a record of an official act, such
as an arrest, without exposing state or federal officials to law suits
for civil rights invasions. Accordingly, the fact that the record may
be incomplete does not constitute a prohibition to its dissemination
in accord with normal procedures. In its decision, therefore, the
Supreme Court clearly had to balance competing rights and chose to
weigh the public right to know more heavily in the balance.
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Tho press has been oru> int.ro-A which ha. consi.L.nLly pressed
for t.h. presumption in favor of disclosure of public records, especially
records of criminal proceedings. The press contends that, exercise of
its first amendment rights is necessarily curtailed by any recjulafions
limiting access to public records. Consequently, they have been
strongly opposed to any form ol regulations which bof.h limit access
and/or expose them to liable suits. As we see in Chapter III, the
press' interest in maintaining open access to and publication of
criminal records has undermined LEAA's attempt to implement a uniform
national policy limiting dissemination of criminal records.
Separation of powers
One of the persistent tensions in our constitutional form of
government is the maintenance of an independent judiciary, hv.. from
interference from executive or Congressional regulation. The develop-
ment of a national CCIl presents tensions in this doctrine.
The effectiveness of the national CCIl necessarily requires
substantial participation by courts in the timely submission of final
disposition information of state and federal repositories. However,
the separation of powers doctrine; has made attem|)ts to legislate court
participation in a national CCIl and observance of records management
regulations unsuccessful. While local trial courts are dependent upon
information generated by pol ice and prosecutors for a variety of
decisions, state and local courts have proceeded with caution with
respect to enlarging participation in state and local criminal justice
information systems which entail executive erosion of judicial
independence. Thus far, although state court interests (e.g., the
National Center for State Courts) have not opposed the development of
a national CCH, they have not been supportive of federal policies
which involve regulation of courts using the NCIC or other criminal
justice information systems. Moreover, efforts by state courts to
develop integrated information systems for trial courts have not been
particularly successful in mandating participation in such information
technological reforms.
Federal i sm
The formulation and implementation of federal policy typically
Invites conflict over the acceptable balance of authority between
federal, state and local governments. The attempt to develop a
national policy for the collection, exchange and dissemination of
criminal history records is no exception.
First, tradition dictates that the criminal justice system is
highly decentralized both in political and functional terms. Like
education, law enforcement and the administration of criminal justice
is considered a matter of local control; leadership of most of the
major elements of local criminal justice (e.g., police, prosecutors
and courts) is selected through general elections. Thus, criminal
justice officials represent diverse and overlapping constituencies.
The relative political independence of each component sustains and
reinforces differences in perspective on appropriate policy responses
to crime, and thus limits the efficacy of federal policy intervention.
Efforts to create a national CCH imply a centralization of regulatory
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authority over state and local law enforcement and other criminal
justice agencies which heretofore has not existed. Moreover, law
enforcement interests do not constitute a monolithic or unitary
political force. Federal, state and local law enforcement interests
are often divided on policy issues which require consensus on gover-
nance and management because of strong differences over functional
responsibilities, roles, jurisdiction, and so forth.
Second, the development of a national criminal information
exchange system necessitates increased state authority and/or enforce-
ment of policy which presents some novelty for most states. Only four
states now exercise any regulatory control over criminal justice
activities including information system processes (Skoler, 1977). it
is not entirely clear what role state and local elected officials should
assume under a national CCH and what agency or agencies should assume an
enforcement or oversight role. Moreover, it is not self evident how
uniform policy might take shape under conditions of state decentraliza-
tion in criminal justice leadership. For unlike the relationship
between federal and state courts, criminal justice agencies are not
clearly linked in either a formal or informal hierarchical structure.
Thus, the configuration of the criminal justice system and power con-
flicts pose important constraints to the implementation and enforcement
of a national CCH.
System governance
Not only does the national CCH pose problems for federalism,
but it raises issues central to democratic governance processes. One
of the difficulties involved in the regulation of criminal justice
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information systems is to find an appropriate regulatory authority.
Since its participation in the development of a national CCH, SEARCH
Group, (a major contractor and consultant to LEAA) has promoted a two-
tier governance system. The first tier would consist of representa-
tives from each of the fifty states to constitute a governance body
with authority to make policy decisions and enforce compliance with
national standards. The representatives would be appointed by state
governors and would not necessarily have law enforcement backgrounds.
The second tier would consist of independent state commissions
with responsibility for state policy development, regulation and
enforcement of national and state criminal justice information system
standards, including privacy. Other functions of state boards might
include audit responsibility, appellate review of disputed record
challenges, and coordination of standards with other state information
systems. The state board or commission would be broadly representative
of public and private sector interests including law enforcement.
LEAA (along with liberal academics and civil liberties groups)
has generally favored the SEARCH Group proposals and has consequently
strongly advocated that states consider an independent commission as
the preferred alternative to other approaches such as state law
enforcement agencies. This approach, however, has not gained much
support from either state executives and legislatures nor from state
and local law enforcement officials. In an era of deregulation and
greatly reduced public intervention, with few exceptions (e.g.,
California, Massachusetts) governors have been reluctant to create
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new commissions, especially when conflict with law enforcement interests
is a likely consequence.
State law enforcement is not eager to surrender even partial
jurisdiction over state standards to non-criminal justice interests.
Likewise, local criminal justice officials are not eager to see the
enlargement of state regulation, regardless of its source or composition.
Finally, the FBI considers the two-tier concept to be inimical
to its interests as a national investigative agency whose responsibil-
ities include policy leadership in criminal justice and maintenance of
a strong moral authority in the eyes of state and local law enforcement.
Record content, manage-
ment and oversight
Any national CCH system must necessarily include guidelines for
record management processes by users, establish limits to file size and
content, establish standards for record quality and oversight for audit
mechanisms. Such guidelines are essential to ensure the integrity,
security and privacy of criminal history record information.
Record management procedures include file structure, data
collection and maintenance practices, exchange and dissemination pro-
cedures, monitoring and transaction logs and so forth. There is little
uniformity across criminal justice agencies in jurisdictions with
respect to record management practice. Consequently, the interstate
transmission of criminal record information involves potentially wide
variations in the care and restrictiveness with which it is maintained
and utilized. LEAA grants have been used to support greater standard-
ization but with only limited success, in part because standardization
41
was considered equivalent to centralization of policy control (Folan
and Lettre, 1981 )
.
Also, agreement must be reached among federal, state and local
law enforcement groups and national civil liberties groups as to the
size and content of a national criminal history record file. Numerous
alternatives have been identified and assessed by OTA (1982a), but
there is little agreement on these proposals. File size would be
dictated by the system configuration or structure (i.e., national
repository versus index). For example, if a national CCH is limited
to violent and serious offenders, file size would be approximately
8.6 million records, whereas a national index consisting of federal
and single-state, multi-state offenders would be 20.5 million. Gener-
ally, the larger the size of the national files, the greater the
likelihood of problems of record quality (i.e., inaccuracy and in-
completeness). Consequently, technical issues such as these necessarily
involve unresolved political issues. For this reason, and given the
greater potential for surveillance that a larger file size entails,
civil liberties and minority group interests have generally opposed
enlarging the NCIC along the lines of a national repository or utiliza-
tion of an FBI-controlled message switching service between the states.
System audit mechanisms are also necessary but again, political
factors limit consideration of approaches which ensure adequate control.
The GAO has most recently been proposed by OTA for nationwide audit
responsibility, but criminal justice interests contend that outside
auditors lack expertise, necessitate security clearances and are unable
to guarantee confidentiality of findings.
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Structure of Analysis
According to the policy implementation literature there are a
number of variables which strongly influence the likelihood of
compliance to policies originated by legislatures or courts. Chapter
II consists of a review of that literature and alternative conceptual
frameworks with which to understand the relative significance of
factors influencing state and local implementation processes.
In Chapter III, national data is presented to identify patterns
of state policy response to the criminal records privacy regulations
(Title 28) and effects on records quality and management processes.
Chapters IV through VI consist of a case study of state guideline
development and implementation processes in Washington state. The case
study identifies interests involved and other factors influencing state
performance which contribute to an explanation of national patterns of
state response.
Finally, Chapter VII develops and assesses alternative explana-
tions of the Washington case and identifies common factors influencing
the politics of state implementation of court and legislative policy.
Introduction to the
Washington case
Chapters IV through VI consist of a case study which documents
how the federal criminal records privacy mandate was converted into
state policy; how guidelines were subsequently developed; how imple-
mentation occurred and how state and local criminal justice agency
practice was affected. Chapter IV focuses principally on the role of
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state officials, the state planning agency and other interests involved
in the passage of comprehensive state legislation. Chapter V examines
the guideline development process in some detail, focusing particularly
on interests and factors involved in a committee review process by which
federal policy was translated into state guidelines. Then, Chapter VI
examines the impact upon state and local criminal justice organizations
and interests and their response. The case documents factors precipi-
tating subsequent efforts to bring about legislative amendments and
regulatory revisions.
The case study covers the time period from late 1976, when a
state security and privacy plan was developed along with draft legisla-
tion, to the summer of 1981, over a year after the State Patrol assumed
regulatory authority for administering the law. The significance of
this interval resides in the fact that during this time two different
state agencies (the State Planning Agency and State Patrol) exercised
administrative authority and thus two different processes and versions
of state guidelines resulted. The period under investigation involves
events covering two different presidential and gubernatorial administra-
tions (in Washington) and two different implementing agencies (the SPA
exercised administrative authority from 1977-1979, at which time the
State Patrol assumed administrative control).
The reconstruction of the legislative, guideline development
and implementation processes is based, in part, upon this author's
personal observations and recollections as a participant in these
processes from 1976 through 1978. From 1976 to 1977, I served as a
staff member to the Governor's Committee on Law and Justice, through
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the State Planning Agency (SPA), and developed long range plans and
standards for information systems. In 1977, I was involved in the
legislative process which then passed state legislation implementing
the Title 28 privacy regulations. Subsequently, I was appointed by
the Governor's Committee as administrator of the Security and Privacy
Program with responsibility for guideline development and implementa-
tion. Thus. I have drawn upon personal experience, official documents,
correspondence and other state records for documentation and corrobora-
tion of events.
During 1980 and 1981, I conducted a series of twenty-two
intensive interviews with criminal justice and other officials and
individuals not only to help reconstruct processes involved in state
implementation and their effects but to probe factors of particular
interest to this study. Those factors included perceptions of federal
and state policy objectives, attitudes towards regulatory requirements,
expectations about and actual effects of the law and regulations on
existing practice, and consequences for inter-agency and state-local
relationships. The following criteria were utilized in the selection
of interview respondents: (1) participation in and familiarity with
state guideline development processes; (2) position and influence in
state and local criminal justice agencies and professional associa-
tions; (3) institutional and geographic representativeness; and (4) non-
criminal justice interests familiar with and involved in the development
and implementation of the policy. When I report information from these
Interviews in Chapters IV through VI, publicly known officials are
identified by name and title, otherwise I refer to individuals only
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by their general region, position, role or relationship to the Security
and Privacy program in order to protect their anonymity.
There are some potential sources of bias in utilizing this
approach. My participation in both legislative and implementation
processes may inhibit the candidness and truthfulness of the responses.
However, this difficulty was circumvented in part for the following
reasons: my involvement in the program terminated in 1978; the State
Patrol has subsequently assumed administrative control (February 1979);
the controversy surrounding passage of the law has grown dormant; and
federal enforcement action has slackened considerably with substantial
reduction in LEAA funded activity. In addition, this study sought an
explanation, not an evaluation, of performance (a potentially less
threatening focus) with potential technical assistance benefits to the
criminal justice community. Also, the interviews did not require, in
most instances, departmental approval and confidentiality of the re-
sponses was maintained where requested.
The case approach
The case study approach is a useful strategy when complex
phenomena must be examined in real world contexts. The state imple-
mentation of a federal mandate presents such a context for there are
numerous factors and interests at work which shape responses, ultimate
outcomes and impacts of federal policy. A study limited solely to
available data on patterns of national compliance would not provide a
sufficient basis by which to explain why things happen the way they
did. The processes by which policy gets implemented are perhaps best
understood through a case study approach because it is extremely
difficult to separate or distinguish between the factors influencing
implementation and the context in which they operate or interact.
Although it may be difficult to precisely assign causal relations be-
tween factors, case analysis facilitates construction and testing of
alternative explanations (Yin, 1981).
To be sure, there are inherent weaknesses to a case approach.
First, the number of variables involved in implementation processes
can be extremely large, thus limiting analytical precision. This
aspect requires selectivity and qualitative judgment in assigning
significance to variables affecting outcomes. Such problems can be
dealt with by utilizing retrospective interviews to reconstruct key
events in ways which identify factors suggesting a common explanation.
Second, an analysis of one state's response, although suggestiv
of similar factors producing national patterns of state response, does
not provide an exclusive explanation of such patterns. There may be
factors idiosyncratic to the Washington case which limit applicability
to an explanation of national performance. Thus, the findings of the
case are limited to other states whose experience is most comparable
with respect to statutory approach, technological capacity, and other
features. However, in conjunction with nationwide data, the case
approach provides depth to enrich our understanding of the political
significance of national patterns.
CHAPTER II
ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL POLICY
STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATIVE
AND JUDICIAL MANDATES
The conventional wisdom of the policy implementation literature
holds that there are several conditions conducive to effective (success-
ful) implementation and compliance. Such conditions are generally held
to be invariable regardless of the policy characteristics, nature of
the policy system, organizational structure and implementing environment.
Therefore, this chapter begins with a brief review and assessment of
these factors which include: minimal threat of change, clarity of
mandate, support of state and local elites, and possibility of
enforcement.
Next, the comparison of state responses to legislative and court
policy to regulate the administration of criminal justice may help to
determine the potential relevance of these factors to the criminal
justice system. Supreme Court policies regulating law enforcement
(specifically the Mapp and Miranda decisions) provide this study with
the closest policy analogs with which to understand the politics of
implementation of criminal records privacy policy.
A study of the effects of Supreme Court criminal procedures
policy on lower courts, especially state courts, contributes to our
understanding of the significance of guideline development as a factor
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which influences implementation processes and subsequent outcomes. The
fact that state courts and administrative agencies both exercise similar
supplementary rule-making functions suggests a potentially fruitful
avenue of exploration of the relative capacities of courts and legis-
latures to influence implementation. Studies of the Map£ and Miranda
decisions, for example, have focused upon the supplementary policy
making functions that state courts employ to translate Supreme Court
policy into state practice (Canon, 1973; 1977; Manwaring, 1972; Romans,
1974; Tarr, 1977).
This comparative analysis necessarily focuses upon state courts
and legislative-bureaucratic policy makers/impl ementers because state
courts and, in most cases, state legislatures and administrative
agencies are the intermediate recipients of intergovernmental policy.
The factors which shape state officials' responses to policy enunciated
by their federal superiors in the intergovernmental system may have
important consequences for the way that policy is understood and
interpreted as well as transmitted and communicated to lower level
impl ementers.
Legislatures and courts do differ fundamentally with respect
to processes by which polices are made. Also, courts and legislatures
exhibit other differences as well, such as organizational structure,
and implementing environment. However, an exhaustive review of
similarities and differences between the institutions originating
these civil liberties decisions and the criminal records privacy
mandate is neither necessary nor desireable. Such a comparison is
unnecessary because what we wish to learn from the civil liberties
are
policies, which happen to be Court-initiated, is what they suggest
the salient factors and interests involved in the implementation of
policies assigned to regulate the administration of criminal justice.
In addition, the desireabil ity of such an approach is questionable
because of the likelihood that the inquiry would become preoccupied
with invidious comparisons of strengths and weaknesses of institutional
policy-making capacities. While efforts of this kind are illuminating
about potential policy boundaries between courts and legislatures
(see Baum. 1981; Horowitz. 1977; Youngblood and Folse, 1981), they tell
us little about political factors shaping the responses of criminal
justice officials to federal policies. Moreover, as Baum asserts:
The difficulties involved in the implementation of judicial
policies are far from unique. If problems of implementation
are common in the judiciary, these problems are chiefly the
result not of special conditions in the judicial system but
Of the universal weaknesses of organizational superiors(Baum, 1976a: 108-109). [Emphasis added.]
Therefore, a review of state responses to and effects of these two
important civil liberties decisions may be suggestive of the likely
results of the state implementation of a Congressional mandate advancin
similar objectives.
What the ensuing analysis of state responses to the Supreme
Court civil liberties policy suggests is that elite support and willing
ness to enforce compliance are significant factors involved in the
implementation of a national policy designed to regulate the administra
tion of criminal justice. These factors appear to account for
significant variations in compliance between states. This is not to
say that the other factors are unimportant. The extent of change
appears to have a secondary, but nonetheless important relationship
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to elite support and local compliance while policy clarity and
specificity have, if anything, precisely an inverse relationship to
compliance and change.
Finally, the chapter concludes with a review of recent
conceptual frameworks advanced to show the relationships among the
factors identified above and other variables influencing the implemen-
tation of policy in the federal system. Such frameworks seek to
provide the basis for explanatory theories of policy implementation
processes. As such, they attempt to specify causal relationships
between factors likely to increase compliance regardless of differences
in characteristics of policy systems, organizational structure and
process and implementing environments.
Common Conditions of Effective Implementation
Minimal threat of change
Most of the implementation literature holds that judicial and
legislative policies which involve extensive change are less likely to
be effectively implemented than those in which change is minimal.
Significantly, while courts may be less constrained than legislatures
by political-environmental factors in making rulings involving profound
social change, they are no less affected by problems in implementation.
Policies which involve extensive change but low goal consensus
are more likely to encounter difficulties in implementation than
policies with little change and high goal consensus (Van Meter and
Van Horn, 1975). This is so because policy is largely a product of
incremental decisions; current policies build on past ones deviating
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only slightly from prior goals and practices. Legislative policies
involving extensive institutional change require an enormous amount
of initial public support and continuous special interest support
over time to ensure they are faithfully and effectively executed.
This support is especially vulnerable to dissipation over time and
subsequent erosion of initial statutory success is a likely byproduct
(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981).
Unlike legislative policy, court decisions can involve exten-
sive change with little public support. Therefore, implementation
processes depend less on interest group support over time than on
other factors internal to the judicial process and organizational
context into which the decisions are injected (Baum, 1981).
Regardless of these important institutional differences, the
amount of change does have a bearing on the extent of compliance.
There are at least three factors which reinforce the importance of
change in influencing policy outcomes. These factors include:
complexity of organizational process involved, stability of the policy
system, and the values, attitudes and expectations of impl ementers
.
First, policies which entail extensive organizational change
and interorganizational coordination are likely to be perceived by
implementers as involving more extensive change than those minimizing
such effects (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Even policies involving
high goal consensus are likely to be ineffective if they also require
organizational change.
Next, policies involving policy systems characterized by
instability and fluctuation will generally be less capable of
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effectively implementing policy involving extensive change than systems
which are stable and tightly coupled (Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein,
1976). This is so because consensus and decision making processes are
more likely to be weak in "loosely-coupled" systems than in those which
are not. Extensive bargaining and compromise is necessary before
policies can reach execution stage with the predictable result that
as the policy nears the execution stage, ambiguity replaces clarity
and specificity.
Finally, the values, attitudes and expectations of implementers
can be important factors influencing the extent of policy change. If
implementers do not share values underlying a decision or statute,
perceived changes are likely to be greater than if policy values are
compatible with implementers" beliefs. Moreover, policies involving
extensive change of values may affect the intensity with which the
policy is supported or opposed by target groups. Policies involving
extensive change which produce intense opposition are less likely to
be effectively implemented than those involving neutrality or more
weak opposition (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975). Expectations also
affect the way the magnitude of change is characterized. For example,
court decisions which are not anticipated by target groups may produce
greater expectations of change than decisions and trends which build
slowly over time (Wasby, 1970). Importantly, regardless of the actual
amount of change, policies can produce expectations about policy out-
comes which differ markedly from actual effects.
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Unambiguous mandate
Another tenet of successful implementation is that the policy
objectives should be stated clearly, intended behavior identified and
performance specified (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Mazmanian and
Sabatier, 1981).
Clarity of policy is important for three reasons. It tells
implementers what is expected of them and provides a way to deter
deliberate distortion or misrepresentation by those seeking to evade
compliance. In addition, an unambiguous policy provides a resource
to supporters of the policy (i.e., clients and special interests) to
influence implementation processes (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981).
Judicial opinions are somewhat more limited than statutes in
the potential for clarity. While statutes provide general rules for
action, judicial decisions typically justify certain acts and there-
fore are deliberately narrow in scope. Little is said about alterna-
tive behavior.
However, the complexity of legislative processes and necessity
for compromise make intentional vagueness and delegated discretion
inevitable elements of statutes (Van Horn, 1979). To the extent that
both courts and legislatures face similar problems of complexity,
intermediate and lower level implementers are given responsibility for
the development of more detailed guidelines to provide the clarity
lacking in original policy (Baum, 1981).
Further, clarity of policy affects the processes by which
policy is transmitted from superiors to subordinates. In this respect,
courts are less able than legislatures to control the way decisions are
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transmitted. Courts are more dependent upon communication processes
controlled by numerous participants in the judicial process (Wasby.
1970; 1973). Consequently, clarity is essential to limit vulnerability
to distortion by lower level implementers
. In contrast, the special
difficulties legislatures face concern loss of control over guideline
development processes to federal and state agency implementers. Thus,
the exercise of oversight powers is essential to obtain feedback as to
bureaucratic fidelity to legislative intent.
Supportive state and local elites
Next, initial and continuous support by state and local elites
is crucial to effective implementation of federal policy. There are
two sources from which elite support may emerge to influence compliance
processes: (1) governors, legislators, judges and local elected
officials; and (2) state and local agency administrators.
State and local elite support is especially important to the
success of a federal intergovernmental policy because such officials
exercise more direct control over agency resources and activities.
Conflicting policy objectives from federal and state sources are most
likely to undermine compliance with federal policy (Mazmanian and
Sabatier, 1981). While support for federal programs over time is
determined largely by national political forces, strong initial support
for state adoption and compliance is especially crucial to short term
success. A "fixer" (a legislator or executive official who controls
resources important to the program) should be readily available to
intervene on a continuous basis in order to protect the program from
destruction (Bardach, 1977a). In this regard, in recent years the
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devolution of decision making to state and local elected officials
has been urged as a strategy to increase elite support by strengthening
accountability and representation processes at state and local levels.
Another way in which state executives and legislators can
influence policy implementation processes is through their power to
interpret policy intent and objectives to lower level implementers.
Such interpretations can decisively influence attitudes of subordinates
in the policy system. As Dolbeare and Hammond (1971) found, elite
predispositions toward a policy can reinforce misinterpretations of
policy in which the lack of positive action is rationalized away.
In addition to state executives and other state officials,
state and local agency administrators with direct responsibility for
implementation can influence the degree of compliance. Federal policies
which create new agencies and organizational processes by which policy
is implemented are more likely to achieve initial policy objectives
because implementers may be chosen who are supportive of the aims and
statutory purposes. In addition, agency administrators must be skill-
ful in the use of resources and mobilization of interest group support
to persuade sovereigns to continue to support efforts towards com-
pliance. If these skills are lacking little success can be expected
in securing compliance (Rourke, 1976).
One final factor significant in determining whether support
of agency administrators will occur is the extent to which statutory
goals are consistent or compatible with their utilities or preference
rankings (Brown and Stover, 1977). Policies which impose costs with
little payoff for administrators with respect to continued interest
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group support and long term agency survival will find little support,
so non-compliance becomes an acceptable alternative.
Enforcement possible
As Richard Neustadt declares, decisions are not "self-
executing" and policies adopted by legislatures and courts are no
exception (I960). Any policy will encounter some indifference or
resistance which must be overcome to achieve goals and objectives.
Therefore, effective policy implementation requires that some means
be available to ensure that intended policy objectives get implemented.
Here, the implementation of legislative and court-originated policy
differs in a fundamental respect. Legislative policy objectives are
primarily enforced through an inducement system in which conditions are
attached to grants of aid. In contrast, courts must rely primarily
upon sanctions to enforce compliance to its decisions.
Inducement and sanction systems differ in important respects.
The allocation of resources is intended to make compliance to policy
more attractive; the benefits of compliance are meant to outweigh the
costs. Factors likely to affect the efficacy of policy inducements
to increase compliance include policy salience and support, relative
deprivation of loss of funds and likelihood of actually suffering
the loss of funds.
Sanctions, on the other hand, are meant to make a negative
response less attractive. Sanctions increase the cost of non-compliance
without altering the benefits of compliance (Baum, 1976a: Brown and
Stover, 1977). To be effective, sanctions must entail the threat of
substantial loss and credibility of use; that is, the recipient must
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value the object forfeited and must perceive that the sanction is
Hkely to be inflicted for non-compliance. Factors likely to affect
the credibility of the sanction and likelihood of compliance there-
fore, include zone of acceptance, intensity of enforcers' demand
(Krislov, 1971); number of target groups affected (Brown and Stover,
1977); and number and intensity of groups willing to challenge
Officials for non-compliance (Brown and Stover, 1977; Scheingold, 1982).
There are several means available to legislatures to enforce
compliance with policy decisions. Obviously, one of the most important
is the control over and potential withdrawal of federal funds for non-
compliance. Another is the direct intervention by superiors in the
activities of subordinates. Yet, such direct means are rarely employed
and in fact, need not be because there are a variety of other indirect
but effective approaches to achieving compliance (Van Meter and Van
Horn, 1975).
The statute itself constitutes an important source of leverage
to legislators and bureaucrats to enable enforcement. New agencies
may be created or existing ones designated for policy execution that
are sympathetic to the policy objectives, likely to build professional
and client alliances and pursue aggressive agendas. Decision rules of
implementing agencies (e.g., grant allocation formulas and regulatory
procedures) can also be structured to minimize veto points and ensure
organizational consistency with intended objectives (Mazmanian and
Sabtatier, 1981).
In addition, grant-in-aid programs secure advance compliance
by requiring detailed plans for the administration and allocation of
funds. Along with plans, detailed guidelines may be promulgated to
carefully specify eligible expenditures, intergovernmental and inter-
agency responsibilities and relationships, reporting requirements and
other areas (Van Horn. 1979). Regulatory intrusiveness may therefore
be an important surrogate for the direct hierarchical control lacking
in a federal system involving decentralization of power and state and
local autonomy (Nieman and Lovell, 1981).
Finally, exchange strategies which try to maximize shared
values between superiors and subordinates can also be an important
substitute for approaches based upon power-dependence (Gray and
Williams, 1980). Funding can be used to foster policy innovation and
demonstration projects designed to cultivate mutual support for change.
Moreover, to the extent that state and local officials can be encour-
aged to address common problems through federal initiatives, the need
for active enforcement is diminished. Thus, recent federal policies
have emphasized the strengthening of state and local relations under
revenue sharing in order to devolve accountability and thus, enforce-
ment to lower levels of power.
Recent studies of state court policy making in the aftermath
of the Warren Court suggest that states have assumed increased leader-
ship in extending Supreme Court-originated rights protections into
other areas. Therefore, it is contended, decentralization of policy
making to state courts is likely to increase the prospects of further
alignment and enforcement of state policy with constitutional requisites
In this respect, the devolution of decision making to state courts is
considered a key factor in increasing the possibility of enforcement
(Porter and Tarr, 1982)
.
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Implementing Mapp and Miranda
In its decisions on Mapp vs. Ohio in 1961 and Miranda vs.
Arizona in 1966, the Supreme Court enunciated national guidelines for
police observance of suspects' and defendants' due process rights which
have had far reaching political implications. Civil liberties groups
hailed the rulings as a significant step towards curbing police power
and abuses while criminal justice interests and other sympathetic public
officials decried them for undermining effective law enforcement. The
decisions also precipitated controversy between states-rights propo-
nents and interests advocating a thoroughgoing federalization of civil
rights policy. Therefore, a brief review of the decisions is necessary
in order to understand the political environment surrounding the
implementation of these Supreme Court policies.
The Miranda ruling involves an attempt to specify the conditions
under which a suspect's statements may be considered voluntary. Unless
certain designated warnings have been given to a suspect by police
(e.g., the right to remain silent, have an attorney present during
interrogation) the statements cannot be considered voluntary and thus
cannot be introduced as evidence by the prosecutor.
In addition, Miranda requires that officers take positive
actions to acknowledge suspects' rights. The warnings are to be in-
corporated as an integral part of the formal process by which an
offender is taken from arrest to final adjudication. In most circum-
stances, suspects must be given an opportunity to exercise or waive
Miranda rights at the point at which they are taken into custody. Thus,
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the Miranda ruling does not alter police roles or functional activities;
rather, it establishes limits on how far the fact-finding process may
proceed before an individual is given an opportunity to withdraw from
further involvement in that process.
The Miranda decision is a model of clarity and specificity,
providing little leverage for alternative state court interpretations.
Police use of confessions as investigative tools is clearly discour-
aged. Moreover, the warnings are not to be employed in a perfunctory
or ritualistic way but given in "unequivocal terms" (Milner, 1971a: 40).
The Mapp decision applied the so-called exclusionary rule for
searches and seizures to law enforcement officials in states, holding
that illegally seized evidence could not be used in state criminal
proceedings. In contrast to Miranda
, the Mapp decision involves not a
positive but a negative injunction; police are not to collect evidence
through methods contrary to the right to privacy, and courts are not to
admit evidence which involves use of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Some observers see the Mapp decision primarily as an attempt
to deter police abuse of investigative powers. In contrast, others
advise a broader reading of Mapp as a rule to guide judicial decisions
regarding admissibility of evidence and the adjudication of guilt or
innocence of the accused (Horowitz, 1977). But it is not altogether
clear why Mapp must be considered either a regulation of police or
lower court conduct but not both. Moreover, understanding both Mapp
and Mi randa decisions as an extension of the supervisory responsibility
state courts have over trial court procedure suggests the importance
of their leadership in securing police compliance.
What is common therefore, to both decisions is that the Court
determined that the credibility and fairness of trial outcomes was
seriously undermined by admitting evidence or testimony secured by
police in fact finding processes which involved unreasonable invasions
of individual privacy or coercive custodial environments. The Court
clearly attempted to advance at least two objectives by this decision.
First, the Supreme Court intended that the police not only
discontinue certain practices associated with investigation such as
warrantless searches and custodial interrogation but expected police
to devise other methods by which evidence could be collected.
Second, the lower courts were expected to utilize these
policies as standards governing decisions on admissibility of evidence
and, significantly, with Mapp judges were expected to directly par-
ticipate in decisions regarding the need and appropriateness of the
issuance of search warrants. Thus, the policies involved structural
implications; courts are directly implicated in a supervisory function
which expands their responsibilities in the criminal justice process.
The methodologies employed to determine the impact of the
Supreme Court civil liberties decisions vary in significant ways.
Scholarly opinion is consequently strongly divided about the results
and efficacy of the decisions, especially in the case of Mapp
. No
attempt is made here to participate in this debate. Rather, I have
tried to draw broadly from representative studies in the literature in





What Is striking about initial responses of criminal justice
officials to the Ma££, and Miranda decisions is the common expectation
that if Implemented, they would result in extensive, adverse change
in the conduct and outcomes of the criminal justice process. The
observance of defendant's rights was expected to constrain law
enforcement investigative functions. Impede effective prosecution
and produce judicial outcomes contrary to findings of factual guilt.
Subsequent studies suggest, however, that these beliefs or perceptions
were greatly exaggerated; the actual effects of the policies have
varied substantially from initial expectations.
Although the response by the criminal justice community was
largely negative and consistent with public opinion, neither decision
was unexpected by criminal justice officials. Twenty-two state courts
had already adopted some form of the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp
.
Moreover, federal courts had been operating under the rule since
Weeks in 1914. Yet, interestingly, police in states operating under
the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp perceived greater disruption of
existing practice (Murphy, 1966). Pre- Mapp rule states also showed a
greater likelihood towards non-compliance than non-rule states,
although compliance would be unlikely to involve much policy change
for pre- Mapp rule states.
The Miranda decision also was preceded by several prior Supreme
Court decisions involving a gradual but unmistakeable enlargement of
defendants' due process protections. Miranda simply consolidated the
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several Incremental steps the Court had already taken to ensure adequate
and uniform due process protections in the states. In fact, the deci-
sion seems to have been better anticipated by police than Escopedo
(Wasby. 1970: 155). Yet once the complete panoply of defendants-
rights was fully specified and embodied in a concrete procedure, the
perceived extent of change was greatly magnified.
Studies of the impact of Ma££ and Miranda generally suggest
that expected effects were greatly overdrawn. Changes have occurred
but not necessarily in either intended or anticipated directions.
Formal compliance does not carry the onerous consequences expected by
police and prosecutors, nor do the decisions appear to close avenues
available to bypass or evade compliance (Baum, 1979; Wasby, 1970).
The issuance of Miranda warnings, for example, has not endangered the
likelihood of conviction (see Seeburger and Wettick, 1967; Wald et al.,
1967). And both decisions have generally revealed the resilience,
adaptiveness and pervasiveness of informal practices (e.g., plea
bargaining) which limit policies designed to formalize procedures and
structure discretion (Horowitz, 1977). In this regard, the Miranda
decision, more so than Ma££, lends itself to literal compliance.
These findings underscore the limited behavioral change required
to achieve compliance, yet the general lack of efficacy in achieving
desired objectives. The importance of the decisions for our under-
standing of the relationship between extent of change and compliance
therefore suggests that policies may impose cognitive costs for role
bearers who must comply with policies for which they have no underlying
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belief or support. The actual extent of behavioral change necessitated
to achieve policy compliance may be far less important in determining
policy efficacy than the extent of dissonance resulting from compliance





One of the novel attributes of the Supreme Court civil liberties
decisions, contributing no doubt to the general image of profound policy
change, was the attempt to specify police and trial court behavior in
detailed terms. In this regard, the Miranda decision constituted a
model of clarity and precision, atypical of most court decisions as
well as legislative policy. In addition, both policies were clearly
intended to minimize the variations in state court criminal defendant
guidelines and limit the leverage lower level implementers might have
to either evade, avoid or fail to comply with the policies.
Studies of the impact of these Court-originated policies suggest
however that there may be an inverse relationship between the extent of
policy concreteness and compliance. The attempt to limit the leverage
of lower level implementers by making procedural adoption unavoidable
may make change in informal processes especially likely to sustain non-
compliance. Policies limited to procedural objectives may increase the
probability of perfunctory responses and thus limit the probability of
change in actual performance.
The Mapp and Miranda policies offer contrasting profiles of
compliance which strongly suggest that Miranda has resulted in patterns
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of literal and perfunctory compliance while the l.v. pn.:i.... Maj,p rulin,
has produced differential responses (Bauin, l')/-)). while the majority
of police may now be using the Miranda warnings
.
they have developed
a variety of subtle, informal methods by which to adapt to Miranda and
avoid its consequences. The tight focus of the decision on discrete
point in the investigative process has evidently invited exploitation
of marginal situations in which custody is ambiguous. In contrast,
the exclusionary rule, given the absence of procedural prescription
has produced far more uncertainty among police and others about the
likelihood that non-compliance will go unnoticed or unchallenged.
Compliance to Maj.jj is therefore dictated largely by the nature of the
case and the importance of obtaining a conviction (Canon, iq74a).
When response to the civil liberties decisions is enlarged to
include the prosecutorial stage, compliance is more problematic. The
informal practice of plea bargaining is pervasive in the criminal
justice process. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of cases are
disposed of through guilty pleas. There are in fact, a variety of ways
in which prosecutors may deal with problems of evidence; compared to
these alternatives, the likelihood that a case will go to trial, involve
a successful motion to supress evidence and lead to sanctions ol police
practices is rather slim (Horowitz, 1977).
In addition to these problems, unambiguous Court-originated
policy mandates have not produced uniform state court rulings. There
are, in fact, a number of ways in which stat(} courts may respond to
Supreme Court policy. Many such responses are not clearly categorized
as either compliant or non-compliant. State courts in some insLarices
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have chosen to qualify, limit or even expand Supreme Court civil
liberties policies (Kramer and Riga, 1982). The specificity of the
Mij::anda decision has, for example, produced state court responses which
clearly divide along ideological lines (Romans, 1974) and show wide
variations in the scope of permissible behavior defined to fall inside
or outside interrogation policy guidelines (Cimino, 1973). Moreover,
occasions of state court non-compliance appear related less to clarity
and substance of policy than to the importance of state practices they
seek to invalidate. State courts are less likely to comply when long
standing state practices are threatened (Tarr, 1977).
Finally, the communication of Court-originated policies
undergoes distortion in their transmission from superiors to subor-
dinates. It is not evident, however, that policy clarity contributes
to more effective transmission processes. Clear policies are just as
vulnerable to distortion as unclear ones, particularly if they are
controversial as was the case with Miranda
. Press reports of the
^"irdnda rules greatly oversimplified the policy and often failed to
report how it affected the interrogation process (Wasby, 1973). More-
over, how Miranda was understood by police depended primarily upon the
source interpreting it. Milner (1971a) reported significant variations
in police understanding of Miranda in terms of source. Significantly,
he discovered that departmental sources were more likely to involve
greater distortion than those outside the department.
Differential support by elites
State court justices are potentially important Intermediaries
1n determining the way Supreme Court decisions are implemented at the
state and local level. Most state courts now have authority to
supervise trial court behavior through adoption of rules and through
enunciation of guidelines resulting from review of trial court cases.
Therefore, state court review of trial court decisions provides two
important vehicles by which state courts may influence state and local
Implementation of Supreme Court decisions. State court opinions may
be used to express support or opposition to policies implied by Court
decisions and such decisions may help commence a process by which
additional state court policies emerge. While it is clear that state
courts have undertaken a more activist posture over the last two
decades (Porter and Tarr, 1982). few studies are available which care-
fully document precisely how much Influence state court rulings
interpreting Supreme Court policy have in determining lower level
responses and ultimate policy outcomes. The few studies that do focus
on this issue, although unable so far to establish a direct causal
relationship between state court decisions and directions of local
response, do provide evidence of the importance of state and trial
courts' support for a Supreme Court policy.





controversy among national, state and local elected officials. State
courts were no exception. Canon (1974b) discovered that "organiza-
tional contumacy" was widespread. Canon defined Instances of contumacy
to consist of attempts to express defiance, disobedience or resistance
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to court policy through tactics which include adoption of strained
interpretations, expressions of confusion and other means of delaying
implementation.
Significantly, the most frequently expressed criticism of both
decisions pertained to their adverse implications for effective law
enforcement. State courts showed considerable sympathy for police
and strongly sided with law enforcement values. As Canon observes:
Those taking this approach seem to identify less with
va ues ascribed to the courts in determining co s^U tional
0974b: 61).' ''''' ''''''' the Judiciary
Thus, state court contumacy may provide an important source
of political symbolism injected into the arena of state politics.
Given the widespread negative public reaction to Ma££ and Miranda,
perhaps state courts found it necessary to shield themselves from the
inevitable political repercussions likely to ensue from the necessity
of complying with decisions of judicial superiors. Such cues create
expectations among prosecutors and police that Supreme Court policy is
being implemented under protest and that actual enforcement may be
unl i kely.
We also know a great deal about prosecutor attitudes toward
the Mapp and Miranda rulings and they are overwhelmingly negative. In
his survey in one state Katz (1966) found the following prosecutor
attitudes toward Mapp
.
For example, most prosecutors are more likely
then other criminal justice officials to hold that reliable evidence
should be admitted in court regardless of the legality of seizure, that
state courts should not apply the same standards as federal courts.
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that pdce should not be subjected to civil or criminal prosecution
for violations of the exclusionary rule and that the Ma££ rule should
be relaxed.
Yet once the federal standards had been adopted by state courts
it appears to have been difficult to persuade them to relax or withdraw
the standard in face of Supreme Court invitations to do so. Studies
by Wilkes (1974; 1976) and Gruhl and Spohn (1981) show that efforts
by the Burger Court since 1971 to relax the Miranda standards have
neither resulted in similar decisions by state courts nor produced
increased attempts by local prosecutors to evade the ruling. Inter-
estingly, however, prosecutors continue to be critical of the policy
yet uphold the doctrine in their day to day decisions.
In addition, there is some evidence that police also look
primarily for direction from local trial courts. While local trial
courts sometimes demonstrate little familiarity with state court
decisions, where local courts do comply with instructions from state
courts, police practices are likely to be more consistent with state
court policy (LaFave, 1968).
What this analysis suggests is that where police and prosecutors
attitudes and styles are similar; where hostility by trial judges to
the policies is widespread; where judicial willingness to supervize
police investigative activity is minimal and where prosecutorial case
screening is unsystematic, then police non-compliance is likely to
flourish. Where such conditions prevail, the unintended consequence
of the civil liberties decisions may have been, as Horowitz (1977)
contends, to reinforce rather than weaken an informal and, at times,




If most state courts have complied with the Supreme Court
civil liberties decisions in Ma££ and Miranda
, in spite of initial
criticisms (see Baum, 1979 and Tarr, 1977) and trial courts and local
prosecutors are generally willing to comply with state policies, then
it would be reasonable to expect increased police observance of
defendants' due process rights and substantial reform of police in-
vestigative practices. Yet the available evidence fails to support
these expectations. Instead they suggest that police conduct continues
to be governed primarily by local custom and practice. Moreover,
there appear to be extensive variations between police departments
within states governed by clear and consistent policies expressing
unequivocal protection of defendant's due process rights (Canon, 1973;
Manwaring, 1972; Porter and Tarr, 1982).
There are two lines of argument to explain the gap between
federal and state policy and local performance: (1) state courts are
incapable of direct intervention in police conduct and therefore are
unable to enforce decisions; (2) there are important political,
intergovernmental and organizational constraints which limit the
aggressiveness with which enforcement of Supreme Court mandates is
pursued.
First, while it is true that there are important institutional
constraints to state court intervention and supervision of police
behavior, state courts do have the power to supervise lower court
behavior and, thus, may impose sanctions on both trial courts and police
for non-compliance. Yet studies of state court implementation of Mapp
,
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for example, indicate that while state courts have been more willing
to overturn police methods conflicting with the exclusionary rule,
they have also been unwilling to impose actual sanctions on offending
departments and individual officers. What evidence of this kind
suggests is that trial court judges frequently fail to supervise
police investigations when there is a need to do so.
Second, while enforcement is possible, political and organiza-
tional considerations make enforcement unlikely. State court
organizational relations to lower courts and police were put under
pressure by Supreme Court rulings involving increased state enforcement
efforts. Briefly put, state courts adopting their own exclusionary
rule before Ma££ were less likely to comply with that decision because
adoption of the federal rule preempted state-based mechanisms for
enforcement. Clearly, criticism of federal preemption of state court
supervisory, policy making and enforcement power was widespread. One
important recurring complaint, as Canon's review of state court
contumacy indicates (1974b), was that Ma££ and Miranda put state and
lower courts in an awkward and unwanted position of supervising police
behavior. Therefore, adoption of a Supreme Court policy would not
only preempt state policy making and thus, a body of ancillary
decisions, but give federal courts a larger role in enforcement of
federal law. Therefore, potential federal preemption of state enforce-
ment mechanisms constitutes a threat to the decentralized power and
local discretion which typifies the administration of criminal justice.
State court judges are unlikely to treat Supreme Court policy
with a sense of urgency unless organizational interests are either
threatened or advanced by compliance. The Supreme Court civil liberties
decisions created new opportunities for state courts to increase their
organizational strength and policy making authority through administra-
tive reforms. Efforts to increase the power of state courts to
supervise trial courts through policy making may also further adminis-
trative centralization and vice versa. However, there is little
evidence to be found which suggests a significant relationship between
policy and administrative control and the ability of state courts to
influence lower court compliance to policies and decisions through
administrative reforms. It is evident that progress towards state
court unification has been slow; where substantial administrative
reforms had been adopted, it is not evident that their implementation
has been successful nor increased lower court compliance to state court
and Supreme Court policy (Baar, 1980; Glick, 1982; Click and Vines,
1973).
Conceptual Frameworks for Understanding State
and Local Implementation of Federal Policy
Studies of the policy implementation process have progressed
through several stages involving closely related focal points of
inquiry. The traditional disciplines of administrative theory and
organizational behavior supplied the initial impetus to systematically
investigate why policies fail to get translated into neutral rules of
program execution (Hargrove, 1975; Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein, 1976).
Studies of the impact of Supreme Court decisions, demonstrating
a gap between intent and actual performance invited closer inspection
of how a legislative policy gets translated into behavior (Dolbeare
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and Hammond, 1971; Wasby, 1970). As the field of policy implementation
developed, the focus has broadened from a preoccupation with organiza-
tional dynamics of policy execution to recent attempts to advance
integrated explanatory frameworks capable of specifying common factors
affecting outcomes.
The second stage of policy implementation analysis has been
characterized by a plethora of case studies identifying a number of
factors hindering program implementation processes. Studies by Bailey
and Mosher (1968), Derthick (1975), Lowi (1969), Murphy (1972), and
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) document how statutory ambiguity, guide-
line development processes and organizational complexity, including
variations of state and local official support may contribute to the
failure to achieve intended goals. With the exception of Lowi, studies
by these authors and others of a similar kind have exercised caution in
developing broader implications of what their findings imply about the
nature of the political system.
This restraint has been justified in part because we lack the
explanatory theories necessary to identify causal relationships between
significant factors shaping outcomes. In addition, there has been no
common agreement on what should constitute the outputs of public policy.
Some studies have been content to measure procedural compliance while
others seek to trace the relationship between output, impact and
ultimate change processes (Dolbeare, 1974).
Recently, efforts to model the implementation process have been
launched to fill in this important stage of theory building. The models
developed cover a wide range of policy areas and arenas and draw upon
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several areas of knowledge such as organizational behavior, public law,
community power studies, and technology innovation and diffusion. These
efforts hav3 resulted in identifying several factors likely to influence
policy effectiveness. There are however, variations in the rigor and
specificity with which the models are constructed. Some schemes con-
stitute interesting conceptual frameworks (e.g., Bardach, 1977a; Berman,
1980; Edwards, 1980) while others specify causal relationships between
'
factors, elaborate the significance of key variables and in some
instances, prescribe ways to achieve effective policy implementation
(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Ripley and Franklin, 1982; Van Meter and
Van Horn, 1975).
There have also been attempts to examine the utility of more
rigorous models in applied settings, most notably by Van Horn (1979)
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), and Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein (.1976).
But, little effort has been directed at testing the strength of these
and other models in accounting for the variation in the effects of public
policies. Studies which apply conceptual frameworks and specific policy
contexts do suggest, however, that the relative significance of particular
factors likely to affect policy implementation processes may vary between
policy systems. For example, given the strength of dispositional ele-
ments and controversy likely to confront criminal justice policies, the
extent of change and clarity of policy goals may be more important to
policy success than elite support or availability of enforcement mecha-
nisms (Morash, 1982; Wasby, 1970).
Although theory testing is only in a rudimentary stage at this
point, efforts have been made nonetheless to develop conceptual or
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explanatory frameworks capable of integrating our knowledge across
policy settings and institutions. Such efforts seek to identify
common factors influencing the implementation of policies originated
by courts as well as legislatures. Although the attempt to develop an
integrated explanatory framework presupposes further progress in
applied studies, it is not precluded by these developments.
Moreover, conceptual frameworks construed in the broadest
institutional terms are a necessary corrective to study conclusions
dictated largely by policy areas in which particular frameworks are
applied. Examples of limited attempts in this regard include works by
Baum (1977; 1981); Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983); Nakamura and Smallwood
(1980); Shapiro (1968) and Shapiro and Hobbs (1974). Baum, in particular,
urges caution in generalizing about judicial implementation processes from
legislative policy studies because of important differences in institu-
tional characteristics and the secondary importance of environmental
influences such as interest group and public support. He also suggests,
along with Brown and Stover (1977), that the literature in organiza-
tional behavior provides the best source of guidance in understanding
court systems in which policy implementation processes are determined
principally by the preferences and utility structure of subordinates.
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss some of the issues
and terms used by the authors of different conceptual models to describe
policy outcomes. Then, I review and contrast in more detail the con-
tours of three models which advance contrasting explanations of state
and local implementation of federal policy. The models have been
selected for their perported general applicability to the implementation
76
of federal grant-in-aid programs involving intergovernmental regula-
tion. Since the models selected also generate conclusions about the
nature of the American political system and institutions from applied
settings, these themes will be carefully drawn out in the ensuing
discussion.
Following the analysis of the state implementation of the
federal criminal records privacy mandate presented in the next few
chapters, alternative explanations are developed in Chapter VII which
draw upon the frameworks sketched here. Subsequently, I assess the
relative significance of factors contributing to compliance to public
policy, suggest connections to the findings of studies of state
implementation of Supreme Court due process policies and sketch a
conceptual framework with which to understand common factors influencing
the state implementation of federal mandates.
Measuring response and
pol icy outcomes
An important concern of conceptual models regarding policy
implementation processes is how to define the outputs of public policy.
There is little agreement or consistency in the literature on policy
implementation regarding ways to best characterize outcomes of public
policy. The terms compliance, response and impact for example, are
used in inconsistent and often overlapping ways, each suggesting
different implications regarding scope and measurement. Thus, there
is a need to employ a common terminology in order to compare the
implementation of policies originated by two different institutions
involving different capacities and approaches to implementation and
enforcement.
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As Wasby (1970) has argued, compliance involves a narrower
focus than impact. Assessments of compliance turn upon judgments about
the policy originators' intentions as well as the implementers ' aware-
ness, and understanding of what is expected. Importantly, the term
compliance differentiates between correct and incorrect behavioral
responses, thus strongly weighting interpretations by policy superiors.
However, the consequences of policy may not be intended and often in-
volve second or third order consequences (Dolbeare, 1974) which
complicate judgments about causal relationships between policy, behavior
and attitude. For example, the implementers' perceptions or expecta-
tions about a policy's effects may influence their willingness to comply
with a policy directive.
In addition, the usage of the term compliance involves normative
assumptions regarding hierarchy, obedience and acceptable and unaccept-
able response to policy. Policy is often implemented in contexts where
lines of authority are uncertain, where intergovernmental and inter-
organizational relations are better characterized in non-hierarchical
terms. Although the implementation of judicial policy may involve
formal hierarchical relations between the Supreme Court and state courts,
states and localities do not always bear a subordinate relation to
Congress with respect to policy development. In addition, implementers
may exercise substantial discretion in the way they choose to respond to
policy requirements. Consequentially, they may satisfy policy objectives
in varying degrees through behavior neither required nor intended by the
pol icy originator.
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Four terms may be employed to characterize policy results, which
help bypass some of the more vexing problems associated with the measure-
ment Of compliance. These terms are response, effects, performance and
change. Each term may be distinguished in several ways.
First, the term response appears to capture two dimensions of
behavior: the consistency of direction of behavior with intended goals
and the intensity of the impl ementers attitudes toward the policy.
Both the direction and intensity of response may be influenced in turn
by how the policy is interpreted and by perceptions of expected effects
of that policy. Direction of response pertains to the avenues the
implementer chooses to "satisfy" policy demands. Thus, response to the
policy demands is not necessarily the same thing as compliance.
Policy effects or impacts, on the other hand, refer to the
direct consequences of the policy including organizational structure
and patterns of intergovernmental and interorganizational relations
characteristic of a particular policy system. Policies may produce both
intended and unintended effects. When intended results are achieved,
this usually implies that at least some of the policy goals or objec-
tives have been achieved. However, unintended consequences do not
necessarily imply policy failure for such effects may sometimes con-
tribute to the realization of policy goals.
A third term to distinguish from the other terms characterizing
implementation processes is that of performance. Compliant behavior
may not result in changes in performance. Thus, we are interested not
only in knowing what happened as a result of the adoption of public
policy but whether there has been some improvement in the nature or
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conduct Of decision processes and outcomes, issues of efficiency as
well as effectiveness, including fairness and due process, must figure
into the appraisal of performance.
In addition to these notions, attempts to alter performance
involve the idea of change. Policy induced changes are, for reasons
we have already noted, difficult to measure, for change can occur on
many different levels. Change or the lack of it may be manifested in
beliefs, behavior, attitudes, procedure and organizational structure.
It is unlikely that policies will produce simultaneous changes in all
these dimensions; rather, such changes that do occur as a result of
the implementation of policy will be limited to one or two dimensions.
The local consequences
of federal aid
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) advance a systems model of policy
implementation. Their model proposes that where implementation involves
a federal, intergovernmental policy, it embodies a unidirectional
relationship between the policy, intervening variables and performance.
Performance is defined narrowly to consist of the "degree to which
anticipated services are actually delivered" (144). As such, the
definition neglects an important feature of policy implementation
processes--it's impact and whether ultimate outcomes were achieved.
It is conceivable, therefore, by this measure, that policies could be
effectively implemented but not result in any change.
Key variables posited by this model include: policy standards
and resources, a set of intervening variables which include federal
communication and enforcement mechanisms, characteristics of implementing
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agencies, and economic, social, political and other environmental
conditions. In addition to these factors the authors suggest that
within the local policy environment, the disposition of local imple-
menters is an important variable standing between federal control
mechanisms and ultimate performance. The importance and utility of
their work lies in its stress on local elites and the political
environment.
Van Horn (1979) has applied an amended version of their
original construct to explain the outcomes of the implementation of
several recent revenue sharing programs. In this analysis. Van Horn
reviews the legislative history and implementation of General Revenue
Sharing, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (ETA) and the
Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG) in order to determine
what the resulting performance of these programs implies about how the
funds were used, who benefits and who governs.
The findings about the latter two issues provide an interesting
explanation of implementation processes and politics. In essence,
although federal revenue sharing policies deviated only marginally
from intended goals, they also exerted little impact on decisions made
by local impl ementers
.
First, Van Horn contends that the "worst fears" of liberal
opponents to decentralization of redistributive policies in employment
and training (CETA) and housing (CDBG) were not realized. Decentral-
izing power to state and local governments did not produce benefit
patterns which substantially departed from targeted disadvantaged
groups. One important reason for this outcome is due to the relative
strength of national and local interest groups (whose political clout
was increased by war on poverty programs) in protecting the interests
of the poor and disadvantaged.
Secondly, however. Van Horn contends that unclear national
policies and vague goals, combined with the autonomy of local officials
minimized the impact of federal agency control over intergovernmental
implementation processes. There were two sources for these variable
results.
The inability or incapacity, as Van Horn suggests, of Congress
to specify clear national policies helped account for variations from
intended outcomes. Given multiple and ambiguous objectives, local
implementers unsurprisingly developed a variety of interpretations as
to how best to allocate funds. When Congress grew disappointed with
limited initial progress, they responded during reauthorization by
imposing heavier regulatory burdens on local government. Yet increased
federal regulation had counter-productive effects which withdrew
flexibility, thereby inviting increased variations in response.
Van Horn's reading of several revenue sharing programs leads
him to reason that effective policy implementation is most likely to
occur when the ends of policy are clear but means are left unspecified
or flexible, incentives are targeted and enforcement is selective.
Federal enforcement has been the subject of particular abuse. Van Horn
observes, because a heavy handed approach is used regardless of the
vast differences with respect to faithfulness to statutory intent and
performance records among state and local governments. Thus, enforce-
ment tactics must be geared towards actual performance and be stronger
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where local interest groups representing target groups are relatively
weak in their influence in local politics.
Moreover. Van Horn disputes Lowi's (1979) assertion that
ambiguous law results in delegated power and policy failure because
of the very unambitious policy agenda that ambiguous laws support.
Van Horn argues that flexibility and the lack of legislative clarity
are essential ingredients to intergovernmental feasibility and local
innovation given the forces of rapid social economic change.
Adjusting policy to the system
Rein and Rabinovitz (1977) offer a contrasting conception of
the policy implementation process. They argue that we conceive of
the politics of implementation as a circular process which progresses
from policy enactment to guideline development, resource distribution,
oversight and legislative revision. At each stage contending impera-
tives of legal intent, bureaucratic feasibility and external consensus
must be resolved before policies can be fully implemented and objec-
tives achieved. These three imperatives may operate in isolation or
(more likely) in conjunction at each stage of the process.
Respect for legal intent requires that implementers acknowledge
legislative objectives. The requirement that policy be bureaucratical ly
feasible necessitates that implementers make concessions to various
interest groups in order to minimize opposition from target groups.
Such concessions may be required in order to assure effective
implementation. The consensual imperative is operative when interests
external to the implementing process dominate implementation through
control over priorities and definitions of standards constituting
effective performance. This influence typically results in control
over the allocation of resources to beneficiaries.
Thus, the politics of implementation of federal mandates is
portrayed as the process by which conflicts among contending impera-
tives are resolved at each stage of the implementation process.
Importantly, Rein and Rabinovitz hypothesize that the way in which
conflicts are resolved is a function of statutory purposes (i.e.,
clarity, salience, and consistency), resources (i.e., kind, level and
timing), complexity and "settledness" of the administrative arena in
which policies are implemented. In previous work (see Rabinovitz,
Pressman and Rein, 1976) the authors have attempted to examine their
theory with respect to the guideline stage of implementation. These
studies have sought, in particular, to determine how guideline
processes vary across policy arenas (e.g., health, social services,
housing and internal revenue) and how guidelines relate to the larger
political system.
An arena in which policy is implemented is defined to consist
of a political and administrative context in which policy is both
formulated and implemented. It includes a "web" of individual and
institutional interrelationships which would develop over time among
congressman, administrators, interest groups and academic experts, and
other interested parties (1976: 405). Arenas vary in terms of level
and complexity of the intergovernmental hierarchy of working relation-
ships, centralization of decision making and settled patterns of
interaction. The patterns of relationships between policy and arena
which unfold from these studies suggest that clear policies are likely
84
to result in compliance in settled arenas but require accommodation
(i.e., bureaucratic imperative) in open systems. Ambiguous policies,
on the other hand, require clarification in settled systems and both
central control combined with delegation over time, in open arenas.
Guideline development processes involved in implementing Internal
Revenue Service tax regulations is offered as an example of the first











Figure 2. Issues, Arenas and the Process of Guideline
Development
.
SOURCE: Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein, 1976: 406.
While the social service guidelines documented by Derthick (1976) depict
the polar extreme in cell 4, the Health Maintenance Organization guide-
line development processes are considered an example of 2 as documented
by Altman and Sapolsky (1976)
An example of an instance in which an ambiguous issue is
implemented in a settled arena would be Steiner's (1971) analysis of
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public relief policy. This presents an interesting case according to
the authors because it suggests that an ambiguous issue could work to
unsettle an arena thus implying that structural changes may occur
depending on the match between policies and arenas. The possibility
that ambiguous policies may become more clear, and vice versa over time,
may be due to changes in the patterns of interactions in an arena,
induced 1n part by reactions to policy by institutional actors in that
arena,
The fact that this last point is left undeveloped by the authors
suggests the need for additional cases which fit these circumstances.
But what is not entirely clear are the criteria for deciding how to
characterize a policy arena or system in order to measure changes it
may undergo over time. Moreover, a policy system may involve a mixture
of settled and unsettled elements which include relatively unchanging
functional routines and transactions, yet decentralized power and
conflictual policy making processes. Such features could very well
complicate judgments about conditions conducive to compliance and policy
effectiveness
.
There are several implications of Rein and Rabinovitz's (1977)
examination of intergovernmental regulation and the American political
system. First, if policy effectiveness, more than simple compliance,
is the major objective of implementing public policy then the price
paid for the consensus that is required is reinterpretation and minimal
change in institutional structures. This is so because we are con-
fronted with a paradox: clear policies have their best chance of
success in systems which have remained unaltered over time. When we
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fan away from this optimal situation there is greater conflict and
less consistency with statutory intent. By this reckoning, it would
seem that ambiguous policies implemented in open systems must closely
approximate pluralist political processes, yet are least likely to
involve consistency with statutory intent.
In fact, the authors are moved to conclude that since most
policy arenas fail to approximate the characteristics of a settled
arena, federal and state guideline development processes set in motion
the forces of dissipation and disaggregation at each successive stage
of implementation. Therefore, policy which ultimately gets implemented
is likely to be the product of complex bargaining, negotiation and
interest group compromise. Policy implementation processes thus
reflect the broad dispersion of power and access to decision making
characteristic of a pluralist political system.
What makes this view contrast most sharply with Van Horn's
analytical framework is the evident absence of a meaningful role of
state and local elected officials in the implementation of federal
policies. Guideline development processes appear to occur in self
contained bureaucratic worlds answerable only to the most powerful
external interests. Therefore, by this account, state and local
elected officials appear to have very little significance in the equa-
tion in which policies ultimately get executed.
A unified framework for explaining
judicial and legislative policies
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) have developed and applied a
comprehensive conceptual framework by which to explain policy
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implementation processes involving federal policies which include
either distributive and regulatory purposes or both and are originated
by either courts or legislatures. Thus, they have developed an inte-
grative framework by which to explain implementation processes of
courts as well as legislatures. They construe policy to include broad
societal agendas involving complementary statutes and court decisions
over time.
Moreover, the authors contend that their framework includes
other strengths as well compared to those frameworks already described,
and greatly enlarge upon the conditions identified in the literature
as conducive towards compliance. They also acknowledge the importance
of tractability of the problem and validity of theory as important
variables affecting performance. In addition, the diversity of target
group behavior is also considered an important determinant of exten-
siveness of change.
Finally, they are careful to draw distinctions in the stages
of policy outputs. Policy outputs (e.g., adopting agency policies,
delivering services) constitute one of several types of dependent
variables in the implementation process which include compliance by
target groups, actual impacts, perceived impacts, and major statutory
revisions. This distinction is important, for as Dolbeare (1974) has
cogently argued, policies produce radiating second and third order
consequences which may confound assessments of causal relationships
among factors and influence assessments of the extent of change.
Compared to Van Horn, Rein and Rabinovitz and others, Mazmanian
and Sabatier are far more impressed with the extent to which a statute
can be structured to satisfy the twin goals of policy effectiveness
and democratic accountability; neither goal has to be necessarily
sacrificed in the implementation process. The authors strongly
reject the findings of Rein and Rabinovitz and Berman (1980) that the
distinction between formulation and implementation dissolves when
policies are implemented. They offer three reasons why the distinc-
tion must be maintained.
First, instances in which the distinction dissolves are the
exception rather than the rule. Second, if policies evolve continu-
ously over time (or involve circular processes) the evaluation of goal
attainment becomes problematic, if not impossible. Last, viewing
policy processes as a "seemless web" obscures the division of authority
between elected public officials and administrative officials.
The application of the framework to different policy fields
culminates in several findings. The most salient finding is that the
processes by which federal mandates traverse through state and local
implementation processes to become public policy do not appear to
undergo any pattern of "routine or natural progression" towards ultimate
outcomes. Policy implementation processes may start slowly, quickly
gain or lose momentum or pass through several cycles. The exact course
which the policy will take will primarily depend upon the extent to
which the statute effectively structures the implementation process,
and long term environmental conditions which include support by
soverigns and interest groups. Policies do not necessarily degenerate
over time nor permanently derail; policies may be rejuvenated with
renewed vigor after long periods of a semi-stalemate.
Brown vs. the Board of Fdnr.tinn (1954) 33
an example of a policy fitting a cumulative incremental i sm scenario
in which change in the political environment was a precipitating
factor in achieving substantial gains in compliance. The Brown
decision, although largely ignored by an indifferent Eisenhower
administration, was given renewed vigor by a combination of national
legislation (Civil Rights Act of 1964), bureaucratic enforcement by
HEW and supportive appellate court decisions. Interestingly, differ-
ences in the politics of discrimination between the North and South
have also accounted for emergent differences in efforts to end school
segregation. Southern segregation, manifested largely in de jure
terms, has been easy to rout out compared to de facto forms in the
North. Consequently, as a result of differences in environmental
contexts in which discrimination is manifested, there are now two
policies instead of one. However, some observers of the judicial
process, such as Baum, argue that "the balance of political forces is
less important" to Court decisions, citing Ma££ and Miranda as having
been "made in a seemingly unfavorable climate of public opinion"
(1981: 42).
Mazmanian and Sabatier contend that if the statute or decision
carefully structures the implementation process so that sovereigns are
given continuous oversight and intervention responsibilities, the
distinction between authority, power and accountability of elected
officials versus bureaucrats can be more carefully maintained. Yet,
given the proclivities of Congress to produce ambiguous, unstructured
statutes and judicial reluctance to interfere with bureaucratic
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discretion, the authors' prescriptions for policy success would
necessarily require changes in the institutions of Congress and the
judiciary which are unlikely to occur in the forseeable future. In
addition, continuous interest group support and periodic intervention
by sovereigns is no guarantee against either statutory revisions in-
consistent with initial purposes nor long term preservation of the
status quo. The identities and policy priorities of interest groups
and sovereigns are themselves subject to change over time, which in
tandem, may produce new consensual underpinnings of a policy in
dramatic contrast to initial basis of support.
Although intent on accentuating differences between their
framework and others, Mazmanian and Sabatier characterize successful
policies as undergoing cumulative incremental ism in which enacted
policies develop gradual support over time moving closer rather than
farther away from original purposes. This may be a distinction without
a difference. For regardless of whether policies undergo disaggrega-
tion and revision or cumulative support and progress toward ultimate
objectives, the processes by which either result occurs involves an
assumption of the politics of interest group bargaining, negotiation
and compromise. Therefore, from opposing perspectives, the politics
of legislative formulation and implementation appear to involve
essentially the same processes.
CHAPTER III
IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL PRIVACY MANDATE: THE
NATIONAL CONTEXT FOR THE WASHINGTON CASE
The 1973 amendment to the Crime Control Act provided LEAA the
opportunity to impose a national policy on the states for the protec-
tion of privacy and due process rights of data subjects through
regulation of criminal justice information systems. LEAA officials
expected the regulations to result in substantial change in state
record management practices, the integrity and quality of criminal
records, and, importantly, uniform state policies limiting the dissem-
ination of criminal history record information (Marchand, 1980: 204-
205; Zenk, 1979).
However, as Chapter II suggests, the processes by which national
policies are converted into state policies and local practice are
complex and the measurement of compliance is problematic. The recent
history of revenue sharing programs advancing regulatory agendas
suggests that consistency and uniformity is likely to give way to
variable approaches with differential results.
This chapter attempts to determine how the states have per-
formed with respect to the federal criminal records privacy mandate
and political factors shaping responses. There are several reasons
why it is important to examine the national context first and then to
turn to the Washington case and interpret its significance. First,
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the criminal records privacy amendment simply conferred on LEAA the
authority to adopt regulations providing the states with more detailed
guidelines and to set in motion a state planning process by which state
policies could emerge. The guideline development process was prolonged
primarily because of the access it gave to contending political inter-
ests to further influence the shape of national policy. State plans
were initiated during this period of unsettled policy and therefore
provide important bases by which to understand the subsequent state
policy-making processes.
Washington was not unlike the majority of states in undertaking
a planning process which eventually led to the adoption of state policy.
However, in some important respects, Washington state's initial policy
was idiosyncratic and thus unrepresentative of other states. Yet, as
the ensuing analysis indicates, the novelty of this state's policy
quickly dissipated, resulting in a rather desultory and unexceptional
performance record compared with other states, and little evidence of
actual change. What this analysis provides, then, is a way to determine
just how the responses of officials in Washington to the federal mandate
and the state's resulting performance contribute to understanding
national patterns.
Next, wide variations in the methods used by sponsors of studies
of state performance under the federal mandate dictate that caution be
exercized in drawing inferences about policy induced change based
solely on evidence of behavioral compliance. While national surveys
tell us a great deal about procedural compliance, they reveal little
about micro political forces at work in a given state with which to
explain outcomes and assess change processes.
Moreover, as Marchand's comprehensive documentation (1980) of
the conflict over a national CCH indicates, the assessment of the
results and efficacy of the criminal records privacy mandate vary
according to the interests sponsoring the particular study, m this
regard, even the most recent studies by the Office of Technology
Assessment have not been immune from political forces intent upon
interpreting the facts to suit particular interests. Therefore, a
case analysis drawn from one state's experience provides a useful way
in which to put documentation of the national context in perspective.
Finally, notwithstanding these deficiencies in studies docu-
menting state performance, a national context for Congressional
regulatory policy provides a means by which to probe similarities with
and differences from state performance under Supreme Court civil
liberties policies. Since both policies constitute forms of inter-
governmental regulation of criminal justice, albeit from different
institutional sources, an analysis of one state's experience within
this dual context may uncover, in more depth, common political factors
which confront and shape outcomes of attempts to regulate the adminis-
tration of criminal justice.
Issues Involved in the Development
~o"f Federal Guidelines (1974-1976]"
Although spare in detail, the addition of Section 524B, the
privacy amendment, to the Crime Control Act of 1973 provided not just
another condition of aid, but presented LEAA an opportunity to develop
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detailed guidelines to advance its own interpretation of criminal
records privacy policy. The amendment invited extensive administrative
interpretation and contributed to a prolonged guideline development
process. Although LEAA wasted little time proposing draft regulations
(Title 28) for public review and comment in February 1974, substantial
controversy and criticism delayed their final publication until May
1975. Continued dissatisfaction with several of the guidelines forced
a subsequent substantial revision in 1976. The regulations underwent
yet another modest revision in December 1977, in which, among other
things, LEAA suspended the deadline for final compliance to some





LEAA's 1974 draft regulations drew heaviest fire from criminal
justice interests with respect to the definition of criminal history
record information, internal dissemination controls, and applicability
to the courts. In addition, non-criminal justice interests, partic-
ularly the press and private employers, along with police, expressed
strong opposition to LEAA's restrictions on public dissemination of
criminal history information. In fact, the dissemination provisions
were by far the most controversial of all of the proposed regulations.
While strong opposition to these and other provisions may be attributed
in part to LEAA's failure to develop guidelines sufficiently grounded
in prior legislative intent, criticism of LEAA's proposed regulations
also stemmed from more fundamental philosophical differences over the
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role that the exchange and dissemination of criminal records plays in
effective law enforcement.
In its 1974 draft regulations. LEAA defined criminal offender
record information to include that information collected for the
purpose of identifying individual criminal offenders and alleged
offenders. The definition represented a novel interpretation because
it was more irKluM^^ of data considered to constitute criminal history
information than either stated in the Menard decision or intended by
Congress. Unlike the Menard ruling or Congressional proposals, LEAA
drew no distinction between files maintained on subjects with formal
contacts with criminal justice and those without such documented con-
tacts. Thus, the inclusion of information on alleged offenders
implied that dissemination of intelligence and investigative informa-
tion collected on suspects would be subject to regulation. The director
of the Michigan State Police expressed incredulity at this prospect by
commenting:
You include within the definitions section all types of
records that I would have in my department. This rule
would provide controls on the access to current depart-
mental internal investigative memorandum, intelligence
files, modis operandi files and any other files I would
have as they relate to current criminal investigations
within my agency. I cannot believe that you truly wish
to provide the criminal or organized crime individuals
with access to information regarding them that involves
ongoing investigation into their criminal activities
(U.S. Department of Justice, 1974a: 33).
In remarks submitted by a staff member of the New York Department
of Justice, the LEAA staff is referred to a section of the Senate Draft
Legislation (the Criminal Justice Systems Act of 1974--the Hruska Bill)
where a more careful distinction is drawn between intelligence and other
criminal record data. Part of the problem with LEAA's overly broad
definition of criminal offender record information was that it wasn't
entirely clear whether it was intended to occur or was a definitional
oversight. There is some evidence that LEAA officials were concerned
about the fact that intelligence and investigative information was not
always carefully separated from arrest and conviction information and
thus had to include it in the definition of criminal offender informati
It is possible that LEAA expected that such a definition (anticipated
to be objectionable to law enforcement) would enable the separation of
intelligence materials from other files, thus accomplishing the same
overall purpose of securing a higher quality and verifiabil ity of
criminal record data. In any event, as the Washington case illustrates
in Chapter V, clarifying the types of material covered by the regula-
tions has not dispelled problems of interpretation.
Law enforcement agencies were particularly concerned about the
effects that dissemination controls, such as transaction logs, would
have on effective law enforcement. One comment submitted by the





Our investigators work on a daily basis with other criminaljustice agencies in our normal duties and are constantly
discussing criminal history information on suspects, prison-
ers, etc., and the logging of this dissemination would be
ludicrous and impossible to control. The dissemination of
criminal history information is inherent within the criminal
justice system, it cannot be contained or curtailed without
a corresponding decline in effective law enforcement (U S
Department of Justice, 1976a: 10).
In addition to the press and law enforcement agencies, state and
local governments also expressed criticism of restrictions on access to
criminal history information by non-criminal justice agencies. Many
state and local governments which permit access to criminal records
through either custom or through ordinance for a variety of employment,
credit and other purposes were pressed to continue existing practice.
Court records and the separa-
tion of powers doctrine
In addition to dissemination policy, LEAA's attempts to make
its 1974 draft regulations apply to the records of court proceedings
proved equally unpopular. While custom holds judicial proceedings and
resulting records of disposition to be accessible to the public, LEAA's
initial broad definition of criminal history records material committed
it to the inclusion of information which pertained to court proceedings.
This was proposed not only for policy reasons but because LEAA recog-
nized that court participation was essential to achieving the goals of
completeness and accuracy.
The National Center for State Courts submitted a strongly worded
challenge of provisions to include the courts under the LEAA regulations.
These statements not only questioned LEAA's authority to promulgate
regulations regarding state court activities, but challenged the con-
stitutionality of executive regulation of the judiciary. The National
Center contended that LEAA's actions "marked a clear departure from its
often stated policy of not imposing federal regulation on states, and,
more particularly state courts, that utilize LEAA funds" (National Center
for State Courts, 1974: 4). What was found particularly objectionable by
the courts was that LEAA had exceeded its administrative authority.
The National Center pointed out that all the original privacy amendment
required was that information stored in criminal justice information
systems be accurate and complete. This did not imply some additional
state regulatory authority. The National Center argued that in pro-
posing this regulation, LEAA was attempting to anticipate Congressional
activities to regulate information privacy.
In addition to these broad concerns, the Center found LEAA's
regulations unclear as to which state agencies would prepare a privacy
plan and unspecific as to whether the state courts would participate
in development of that plan. Moreover, the regulations did not make
clear which areas of the judiciary were covered (e.g., whether it
included only state courts, appellate courts and/or trial courts).
Clearly the National Center was troubled by these ambiguities and the
lingering implication it left for further encroachment of executive
control over the courts:
Thus, the regulations appear to give LEAA wide discretion
determining the extent to which the judiciary will be bound
by the regulations and what must be done by a state judicial
system to comply with the regulations. Such discretion in
a federal agency over actions of a state judicial branch of
government poses serious problems from both the standpoint
of the limits of federal authority and juridical indepen-
dence (National Center for State Courts, 1974: 4).
As a result of widespread dissatisfaction with the attempt to
include the courts under Title 28, an intense lobbying campaign was
mounted by state court judges and administrators to get the courts
exempted from coverage. That effort was ultimately successful for the
1976 version specifically exempted court records.
Privacy and the press
The extensive conflict which the 1974 draft version of the
Title 28 regulations incurred was indicative of the conflict inherent
in attempts to translate general statutes into detailed regulations.
Significantly, conflict focused not only upon issues internal to
criminal justice administration but also upon public access to the
information regarding the proceedings involved in the criminal justice
process. The right to privacy collided with the public right to know.
Importantly, the press considered itself to have a special responsi-
bility and freedom to convey information about the process without
restriction. That right and responsibility was asserted to be pre-
dicated on public attitudes toward crime control and punishment. For
example, comments submitted by the American Newspaper Association best
expressed these concerns:
The American Newspaper Association's position on the
proposed rules of law is one of outright opposition
We applaud the intent of these rules to afford greater
protection of privacy to individuals. However, insofar
as these proposed rules would infringe upon the right
of the press to gather and disseminate information
relating to criminal justice we do seriously object
The danger it seems to us, is that LEAA's effort to
protect one right, i.e., the right of privacy, it is
proposing to make that right supercede the public's right
to know (U.S. Department of Justice, 1974a: 31).
The Allied Daily News Association (an association of the Pacific
Northwest) argued that legal restrictions on dissemination of criminal
records material would also encourage suppression of information about
the working of the criminal justice process:
That the ordinary policeman, jailer, assistant prosecuting
attorney feels morally and legally free to reveal this
information is more important to our criminal -judicial
process than any statutory language mandating such openness--
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more important too. than is generally appreciated Thislack of compunction about "passing the wSrd" rendersdifficult, impossible, any long term cover imnf fin
or^corruption in the system (u's^'S^rrlL^nrofju'ulce!
With the publication of the 1975 regulations, the Allied Daily
News Association took yet another opportunity to elaborate on what was
seen as a widespread philosophy regarding legitimate access to criminal
records
:
Finally we would observe that a lawful purpose of criminal
k nw?2 ^"r°T^^°" the deterrence 0? c? me !heno ledge that a person's criminal history will probablvadversely affect that person's future has been an ?mpon^though unevauated deterrent to the commission of Jrimethroug out history. Granted the criminal record mayactually contribute to recidivism among criminals, thev
fr'om"D:b[l" i^irK^^^'^'"?"''^- deterrence ;es!;i^ingom public ava lability of criminal records works on alltne rest of us--the great majority-who have no criminal
oVTshlZ '''' '''' ^^p-t-"t
Moreover, the press contended that voluntary guidelines govern-
ing news reporting had already been established in numerous states.
By 1974 twenty-four states had adopted such guidelines which recommended
restriction of the publication of some criminal justice information
considered an evasion of individual privacy.
Limits on dissemination
As stated earlier, LEAA's attempts to establish limits for the
dissemination of criminal history record information were fraught with
substantial controversy. Part of the difficulty stemmed from LEAA's
overly broad definition of criminal offender information. LEAA found
itself in an awkward position of restricting dissemination of criminal
record information which heretofore had been freely disseminated between
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criminal justice agencies and widely shared with a variety of non-
criminal justice users.
Revisions made in the 1975 version of the privacy regulations
Showed both a softening of LEAA's position with respect to dissemination
and greater clarity about which records would fall under dissemination
restrictions. An extremely important oversight by LEAA regulation
writers in both the 1974 and 1975 version of the rules was a failure
to define the term "dissemination." Perhaps this explains, in part,
why a survey conducted by MITRE of Title 28 compliance activities
turned up as many definitions of dissemination of criminal history
records as agencies involved in the survey (1977a: 7). In its 1976
planning instructions. LEAA acknowledged this omission and attempted
to correct the mistake with the following definition:
Although dissemination is a key concept in the regulations,
regulations do not define the term. However, it can beinterpreted to apply to the release or transmission of
criminal history records information by an agency to
another agency or other individual (U.S. Department of
Justice, 1976c: 14).
Clearly, the term "dissemination" included exchange of informa-
tion from one criminal justice agency to another. However, not every
transfer of information constituted a dissemination. For example,
exchange of information for the purposes of reporting data to the
central state repository and information exchanged between police,
prosecutors and courts with respect to cases currently in process were
excluded. Thus, LEAA made it clear that factual information regarding
criminal justice processes (e.g., status of investigations, apprehen-
sion, arrest, release, prosecution, correctional status) "which is
reasonably contemporaneous with the events to which the information
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relates" could be disseminated without restriction (U.S. Department of
Justice, 1975b: Sec. 20.33(c)).
While this definition provided a bit more clarity as to when
criminal records information could be legally disseminated, it was not
sufficient to satisfy representatives of the press. For example, the
Dallas Chapter of the Society of Professional Journalists argued that
numerous departments were unwilling to risk faulty interpretations of
what information was "contemporaneous" and thus refused to answer any
and all requests for information. Similarly, the Allied Daily
Newspaper Association observed that most law enforcement officers
would be reluctant to advance their interpretation of when release of
criminal records information was contemporaneous with criminal justice
processes (U.S. Department of Justice, 1974a: 35).
LEAA responded to these criticisms by loosening the dissemina-
tion requirements in the 1975 regulations. Criminal justice agencies
were now permitted to release criminal records information if state
statute or executive order made the absence of a criminal records a
pre-condition for employment or licensing.
Evidently this revision did not concede sufficient ground
to private sector employers who, by 1975, through their contacts with
police departments, had become sufficiently apprised of the effect of
the regulations limiting access to criminal history records. For
example, while responses to the 1974 regulations largely consisted of
comments submitted by criminal justice (fifteen) or other public
agencies (nine), only two comments were received from private firms.
By comparison, when the 1975 regulations were published, thirty-three
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Of the seventy-four comments submitted to LEAA came from private sector
firms and associations. Most of these comments expressed strong oppo-
sition to provisions for limitation on dissemination to non-criminal
justice agencies (U.S. Department of Justice, 1974a; 1976a).
Consequently, under pressure to further relax what had initially
been a very restrictive policy, LEAA made two important concessions.
First, it defined a new category of criminal history information to
consist of "non-conviction data." Non-conviction data is defined to
consist of information pertaining to an arrest which has not resulted
in a disposition either favorable or unfavorable to the data subject
at least one year after the arrest. In turn, the limitations on
dissemination apply only to non-conviction data. Thus, LEAA made a
substantial departure from its initial policy which prevented access
to nearly all criminal history record data.
LEAA made two more revisions in dissemination requirements which
all but capitulated to the pressure of state and local public and private
interests in 1976 and 1977. The 1976 revisions permitted state and local
officials discretion in the interpretation of statistics permitting
access to non-conviction data while the 1977 revisions no longer required
express statutory authority for access to such data (U.S. Department of
Justice, 1976d; 1977: Sec. 20.21(b) (2)).
The states' role in record
management processes
LEAA's draft regulations also proposed guidelines to secure
completeness, accuracy and currency of criminal history records.
Completeness was defined to mean that criminal offender records should
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contain the ''fact, date and result of every transaction which occurred
ln processing a case fro. arrest to fina, disposition" (y.s. Oepart.ent
Of Justice. 1974b.. Sec. 20.21 ,a)( 1 )) . Completeness and accuracy would
be Obtained by requiring that all transactions appear In the state record
file within thirty days of the date of the end of the transaction. This
section was not entirely clear for It alluded to a central state repos-
itory for the storage of complete records but did not specify what role
the central repository would perform in the management of criminal
history records. Presumably, the central state repository would con-
stitute the only point of dissemination of criminal history records to
non-criminal justice agencies.
With the publication of the 1975 regulations, LEAA finally
clarified this point. Prior to the dissemination of arrest and
conviction information, each criminal justice agency would be required
to contact the central state repository to insure that the most complete
and current information was disseminated. Recognizing that many states
could not satisfy this requirement because of the absence of a central
state repository, LEAA made exceptions to the predi ssemination query
rule. Inquiries would not have to be made if, for example, time was
of the essence and the state repository was technically incapable of
responding to the request. As noted in Chapter I, by 1975, only seven-
teen states had automated files of complete criminal history records
and virtually none of these states provided on-line inquiry capabilities
to the localities they serviced. Thus, in many states a predissemination
query by local law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies still
has to be conducted largely through
.ore cumbersome and time consuming
manual processes.
In its planning instructions, LEAA intended these exceptions
to be only temporary:
?pj??if permitted in recognition of thereal ty that present manual repositories cannot resoond
SrSn' ^rS't^aoor^ ''^'^ exce"UfSldoe understood to apply only until central state reDo<;itones wil employ sufficient automated data process q
oTcSal i. ^tf '° ''''' inforLJior edst criminal justice agencies throughout the state fU SDepartment of Justice, 1976c: 27). ^
Given the optimistic expectation that most states would solve
these technical issues, LEAA established a deadline of December 31,
1977, for compliance to the central state repository predissemination
query requirement. Many of the comments received by LEAA criticized
this time frame as unreasonable. Nevertheless, LEAA acknowledged that
"although the regulations do not strictly mandate this approach," the
states were urged to do so in very solemn tones: "The states should
adopt this approach in their plans unless there are compelling reasons
not to do so" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1975: 26). Moreover, the
states were urged to seek legislation to vest a central repository
with legal authority to collect and maintain criminal history record
information.
LEAA's final regulations (1976) were thus the product of con-
flicting pressures in which criminal justice agencies pressed for more
specificity and detail as to what was expected while non-criminal
justice interests pressed for greater flexibility and state discretion.
Moreover, given conflict over executive regulation of the courts and
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subsequent exemption of the. fro. the Title 28 regulations, an important
element in a mandate predicated on effective coordination between
criminal justice agencies was withdrawn. Clearly, the interests forma-
tive in the development of dissemination guidelines had succeeded in
preserving state discretion on a central issue. It also gave the press
and others the opportunity to influence state policy processes con-
sistent with their preferences.
Pa tterns of State Policy and Performanr P-
The Politics of Measuring Compliance
The Title 28 security and privacy regulations divided state
implementation processes into three successive stages. The first
stage consisted of the submission of a state plan by the State Planning
Agency (SPA) which identified steps the state would take to adopt state
policy and implement procedures to comply with the federal mandate.
The second stage consisted of the adoption of state policy (e.g., by
executive order, legislation, court order or rule) and selection of
an agency or commission to administer the regulations. The third stage
included the actual implementation and utilization of state and local
procedures. The results of each of these stages have been documented
by LEAA-sponsored studies in varying levels of detail and methodological
rigor.
LEAA did not require the states to provide evidence of the
extent to which procedures were followed or to document changes in
record quality. The states were, however, expected to certify that
the central state repository had been audited, including a random




the 1977 state legislative session. State plans were reviewed and
assessed through an in-house evaluation process. In its S«r^
State_Plans (1976) LEAA staff presented the findings of that
process, including a description of similarities and difference,
proposed policies and procedures, examples of typical problems states
faced or expected to encounter in implementation and recurrent diffi-
culties in interpreting the federal regulations. Since the Summary
was partly intended to be a technical assistance document it made only
selective references to specific state problems and approaches, and
thus does not constitute a comprehensive state survey (U.S. Department
of Justice, 1976b).
There are other problems with the Summary of State P lans that
should also be noted. As with any survey relying upon self-reporting
and assessment, accuracy and objectivity are problematic. Interpreta-
tions vary among respondents as to precisely which information is
sought and/or what documentation is appropriate, and there is a tendency
to tell LEAA, as the grantor, exactly what it wants to hear. For
example, some state plans failed to provide important information
regarding dissemination and audit approaches while others (for example,
California in 1976) provided elaborate and detailed plans covering
federal requirements and state variations.
In addition, while LEAA required that state plans reflect the
views of diverse groups in the state through a deliberate, phased
process of review and comment, states varied in the rigor with which
the public was engaged. For example, the state of Washington provided
full-time staffing to an Attorney General's Advisory Committee,
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representative of diverse interests, which met for over a year in
careful deliberations to formulate a consensus ultimately embodied in
draft legislation. In contrast, many other states appear to have
relied upon SPA staff to draft a policy, subsequently given pro forma
review and approval for forwarding to LEAA (U.S. Department of Justice.
1976b).
Finally, the significance of the state plans, in most cases,
lies largely in what they promise in terms of policy responses, not
what was actually delivered. With few exceptions, state SPA's in-
dicated that they expected to adopt comprehensive state policies by
the December 1977 deadline. Yet, as of 1981, eighteen states had yet
to enact state policies while six states had elected to simply amend
public disclosure laws to reflect the need to observe criminal records
privacy considerations.
LEAA contracted with SEARCH Group, beginning in 1974, to conduct
a series of surveys to document policy approaches and progress which
states have made to implement procedures which bring them into com-
pliance with federal and/or state guidelines. The SEARCH Group
methodology involves the compilation and analysis of state statutes,
regulations, executive orders, or other formal policies in terms of
Title 28 and other policy categories addressed by the states but not
required by federal regulations. The resulting Compendium of State
Legislation Supplement (U.S. Department of Justice, 1978b; 1979) and
subsequent update published by OTA in 1981 provide an overview of state
progress and a useful source for more detailed comparisons between the
states. Such a comparison has been drawn between state dissemination
policies in a subsequent section of this chapter.
There are, however, three important limitations to the SEARCH
material. First, ambiguity and lack of specificity of state policies
may support different interpretations and judgements as to the extent
Of compliance. Second, the compendium and thus, the survey data upon
which it is based, only describes how states have adopted policy and
procedures required by LEAA; it does not indicate the extent to which
they have been implemented (operational ized) and what that implies
about state performance.
Finally, the SEARCH Group-having initiated the LEAA supported
effort to demonstrate the feasibility of a national CCH, long-time
proponent of state-originated standards, and eager to justify it's
continued consultative and technical assistance role with the states-
has been hardly in a position to objectively document state compliance.
The analysis of state compliance to Title 28 regulations does not appear
to be based on a close reading of state statutes nor a careful distinc-
tion of the actual administrative functions state agencies performed
with respect to security and privacy. For example, the number of
"independent" commissions classified as having administrative authority
for criminal records privacy regulations is greatly exaggerated because
state criminal justice commissions with policy advisory roles (formerly
SPA'S) are included even though they have no operational function in
privacy regulation.
A study LEAA commissioned in 1977 by the MITRE corporation was
intended to provide a more intensive examination of state implementation
activities which included both a quantitative survey (from an eighteen
state sample) of the extent to which procedures were implemented by
no
state and local criminal justice agencies and a qualitative assessment
(based on interviews) of common factors which facilitated or limited
progress toward substantial compliance (MITRE, 1977a; 1977b).
Although site selection criteria were not entirely clear, MITRE
appears to have selected a cross-section of states representing varying
levels of technological capacity, policy development and implementation
stages. The state of Washington was included in the survey. The survey
involved on-site administration of lengthy questionnaires to state and
local officials most closely involved in criminal justice information
systems with responsibility for compliance to Title 28 and state laws.
An important limitation of this format was reliance upon self-assessment
and crude estimates of record quality which could not be verified. The
survey questions, geared as they were towards probing technical or legal
barriers to implementation, tell us little about political factors while,
unsurprisingly, uncovering a whole raft of technical constraints.
Moreover, no clear criteria or standards are provided by the
study authors with which to justify classifying states in terms of
minimum, medium, and substantial compliance. These classifications
are particularly problematic because they fail to distinguish between
state and local policy adoption and actual implementation and/or
utilization of procedures. In addition, given the absence of base
line data, there is no way of determining whether any meaningful change
in state and local practice has occurred as a result of procedural
responses to the regulations.
These criticisms take on added relevance when examining the
Washington experience. Although MITRE classified the state as in
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medium compliance, at the ti.e the survey was conducted (September 1977)
n had been only three months since passage of state legislation and
the implementation process had barely begun. Interestingly, all states
Classified as in either substantial (two states) or medium (nine states)
compliance had state legislation, while all states falling in the
minimum category did not have such legislation. Therefore, the primary
standard of assessment of state and local progress toward compliance
appears to turn upon the presence or absence of state legislation. The
primary utility of the MITRE survey for this study is that it provides
one interpretation of state performance with which others may be
compared.
Perhaps the most comprehensive source of quantitative data which
documents both state utilization of federally-mandated procedures and
attributes of state performance with respect to record quality and
management practice is a study conducted by OTA (1982a). The purpose
of the OTA report was to identify the current status of criminal history
record systems in the United States; define alternatives for a national
computerized system; identify potential impacts of such a system; and
specify relevant policy issues needing Congressional attention.
The publication of the OTA report initiated in 1978 was delayed
several times by lack of funding and unexpected political pressure
emanating principally from Federal and state law enforcement officials.
With each successive draft (one in 1979 and two in 1981) a great deal
of the body of the report was trimmed because of a variety of objections
Including challenges to the adequacy of methodologies used to determine
record quality in federal and state repositories. Interestingly, law
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enforcement interests attempted to downplay divisiveness over gover-
nance, management and other issues pertinent to federalism, which
emerged early in the study, preferring to present a united front for
publ ic consumption.
One element of the analysis begun by OTA in 1978 and 1979
consisted of 130 intensive interviews with a wide variety of state
and local criminal justice officials and staff in over twenty states.
The interviews, excerpts of which are found throughout early draft
reports, probed beliefs and attitudes about the use of criminal justice
information in depth and elicited candid observations about problems
of federal-state relations in criminal justice as they relate to
inter-agency, informational relations.
Two primary messages revealed by the interview responses are
that the utility of a national CCH is questionable (compared to the
magnitude of cost) and that Title 28 regulations have had limited
efficacy in improving the quality of criminal information used in
routine decision-making.
In addition, an effort was also made to conduct sample record
quality audits of both the NCIC/Ident, CCH and several central state
repositories. The FBI, extremely critical of the results of the NCIC
audits, demanded that the work be repeated in two additional surveys
using their own definitions of data quality (regarding accuracy,
completeness, etc.). Ironically, their own 1979 audit showed considerably
poorer record quality (39 percent incomplete) than that documented by
OTA (27 percent) (OTA, 1982a: 91).
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Finally, following a preliminary report published by OTA (1978)
Which included statements by state officials sharply critical of FBI
domination of CCH proposals, the FBI and Department of Justice insisted
that additional surveys be conducted to determine potential consensus
on alternative designs for a CCH. These surveys (OTA, 1982a; U.S.
Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, 1981) generally in-
dicated that a consensus had been reached on the technical configuration
of the CCH system. These survey results were subsequently included in
the OTA final report.
Although the study was not specifically undertaken to determine
the results of Title 28 regulations, the OTA report also systematically
documents (through surveys completed in 1979 and 1981) state policy
responses as well as the extent of actual implementation of Title 28
requirements. Thus, the OTA provides a far more detailed profile than
studies by SEARCH Group and MITRE.
The next sections begin with a discussion of the early state
plans and then turn to the OTA reports to provide an overview of state
and local performance. Following this, the other survey data is pre-
sented in order to identify factors which account for the record
quality and management patterns which occurred. Performance in
Washington will be presented in the context of national patterns and
summarized in a concluding section.
State plans
Adverse responses to the 1974 draft regulations which mandated
compliance to all provisions within a thirty day period persuaded LEAA
to provide a more reasonable time period within which the states could
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take steps to achieve compliance. Consequently, final regulations
published in May 1975 gave the states until December 31, 1977, to
certify that "all procedures.
.
. [were1 fullv nno .L j t y operational and imple-
"(U.S. Department Of Justice, 1975: sec. 20.23). Prior to that
time, each state was required to submit a written plan which involved
significant criminal and non-criminal justice interests and specify
steps to be taken to comply with procedures set forth in the regula-
tions. Thus, each plan would certify that "to the maximum extent
feasible" action had been initiated to implement the plan. LEAA utilized
the planning document to evaluate whether the procedures adopted would
accomplish the required objectives.
Maximum extent feasible, in this subsection means actions
in thp'n?.n H
^° ^°^P^y.^^th the procedures set forthe pla that do not require additional lPnic;i.fiwo
^^^^o^^ty or involve unreasonable cost or do not exceed
w pn^^f'u'^L^uP'^''^^'^^ (Department of Justice, 1976d:bee. ^U. 22(a)). [Emphasis added.]
Thus, with the exception of provisions pertaining to individual
rights to access and review (already mandated by the Menard ruling, to
which immediate compliance was expected, LEAA provided considerable
leverage to the states to justify additional time to overcome any
obstacles. State plans would be required to enumerate legislative,
technical or fiscal constraints and describe steps taken to overcome
these barriers. States unable to satisfactorily implement all pro-
cedures could, upon a showing of good cause, request recerti f ication
of compliance each year until full compliance was achieved. LEAA
officials anticipated that a two year planning process would promote
development of comprehensive state legislation designed to address






they faced 'n achieving complete comp, iance.
Significant,,,
approximately 75 percent of the state plans
were developed and submitted 5y the State Planning Agencies,
„.iie
-t Of the rest were prepared
.y agencies responsible for maintenance
Of the central state repository, m this regard, Washington was one
Of only a handful of states to conduct an exhaustive commUtae and
Publ,c review process as recommended by LEAA. By 1982, i„ thirty-seven
states, state police, departments of public safety or highway patrols
exercised administrative authority over criminal records privacy
guide! ines.
in addition, state plans did not in most instances describe the
method for conduct of a statewide annual audit. Plans exhibited great
diversity in the sample size, frequency, and selection of criminal
Justice agencies to be audited. Although many state plans provided for
an independent audit of the central state repository, the states
generally assigned responsibility for local audits to the central state
repository. In this respect. Washington again differed substantially
from the norm by insisting that the audit function be conducted by a
non-criminal justice entity such as the State Auditor.
In other areas state plans acknowledged few difficulties. Some
reluctance, however, was expressed with respect to satisfying the intent
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Of p.ov,s,ons for i„,i.,,,„
^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
that states be permitted to st.^ctu.e guidelines on individual access
in ways that ™ini.i.ed the potential burdens involved if inundated by
such requests. State plans also displayed several variations in
proposed dissemination policy. Tbese variations were largely the
product Of constant changes in LEAA dissemination policy until a final
version in 1976.
Finally, state plans indicated that a combination of legal
and technical problems limited tbeir capacity to respond to the federal
privacy mandate. Both types of problems appeared to center upon the
role of the Central State Repository (CSR). Lacking sufficient regula-
tory authority, the CSR was unable, in many instances, to achieve a
level of arrest and disposition reporting sufficient to satisfy
completeness requirements. In addition, their inability to handle
local inquiries in a timely fashion limited CSR's usefulness and
effectiveness.
LEAA concluded from the plan review process that prior technical
capacity and the existence of comprehensive state legislation were the
two most important factors contributing to the successful implementation
of a state plan. The Summary clearly indicates that most states planed
to introduce state legislation although specifically not required to
do so:
It should be noted that while the regulations did not require
the enactment of state legislation, the plan review indicated
that nearly all states had enacted or were planning to enactimplementing legislation (U.S. Department of Justice, 1976b: 3)
The only data available regarding NCIC/rrH
to the 1979 OTA st„H
'"'^''^ P''^"'-





f^T^^^^^^^^^^--^^^ - report dis~red
co.plete co.rt dispositions
in addU,on, although no n^erica, values were provided, the report
''"'^™-
-te.atlo e.ort to .easj
'
record
.am. in both federal and state criminal Justice indorsation
systems
A record gualit. audit involves the atte.pt to trace a record
n^amtalned i„ one s.ste. to its origin in another in order to determine
Whether the record contains the sa.e information. While methodologies
are available which involve surveys of end users or decision
.a.ers
the OTA undertook a sample of active cases recently disseminated by'
the NCIC. This method offers clear advantages in terms of accuracy
compared to other methods in which representativeness may be compro-
-sed by a low survey return and variations in quality of computational
processes utilized by respondents to a survey. Two different federal
data bases were involved in the OTA surveys: the FBI Identification
Division's manual criminal history file and the NCIC/CCH file.
The results of the NCIC/Identiflcation and CCH record quality
survey are presented in Table 5. IhO»most.vianif1ca^^
ajA]laL^roblems_for both files Involved t..
-^^-r-ttimi
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Arrests not verifiable because
Pending or sealed
No record locatable
No prosecution of arrest
Fugitive
No arrest data
Total arrest cases verified
Results :
Actual disposition not recorded on
record
Disposition occurred more than
120 days prior to sample
Oisposition occurred less than
120 days prior to sample
Disposition occurred after sample
Disposition data unknown
Record otherwise incomplete when
compared to local record
Shows sentence but no conviction
information
Shows conviction but not
correctional information
Record inaccurate when compared
to local record
Disposition information does not
agree
Charging information does not
agree
Sentencing information does not
agree
Record ambiguous when compared
to local record
Shows more dispositions than












































SOURCE: OTA, 1982a: 92-93).
n,.;,iitw n^^Ki'
^^^^?^9h many records exhibited more than one recordquality problem, only one per record is counted above. Earliest date
of sampling was 7/24/79 for Ident, 8/12/79 for CCH
Monnation, when cc.pa.ed with ^''for::;~7~Z;:;::X^^
position ™eant that a ccu.t disposition was shown in a ioca,
.eco..
^ut .issin, in the fede.a,
.eco.d.
,„accu.ate
.eant that the disposi-
tion, Charges o. sentence appeaHn, in the fede.a,
.eco.d did not a,.ee
wUh the disposition, charges or sentence in the local record.
Thus, of the 168 verifiable Ident arrest events, 49 (or 29 6
percent) failed to contain dispositions and 34 (or 20.2 percent) were
-accurate. In addition, of the 165 verifiable NCIC/CCH arrest events
45 (or 27.2 percent) contained no disposition and 32 (or 19.4 percent)
were inaccurate.
other recent studies of record quality underscore problems of
record incompleteness: An FBI sample in 1979 found that 39.4 percent
Of arrests in the NCIC/CCH file did not contain dispositions. In
addition, a 1980 study by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory found that
Ident receives dispositions on only 45 percent of the reported arrests
(OTA, 1982a.- 91). The differences between these sample findings and
OTA can be explained in part by a difference in methodology. As Table
5 indicates, OTA removed from consideration those cases which were
still pending, sealed, if no prosecution had occurred or if the record
was not locatable. Had these records been included, particularly
records not locatable, they would have been included among "no disposi-
tions reported." Thus, as the OTA report acknowledges, its analysis
tends to understate the true level of arrests without dispositions.
To summarize, the problem of record incompleteness (no disposi-
tions) constitutes the most serious record quality problem for federal
These findings about record quality in the NCIC/CCH fi,»"^it LL le are somewhat
surprising given the fact that thP rai .1
,
™' that submission of record
«
ta participating states (eig.t, is regulated b. strict standards
^i^i^iMitorles. Problems with record quality ta.e on an
added Significance when considered in lig.t of the fact that the eig.t
states Who fully participate account for 66.5 percent of the total
criminal history records submitted by all states to the NCIC/CCH
Record quality also appears to be the most significant problem
Of central state repositories where record incompleteness may vary from
15 to as much as 42 percent or more (OTA. 1982a: 93-94). Compared to
other states record quality in Washington is rather poor. Significantly
although the Washington state central repository is fully automated and
state law mandates state court reporting of disposition information,
central state repository personnel indicated in 1981 that between 30
and 40 percent of state criminal records are incomplete. At the local
level there is little quantitative data available concerning the quality
Of criminal records in most states although some limited was available
in Washington state. However thp mttrf (^Q-7-7.\nu , zne Ni I KE (1977a) survey respondents note
that record completeness was "variable."
Wide variations among states regarding the level of arrest and
court disposition information, lack of monitoring procedures and in-
frequency of audits directly contribute to problems of state record
quality. Most states now require state courts to report case disposition
(see Table 6).
1
Table 6. Institutional Basis for Court Di sposition Reporting.
A formal system mandated by statute
A formal system by agreement with courts
An informal system

















There are substantial differences between the percentage of
arrests versus court dispositions reported to the central state repos-
itory. Arrests are reported, on average, at a much higher rate than
court dispositions (82 versus 66 percent) (OTA, 1982a: 100). This is
true in Washington state where arrests are reported 95 percent of the
time while court dispositions only 60 percent (MITRE, 1977a: 39).
This disparity is surprising given a fully automated state court
information system which has the capability of rapid retrieval of trial
court dispositions for transmission to the central state repository.
There has been only marginal improvement in court disposition
reporting since 1970 as shown in Table 7. Compared to a General




or .ore dispositions reported had doubled (..o. seven to thirteen
states), twenty-two or 48.8 percent of the statP. r. ^•es continued to receiveless than 65 percent of available case dispositions.




JO Study OTA Study
Dls£0^iyon_Rep^^ 1982 OTA Study













^2 24.4% 26.8% 25.5%
More than 90%:
Number of States 7
Percent
z J 2 13 13
.
^±^^' 29.3% 31.7% 27 7%
SOURCE: OTA, 1982a: 102.
State record management
and enforcement
There are also wide variations between the states with respect
to utilization of procedures to monitor and update delinquent court
dispositions. For example, as Table 8 indicates, while about 60 percent
of central state repositories periodically utilize procedures to monitor
the availability of court dispositions, the rest of the states do so
only infrequently or not at all. There also appear to be substantial
differences in the rigor of procedures used to determine compliance.
Some states use onsite visits while most others including Washington
rely on self-reporting (OTA, 1981) i„ tuu
repository in WasMnotoy-Was.,ngton.uststil,
conduct a.anua, review Of files[for reasons discusspd in e ke in subsequent chapters) even th. . .
CSR and ^f^^^ both thestate court files are fully automated.
Disposition']^ state Agencies to Monitor Court
1979 Number 1982 Number
~~
'
°I States of Sf;itpc
Automated review of file
^iates__
17 ( 34.7%) 19 ( oo oo/^
Manual review of file ^
'^^
8 ( 16.3%) n ( 22 A<y^Sometimes inquire of courts before
"
dissemination
5 ( 10.2%) 4 ( 8 2°/)
No review of delinquent dispositions is ( 36 i. . o
"
Don-t know ^ ^
''''''^
1 ( 2.0%) 1 ( 2.0%)
_______
49 ( 100.0%) 49 (100.0%)
Total
SOURCE: OTA, 1982a: 104.
In addition, only a few state agencies (thirteen) have made any
effort to conduct an audit of Information stored in the central state
repository. Significantly, only eleven states (as of 1979) have con-
ducted systematic audits of local user agency files (see Table 9)
Again. Washington does not differ in this regard from the majority of
states. Washington's only audit was done when records were converted
to automated files during 1974 and 1975.
13 ( 26.5%
Conducted quality audit




SOURCE: OTA. 1982a: 105.
Significantly. LEAA's
.onUoring and enforcement efforts have
focused almost entire,, on procedural compliance. Not surprisingly
the profile which emerges shows extensive procedural adoption yet 1 ittl
evidence of substantial change In record management processes or
improvement In record quality. Our review of the available data
suggests that a great deal of progress has been made with respect to
getting the states to both develop policy and adopt procedures mandated
by TUle 28 and to increasing the technical capacity of state and local
criminal justice agencies to implement these procedures. Technical and
legal constraints were cited by both LEAA (U.S. Department of Justice
1976b) and MITRE (1977b) as constituting the most significant barriers
to effective Implementation and compliance. Since then there have
been significant changes In both areas. There has been substantial
improvement in the capacity of central state repositories to collect
and store criminal history information and ability to service state
and local agency needs.
Legal 5a.n-e.s to effective state policy control and
.egulatiohave also been largely removed. As the SEARCH r ,
each st.t. H . indicates,a e has chosen a process thm.mt, .
.
.
^ "^''^ '^'^^ ^°^^'cies have beenadopted to satisfy the federal mandate Yet most . .
, ,
"^o^ states thirty-seven)have lodged regulatory control in a .t.. ^state law enforcement agency and
only
.arely in independent commissions (eight). Also, the powers of
-PosUory (CSR) to collect arrest and disposition
data have been greatly expanded. Prior to 1974 n t .r 1974, only a few CSR's had
statute, authon-t. to collect ar.est and disposition 1nfo™t1on; as
Of 1981. every CSR .as the statutory authority to collect arrest In.or-
nation and ^st states (thirty-five) have either statutory or policy
authority to collect disposition Information fro. the courts {OTA
1982a: 101).
State dissemination pol lev
and practice
This profile of uniform procedural compliance disguises many
differences in policy content (e.g.. dissemination policy) and the extent
to which states and localities actually utilize procedures and enforce
state and local agency compliance with federal and/or state guidelines.
Although nearly half of the states have Imposed a uniform
dissemination policy on state and local criminal justice agencies
through state statute, the rest have adopted other methods which Include
CSR legislation, open records laws, executive orders, or administrative
procedures. While state statutes are applicable to all criminal justice
agencies, eighteen other state policies govern onij, CSR dissemination
procedures (see Table 10).
Record Dlssemnatio^"po'ncy!°''" ''"'^ "^'^ Criniinal History
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state repository enabling legislation
Public or open records law
State repository agency policy
Executive order











NOTE: compiled fro™ U.S. Department of Justice,
,978b; 1979.
LEAA's policy on dissemination permitted the states substantial
discretion to develop policy for the dissemination of conviction and
non-conviction information. Not surprisingly, as Table 11 reveals
from an analysis of LEAA's Cosendium^^stateU^^
„9;8 and
1979) the states exercised that discretion to produce several different
policy variations. While about half of the states' dissemination
policies, including Washington's, conform closely to one of three policy
positions advanced by LEAA at different times, and thus do satisfy
statutory intent, the policies exhibit wide variability in legal
authority, applicability and local implementation.
Group lA states (seven) include states with dissemination
policies which restrict access to both conviction and non-conviction
information, and thus, are closest to LEAA's 1974 draft regulations.
ment, by^?e]r o}' Adopt']on^!°"' Dissemination Policy and Manage
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III. States with Other Approaches '














Compiled from U.S. Department of Justice, 1978b; 1979,
^Regulatory authority in independent commission.
by state^ra:"rn?^rc°e:e:rrgenc;'' "
'''''''''' '^''^''''^ ^^"^^^^^"^
^Management by personal information system board.
Management by state law enforcement agency in all states
without superscripts. j
xa.i bid
O^-se states. A,as. ana Hassacusetts Haa pass, state cH.na,
—
-i-.l»s^,„
- p.,ncat,-on 0. t.e „M .an
.e,U-
-ns. A s,,„,-.cant c.a.acteHstic o. states . 3.o„p u
.h..h pe.centa,e(„ to ct.e. po.-c. ,.o„ps, o. t.e states
.ave
create, separate co™Us,o„s to a«„,ste. state policy an.
.e,uUt1ons





.egolations n.it dissemination o,
cn.1na, history record information to „o„-cri.ina, Justice use, if a
state statute or executive order
.akes criminal conduct the basis for
exclusion fro. licensing or employment. The state of Washington is
included in this group of states because it also ma.es access contingent
on whether criminal conduct is the basis of the exclusion. In most
other respects, the Washington statute is similar to those character-
istics of states typified by Group IC.
Group IC states (nine) have adopted state laws or policies most
Similar to LEAA's 1976 version of the Title 28 regulations. These states
demonstrate the most specificity in distinguishing conviction and non-
conviction information and permit dissemination of non-conviction
information for an^ purpose (except Washington), as provided by either
state statute, executive or court order or local ordinance.
Across these three categories, several states have added
innovations of their own which have the effect of restricting the
exchange of non-conviction information between criminal justice agencies.
The states of Alabama (Group IB), Kansas and Louisiana (Group IC) require
that criminal justice agencies demonstrate that they have a "need to
know" such information for purposes pertaining onl^ to the administration
of criminal justice. Presumably this reauUti .
order tn ,i
'•^Qulation has been adopted ino discourage the practice {discussed in rh .
criminal i
Chapter VI) whereby
~' ^"""^ ^9---" utilized as intermediaries bjustice u<;er5 I ... y non-criminalsers.
,„ addition, Georgia (Group lA) requires nn •justice agencies which gain access to
-n-nminal
or loa
information to recordg all secondary disseminations Of that information
Sroup I, consists of eighteen states which have adopted policiesWhich apply only to criminal history information collected and
by the centra, state repository Thus the di
K
'"^ "i^emination policy adoptedby these states may be classified as less restrictive th" '^"'^'^ictiv an any version
Of the UAA Title 28 regulations. This group is subdivided between
states regulating CSR disseminations either through state statute
formal policy or informal administrative procedure, ynlike states in
Group 1, these states tend to be either less restrictive with respect
to dissemination of non-conviction information or closely paralleling
the 1976 LEAA regulations.
Group I„A includes six states which have adopted comprehensive
open records laws which specifically include the regulation of criminal
history records. What distinguishes these states from other states in
which open record laws have preceeded the development of criminal
records privacy policy is that the open records law specifies the
conditions under which criminal record information may be disseminated.
Texas and Utah, for example, place no restrictions on dissemination
of conviction or non-conviction information while the other states
(Florida, Ohio, West Virginia and Wyoming) closely approximate the 1976
LEAA, Title 28 regulations.
Of the three remaininq statpc t«




-A ,..en„es, t.e state 0. vo.
^e.ulates c.-.„a,
..to.,
.co.s t.o„,. a statute pena.., to
employment practices.
Finally, U is evident fro. an OTA fifty-state survey that
state use of procedures to review local dissemination activity Is In-frequent and unsystematic. Only twelve states
,.4.5 percent, used sue.
procedures frequently.
„Mle most ot.er states either reviewed local
logs only when a specific abuse was Indicated (twenty-nine states or
59.2 percent) or not at all (six states nr 19 c
^
o 12.2 percent (OTA, 1982a: 105)
There is also a great deal of unevenness in local implementation
Of dissemination policy. Some localities have elected, through local
ordinance, to construe eligible reasons for access to non-conviction
information very broadly to include licensing and other employment and
credit-related purposes, which is often inconsistent with state policy
Thus, local custom and policy often prevail as to the availability of
criminal record information (OTA, 1982a).




As the December 31, 1977, deadline drew near for states to
demonstrate full compliance with the Title 28 privacy regulations,
LEAA commissioned a comprehensive survey in September by the MITRE
Corporation to assess the extent of state compliance. As a result of
the survey (published in December 1977) which documented substantial
deficiencies in overall compliance efforts. LEAA permitted the states
to request an extension of up to ei„ht»„
^ ^O"-^ requirements!to demonstrate satisfactory compliance. Significant,, t.
-compliance was tie. to t.e conclusion o st r."^"
-
-









.ut insisted for t.e first time that
Of record quality that had been achieved as a result of i ,^ '^"''I implementation
or LEAA mandated procedures.
The MITRE study determined that states were confronted with
two types Of difficulties in attaining satisfactory compliance: factors
external to the regulations indicative of the environment of implemen-
tation and factors internal to the regulations themselves, such as
'ack Of specificity and clarity of intent which caused difficulties
in interpretation and implementation (1977b: vii).
Factors considered by MITRE to be external to the regulations
include the political environment, financial capabilities and inter-
agency coordination mechanisms, m addition, several other factors
were enumerated which included insufficient time to achive compliance,
lack of precise state mandates, lack of appropriate legislation, lack
Of sufficient resources, local practices which limit change and
tendencies to link compliance with automation of criminal history
record systems. Not surprisingly the study authors conclude:
Because these factors are exogenous to the regulations
^'^"^ ^bout the problems heygenerate which could be ameliorated by changes in thecontent ,n the regulations (MITRE, 1977b J?")
Although MITRE devoted an enti.e vol^e of Us two ,
"
- -e.a, tacto., these
.a t
only Of secondary significance •
"""'^^^^





" '"""^^^^ thatdifficulties encountered in state an. i ,
were rooted either in the f / -P'«entation efforts
^
'^-selves or occurredbecause of the absence of st;>to i ,state legislation and/or detailed regulations.
MITRE ranked the eighteen 5t,t«,
„f , .
^ '"'•^^^^<^ *nto three categories
-oMiance:
—tial co™. iance (two states.
.
.diu. co.lLce
-"—).--1.al compliance <se.en states,, m.tre presentedfourmaoor findings inferred fro. the data utilised to rank order the
states. Pirst, the study concluded that "long ter. prior involvement
-h the privacy and security implementation is a reliable indicator of
successful compliance" (MITRE, 1977b: viii). The two states in sub
stantial compliance had comprehensive legislation and long term
involvement in privacy and security implementation prior to the 1975
regulations. States considered in medium compliance, including
Washington, had passed some kind of legislation to conform with the
regulations, hut were still in the process of implementing procedures
States falling short of medium compliance had not yet passed enabling
legislation.
The second finding stressed that passage of comprehensive state
legislation tended to greatly facilitate progress towards compliance.
Legislation was considered comprehensive if it addressed all aspects
Of the regulations and specified an agency to exercise administrative
authority.
Third, the MITRE survey concluded that-
content lacked spe??f citv c^r '"'"^'^^^ to ful
"naU„ the MURE report ,Uted severa, other
.actors w.ic.
appear to contribute to diffir.nt,- •
^'^•^^^ving compliance. These
r:;.'""""^
Resources, contusion as to interpretation o.
-9ulat,ons. traditional practice and absence o. automated systems
Significant,,, in nearly every instance in which MITRE found
deficiencies in procedural compliance, a connection was established
to ambiguities originating in the Title ^s regulations. Supplementary
-terview data suggested three overall sources of confusion originating
-
the regulations. First, many local agencies were uncomfortable
wUh the Wide latitude of discretion they had to interpret local
dissemination policy and implement the general provisions It is
evident from the MITRE survey that state and local officials sought a
"nghf interpretation rather than that which best fit local conditions
and policy orientations (1977b: 6).
second, what seemed particularly unclear was the exact role
intended for the state repository: some viewed it only as a passive
recipient of local criminal history files; others interpreted its role
to include active regulation, monitoring and enforcement of data
quality requirements. Confusion regarding the state repository's role
was determined to have caused delays in local implementation activities.
Finally, the MITRE study concluded th.t .
of thp . .
"^^"^ ^^^^ "^^ch of the ambiguity
0^ e states, .ole .Sides in the doctn-ne Of fede.lis..
within the states rut on ' ;^p1emen?at?onwho IS to take the init at .'l the question of
This has Often resuUed ?n a nrnn'°"^P^^'"'^ activities,
states. In some states molemp^tf ' .^^^^^"^^te in many
responsibilities as beina ??m?f
^^^''^' ^'"^ perceived their
level activities, onen^ ocal1/'^"'^'P'^^^ t° ^tate
little to achieve comp an ^ e ^^^^^^
^re doing
upon state level implementer^ fni n w^^^^^ '"^^t wait
Frequently, when the state does rn^p J'"'' '"^ procedures,
and procedures, localities h.tl n
°^t^^th guidelines
inactive 0. ,oca, n^^Jr.^rp^-S-r^Mf?^,^;,^?"^
„
™^ "'™^ -"^-onc,u.e. t.at t.e pn„.. avenue to
.eanzation
Of greater progress 1„ state and ,oca, compliance included t.ree
Pnndpal elen^nts: (,) Congressional amendments which clarified the
TUle 28 regulations, particularly on dissemination policy, and spec-
ified a more precise role for the centr;,! ct.^n tral state repository; (2) passage
of comprehensive state leqislatinn- ;,nH M^ •g o , and, (3) increased federal enforce-
ment and technical assistance to help state and ln..i^ n i local agencies interpret
and properly implement required procedures (MITRE. 1977a: 24-25).
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
To summarize, in most respects the state of Washington exper-
ienced technological development in criminal Justice information systems
comparable to the more advanced states. As Table 12 indicates, the
state profile of technological capacity (i.e., central state repository
computerization) is similar to or better than that of the majority of
states. Although not a full participant in the NCIC/CCH, the state
repository has been fully computerized since 1974. Not all jurisdictions
1 35








Cr?mi l' eco'rdr ff'^lf'^'^'^^^^ 1574.
Off-line acces to ciC H-'liorf??-Partial on-line servke to fou° Jh I P^''*l;*P^"t i" NCIC/CCH programlinked through teletype Jurisdictions; the rest are
?SuTcS^pui^;:?Li^c\rp"??r"'
Two subject-in-p?o ess ioi 'case':'"'^ ^^"^^ repositoriesState court information ?v,;»m f,r"^5enient systems.£artici£aMoij:eS^^ but trial court
Regulation
CSR also mandated by court rule
<^'5P°sition reporting to
0 mil a"d"?;?f/?::?^siLr:s^)?s"^-'^ r'^^^p uv^.w,,^.0 Comprehensive <;t;,to n^-w i ™ regulations^.
rest^iclJo^rordlLe^^J^^^o
^V;^*c1i:S^]°r
non-conviction information determi„»rf k J
information; access to
ordinance; dissemination of non-convttlon t f ""^I"?^
^"^
pre-dissemination guidelines ?? I 1"^°™'^°" governed by
maintenance of a log) ' "













Arrest reporting estimated at 95%
~
Disposition reporting estimated at 60-65%
TcZUZlZr-- °' ^'^'^ '-"-mplete.
aTs^^oi-ir]?ss^:n':?!onr^
i>tate logging of disseminations- 95-100%
0 Local agency logging: 6-% compliance.
0 S?a?e audiV'-'
''j^^'^^^' have conducted sample audit of files0 t t dit: sample audit conducted in 1981 to pre-test s. rvpv in
_^trument; no syst^emati^udits have been condurtPH ^ '"'^'^
in 1980.'^^'
Washington State Patrol assumed administrative authority
re^orUnlr^^^^^^^^^ -"^^^^^ court disposition
have on-line access to the CSR but reqional .g information system<; ^-n
p. , ;; ;;






.as aUo a.opte. comprehensive legislation w.icClose,, contorts to policies reco^ended UAA guidelines m
-Hion. an independent agenc. (the State Planning
.,enc,)„as given
--,strat.e and regulator, authority. Finally, the legislation
P-v,des that the administrative agency may contract with the state
Chosen to maintain audit authority within the control of state law
enforcement.
in spite Of these characteristics, the state's actual perfor-
^anagement practices between localities is highly variable, and state
ehforce^ent is negligible. Court disposition reporting to the CSR
lags well behind arrest infor^tion. Thus. 30 to 40 percent of state
files (in June 1980) were incomplete or inaccurate. Only about one-
half Of criminal justice agencies conduct pre-dissemination queries to
the CSR, as mandated by federal and state law. and only an estimated
60 percent of that number make any effort to log disseminations. In
addition, local audits are rarely conducted and a state-wide audit has
yet to be conducted.
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.appe.e. t.e wa. t.e.
... T.e.e a.e i.eimportant recurrent feature^; nf fh. ^ .r tures o the data regarding nationwide perfor-
mance which suggest factors which may explain thp"'dy e gap between intended
goals and act.al performance. Briefly, t.ese performance features
-elude (1) comprehensive state laws „1t. variations 1„ dissemination
policy; (2) discontinuity between procedural compliance and the
frequency of actual utilization of procedures and the lac. of enforce-
ment; (3) negligible efforts to improve record quality; (4) lack of
reporting of court dispositions; and (5) the absence of ev,dence of
Change in local practice.
The first important feature of the data presented here Is that
although states have adopted several variations of federal dissemina-
tion policy, marked by differences in scope of applicability, nearly
half the states have adopted comprehensive legislation imposing uniform
dissemination policies and other procedures on state and local criminal
justice agencies as recommended by LEAA. The utilization of state
legislative processes to respond to and adopt a federal mandate would
seem to constitute a particularly significant measure of the importance
that state officials attach to state adoption of a particular federal
-J—^ --s . cose,, e... .e ...e.e .
the,.po.tanceoft.e.o,eofstateof.c1aUan.ot.e.,„te.ests
'
invoke, in development o. a ,e,.,at,ve consensus, a. t.e .ent.
^-atlon Of interests and factors fo™at1ve 1„ subsequent guideline
development processes.
Another feature of the pattern of state compliance which invites
further analysis is the evident discontinuity or disparity between the
extent of procedural compliance and the frequency with which such
procedures are actually utilized and/or enforced hy state regulatory
agencies,
.here policy is endorsed by a state legislative process and
a state commission or agency is given sufficient authority and jurisdic-
tion to enforce compliance, it would not be unreasonable to expect more
evidence of actual use of procedures (or evidence of their use through
the consequent improvement in record quality) than has been the case.
What needs to be explained, then. Is why the seeming perfunctory
procedural compliance but absence of performance Improvement and change.
Is it, as the MITRE report indicates, because of ambiguity or uncer-
tainty among state or local criminal justice officials as to their
respective roles and responsibilities with respect to control over
records management practices? Are state and local criminal justice
officials simply Ignoring the state mandate or are they refusing to
comply with state guidelines? Or, alternatively, do a combination of
political factors which Include organizational conflicts, the relative
—.en.es, an.
.„e..., e,Ue
the relative importance of these factors in th.t .
.
^ ,
^^^^ two different agenciest.e State PUnn.n,







Perhaps the most conspicuous finding of all surveys reviewed
^ere 1s the negligible. 1f not laC, of change In the quality of federal
-pcsltor. records since 1967. As Chapter I indicates, a co.hlnatlon
Of technical and political factors have limited the expansion of the
NCIC/CCH program. Political reasons have included conflicts over
bureaucratic jurisdiction, federalism, protection of constitutional
nghts and privacy and others. In addition, full participation in the
NCIC/CCH has been negligible because few states are able to satisfy
standards established by the FBI with respect to technical capacity
(e.g., computerization of state files and automated linkages to local
record files), accuracy and completeness, and timeliness. It is
evident from the data on the quality of records In the federal repo-
sitory that even those states considered to have satisfied technical
standards have not solved problems of record quality. Thus, the extent
of computerization alone is no guarantee that states are able to
effectively control record quality and Integrity. Moreover, the
enlargement of state regulatory control over state and local records
management practices, resulting from the passage of a federal mandate.
has not appeared to have had a measureable effert
the state and
, oca,
, eve, Thus h
°" "---^ "
case study of one state's experience is to identlfv tart
Hmit<.H i„ ,
'o i y c ors which have1-ned ,oca, compliance to federa, and state regulation.
Further, although most state renn.it, •
to Obtain „ .
^eposttortes no« have the authority
17 -— -position information, the
"
- -
-e most Significant de ect
'n record qua,ity at federal, state and





-ers doctrine has contributed tothe exemption of the courts from regulation under Tit,e 28. Nonethe-
less, court cooperation is essentia, to attaining the objectives of
accuracy and comp,eteness. «hat is of particu,ar interest to an
ana,ysis of one state's experience, then, is what has been the response
Of state and trial court officials toward the privacy mandate; what
pomica, and organizational factors limit cooperation or coordination
wnh other agencies; and what effects these factors have had on the
amenability of other criminal justice officials to state guidelines
and execution of implementation responsibilities.
Fi-nally, the available data tells us a great deal about state
responses to and performance under Title 28, but little about the
reactions of local criminal justice officials and agency personnel.
What have been the factors which influence responses of local law
enforcement officials, for example, to state regulatory authority?
What have been their perceptions of and attitudes toward the privacy
mandate? What effects do local law enforcement, prosecutors and other
officials expect state regulation of record management to have on
organizational functions and effective
. .
, ,
-recti law enforcement? Thereforehow do these beliefs a)-tit„H„ .
>=reTo ,
„ , ,
expectations contribute to our
understanding of state anHd local responses and performance and con-
e.uent nationwide patterns Of coMiance. The presentation of theWashington case in the next three chapters wi„ probe these issues
in more depth.
CHAPTER IV
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE DECISION MAKING
IN WASHINGTON, 1975-1977
As we begin an examination of the Washington experience with
the federal cH.na, records privacy amendment,
„e note that i™p,e.en-
t.t,on passed through three distinct phases. This chapter treats the
first phase, lasting from 1975 to 1977 wh.vt, •1977, which involved the development
of a state plan and adoption of state leai<;i;,tinn aiLd egislatio despite numerous
political Obstacles. Then, Chapter V is concerned with how administra-
tive guidelines were developed in 1977 and 1978. Finally, Chapter VI
deals with the abortive attempts to improve record quality and concur-
rent revisions in the state policy and reassignment of administrative
responsibility to the State Patrol between 1979 and 1981.
State Elites: The Consensus of Indiffprpnro
In many respects, it is surprising that the State of Washington
ever adopted criminal records privacy legislation. The Washington
State ACLU chapter had sponsored criminal records privacy bills in 1974
and 1975, but neither made it out of committee and both were quickly
forgotten. Like so many conditions which LEAA had attached to receipt
of aid, Washington state officials responded to the criminal records
privacy mandate with a similar air of routine and resignation. Even
the completion and submission of a plan to LEAA in 1976, which promised
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session,was no guarantee t.at a statute wou,, actually 5e adopted
T.ere„e.e seve.aweatu.es o.t.epo,U.a,
e„.>o™ent and
criminal records privacy leoi.l,t,-„
.
=
a rather dim prospect. Primarily
- - «es ... „uld
.ve to
converted into a state plan; an Attorney General whn"e g o was ambivalent
about security and privacy reaulation^- . a
,,,, ,
^"^^ Of state department
heads Who preferred not to be given responsibility for administration
Of the regulations.
By 1977 Daniel Evans was nearing the end of this third term as
a popular Republican governor who had deeded not to run again Then
Dixy Lee Ray, former head of the Atomic Energy Co™ission and political
neophyte running as a Democrat, unexpectedly defeated Republican Oohn
Spellman (King County Executive) in the November 1977 election.
Prior to this, in 1975 Evans had requested that Attorney General
Slade Gorton, Chairman of the Governor's Committee on Law and Justice
establish a special Advisory Committee on Security and Privacy to assist
in the drafting of a state plan to satisfy LEAA regulations. The
Advisory Committee, under the guidance of Assistant Attorney General
James O'Connor, was able after nearly a year of deliberations and
compromise to fashion a forward looking plan which commanded a solid
consensus among both criminal and non-criminal justice interests.
However. Attorney General Gorton made it clear on two separate
occasions that he was ambivalent if not unsupportive of the LEAA
cnm,nal records privacy regulations i„ particular
.
PHvacy statute in general Sort
'
comprehensive
. G on was invited to testify beforeCongress in October 1975 when a h,-ii'^/b, a bill sponsored by Senator Hruska wasintroduced to provide statutory guideline, f. •
at
s or criminal records privacy ^
i^egulations were still in = ^'^cr b iM in a comment and revipw ^f:>n^ ^ ,,
p ,
^''^^^ ^^^gS' 3nd Hruska asked
If Gorton would comment on them Here . cis a segment of that exchange-
Depart:enro?'5usti?: decent! v' i'"T^^ ^^^-^ ' thetaining to crimina jusl ce r^o^ds ^^^^^^^^^ Per-




that they convert material ?hJ i '^ "mfications and
public information ?o ?esJr,rted ?^f' ™f considered
encountered any reac?ion1n"Sa1 relZT^"'
""^
law n orcelenf aoenc?:sTf"'S''' -"-'^t-" on non-
traditionalTy and'historirll?^^™'"' "^^"^ ^"d
to get at some of s fo l^t n'
r^ovlr^t^^ they"t™nrbi??^g^Tl^7{n?t^s
tions'^n genera"!?"™'"' °"
'''' '''' ^ °" '"egula-
thi.'^''' '^J^°"- ' I tip not wish to testifv st
b asked '?he"r''P''' ^^"J^^*- ' ha ve j s{oeen , the Governor has iust asked mv nff^vl ^




h;,vp hnon"^^^ f^iT^' ''^^^'•^P ^ national CCH discussed in Chapter I
P?:- : fn^^)^-^ - -ord man eit
Ka? en'' Tr^in'^s 'o^oo^^r .^^^"^^'^P^^ stan^da'rds'^or^reguL'i n
Sendent nationa hn.^H f ^^^^'^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ed aninaepenaent l board to develop and enforce more riaorous andrestrictive controls (Marchand, 1980: 167-202). ^^Q
I can say this. I have hppn th^ • •
considerable amounts of oMeclions o/'''^'"^ °^the type of which you st^tn^ °^ J^^'^ exactly
n^ent agencies anS non- a'f n oTce^^^r^o^the severity of these r^^tlZ/^ agencies about
fact that they do ?n ?art L ^^e
other governmental en es toZlT 'nV''. °^stand that they are beinn rnnc.-!^ : ^ '^'^der-
of Justice, an^ o'ur ow Ita' ^ Ss^^.^l^^^Pftment
comments known on that subject Rntiin a position to be specif c on i? '^'^^^t-e (U.S. senate Jud?ciar"co:m;tt:e/?976'r"'
When Senator Hruska next asked Attorney General Gorton to
comment on the LEAA program to deal with
'"career criminals," he
suggested that the proposed Title ?r ^on. i ^•a nt 28 regulations may undermine these
efforts
:
Sen. Hruska. Now. the I FAA ic cr.,.^ 4.-
dealing with the so-cal d ca"ee p I*'"?.^ f,\T""
e.cept hTtr;T?^.a^^ r?.- 1^^^^^^^
Do you feel there is a need for efforts in thi.direction to try to deal particularly ad specf 5a Ivwith the prosecution of career criminals a such^ ^What comment would you have on that?
Maybe you have a state plan that gets into thatMr. Gorton. Senator, I do agree that Jhis is a"
s?g Ifi :n?as""?hr"r' V'' the'more
of previous rri^p! "
ap£rwin2_Ui^^
wnetner or not the defendant had proper legal advice '^^tthe time he was convicted for these prev ous cH^esthat IS to say, the proof that he is, in ?act Jhe
d??f cu t'n7^"'i '''''' ''''''''^ ^^^^
[Emphasis Lded.f ' '''''''''
Not only was it difficult to get state officials excited about
criminal records privacy legislation but it was evident that a consensus
was going to be difficult to achieve on which agency should undertake
responsibility for administration and enforcement of criminal records
privacy guidelines. One problem was that there were no agencies which
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«ere either appropriate or willing to accept fu. .•J 1-0 the administrative
responsibility for implementation of such guidelines
-1ch state agency Should assume administra-
to a head at the oece^er i.e,
.eeting
the security and Privacy Advisory Committee. Phil Winberry
Administrator for the State Courts and chairman of the Advisor^
Co»ittee. conducted a discussion regarding administrative options
several agencies were discussed which included: a new Department of
Justice, the State Auditor, the Attorney General, the Identification
section of the Washington State Patrol th. n ^ ny i i , the Data Processing Authority
the Department of Corrections and a new securitv .nH n.sy a d privacy commission
an alternative recommended by LEAA and strongly favored by O'Connor,
staff to the advisory committee (O'Connor, 1975).
The Department of Justice option was advanced because many
expected passage of legislation proposed in the House to create such
a department. Pending creation of this department, it was recommended
that interim responsibility be assigned to the Attorney General.
Nonetheless, strong objections were made to both alternatives. First,
1t seemed inappropriate and premature to assign responsibility to an
'
agency not yet established, and to vest a regulatory function in the
Attorney General's office would create a conflict of interest with its
primary responsibility for prosecution of violations of state law.
Consequently, both of these alternatives were rejected.
Eager to get this important matter resolved as soon as possible,
the committee proposed three alternatives and sought guidance from the
Governor as to his preference on the matter. State Court Administrator
Winberry drafted a letter tn r„.*
*° ^^^""ting that he soUcU theGovernor's guidance on this matter The







commission to undertake con? ulJS'"^
°' independent
responsibilities within the ta e^ Tf'uH.'"'' "''"''^of the committee that whatever .^1 consensus
takes the long term responsiblH? ""d^r-
.7::c\-^;ra^d%-jc\^i L-^^^
-^-•v1^: 5i " - "-desirable
tioL-w^Tc^- L^Sfa^r^
and we would like to know ?f th.J'"'?^"''" recommendation
1976). " ''i^t 15 the case (Winberry,
The other two alternatives presented in the letter included
attaching the Security and Privacy Advisory Co^lttee to the Attorney
General's office or assignment of administrative responsibility to the
Office Of Community Development. While the Governor's subsequent
review of the co^ittee proposals, as reported in a letter from Gorton
to W,nberry did provide some guidance, he questioned whether Title 28
regulations actually required the state to vest administrative authority
in an existing state agency:
.
The Governor asks whether or not the State of W;,ch-inn-Hn
To^ZuT^Xln!^, ^^^^^-^ - ad;1sry11^^ttee
creaJ?o^=oTaT^ndet^^e^-"S:^s1L%^\Se^-u\1e^^^
t"/ 'fi^ 5t^te already has too many
a e oons?hi?T^'"'°"'- ' ^° not w?sh ^ch
therefore U s Jh!'^"'? *° °^ «t°''"^^ G^"^'"^'
•
mvse?f rhJ!,- ^
preference of both the Governor andy l , choosing among your three alternatives, that the
in effect, t.e Oove™.. p.fe... aUe.at.e aff1..ed the stat.s
7'"^ - house. „UM„ the Off,-ce Of Co^U.
--op™ent(OCO,.
^-he.^.e. the OCO „as c.eate. h. the 3ove™.
to a«n1ste. a,! fe.e.a, p.o,.a« ,e.,, Co.p.ehensWe E.p,o..ent an.T--1„g Act. Co.™„Uy Development Bloc. G.ants and LEAA) and
.eet
various planning requirements. Thus the LEAA pn'vacy regulations
seemed to logically fit into this mold.
The Attorney General also indicated that the Governor had
some reservations about the appropriateness of the Office of Community
Development, since it was a planning rather than an operational agency
thus leaving open the possibility that if the committee were to deter-
mine a more appropriate agency, such as the Department of Social and
Health Services, he may reconsider his reco-endation. Consequently,
with the co™,ittee's consent, Winberry contacted several agencies to
determine their interest in undertaking administrative responsibility
for security and privacy.
It is obvious from a review some of the responses from agencies
contacted about their interest in administering security and privacy
regulations that they were not eager to undertake such an odious task.
For example, the Deputy Director of the Corrections Division of the
Department of Social and Health Services (a super agency created by
Governor Evans) made a blunt, unambiguous reply:
^lrpL!''cooI\ ... it is apparent that the department is
^nH T^. ! ""^"^ ^^^'^^y ^^^9^ complex agencyand I think planning responsibility for security and privacy






agencies at present and tn i^^ Justice
an audit whi?h could pos ?b v ?n,n'? ""'^P'^OP'^ conducting
would destroy our e'ffe^'^i^^^ss^^Ic'^ofn^r^^k^r'""'
T.e State Patrol, position on t.s pol ic.
.tter did.t soften durin.
the 1977 legislative session, even though the Sheriffs and Chiefs
Association and other law enforcement lobbies urged that the Patrol
assume administrative control.
Having exhausted the possibility of engaging other state
agencies in the administration of privacy regulations, and acknowl-
edging the need to separate the privacy regulatory authority from
agencies covered by the regulations, the committee gravitated toward
acceptance of the Governor's stated preferences, as O'Connor's notes
of the February 13 committee meeting indicate:





a commission which would bep esenta ive of non-criminal justice as well ascriminal justice views should be establ ished wi?hspecific authority. In light of the views Lpressedby the Governor to the Attorney Genera atLchl qsuch a commission to the Office of Community Dee?op-
fT.lilZ f'fV"^
strati ve purposes might be the besteasib e solution (O'Connor, 1976).
It was evident as the time drew nearer to submit a final plan
to LEAA that the Director of OCD did not concur with the committee's
endorsement of the Governor's recommendation. The OCD director was
invited to express his views at the last formal meeting of the committee
(on June 25, 1976) and proceeded to douse their proposal with cold
water, in what was sutpIu .















.eguuto.. co™iss1on within the OCO would constitute a
" cent™, ove. the aUoca-
tion of LEAA funds (Washington Attorney General', A. •b s Advisory Coranittee
on Security and Privacy, 1976).
Recognizing that the OCO director', ,o'l-ect s views constituted a clear
veto Of the committee's plan, the recommendation was withdrawn to
attach a security and privacy co^ission to OCD. Instead, the committee
commission and carefully explained why the committee had been unable
to select an appropriate agency.
The State Planning Agency
Not only was there little sense of urgency on the part of
state government and criminal justice officials as to the need to
comply with this latest of LEAA guidelines, but the State Planning
Agency (SPA) was hardly in a strategic position to mount support from
the criminal justice community necessary to gain passage of state
criminal records privacy legislation.
Almost from its Inception in 1970 as the Law and Justice
Division of OCD, the SPA was beset with an absence of a sense of






.„.,..o. Ltronted with differenf nVr~,,mc-4.t t crcu.stances and demands, and had varying
aspirations, management styles and policy interests. The SPA
organizational structure and arant *•a g allocation process underwent
numerous changes with each successive administrator. Srant award and
™nagement processes particularly exhibited distinctive changes. When
the SPA first initiated its grant award activities under its first
administrator, dames O'Connor (1970 through
,973), that process was
organized in «hat resembled a combination of what Feeley and Sarat
(1980) term the "agency advocacy" and "cafeteria menu" approaches.
During the initial years of the LEAA program, there were in-
tense pressures for SPA to spend money quicUy in order to achieve
some Visible results. Under these conditions each criminal justice
agency had to insure it could get a satisfactory share of the resources
consequently, grant recipients carefully cultivated an SPA staff person
Who would in essence be an "advocate" for its particular project. What
evolved from this practice was an agency structured in separate divi-
sions, each serving a separate component of the criminal Justice
system. Thus, the annual state plan was the product of a logrolling
process in which support for one project was provided in exchange for
a reciprocal support for another.
However, this approach was neither successful in promoting
innovation nor coordinated approaches to the problem of crime. The
fact that numerous other states adopted similar planning allocation
processes perhaps prompted LEAA to promote a
^ ^ campaign of crime-
specific planning to get the spa'c k. iy SPA s back on track toward the intended
goal Of the Crime Control Act (Feelev .nH .^^ y a d Sarat, 1980: 83). Crime
specfic Planning





te™s Of nove, strategies
„h1ch agencies
.1ght conaho.ate 1„
I^P^c-ng the a«ntst.tion of c a, ,.st1ce and
.eduction of „1.e
The "cafeteria ™enu" approach was an adaptation to crl.e-
specflc Planning employed 5y Washington and other SPA^s. According
to th,s strategy, projects would be funded which deal with specific
cn.es, such as burglary or larceny. Order and purpose was now intro-
duced into the state planning process. Instead of listing projects
according to components in which they were funded, projects were now
categorized according to crime-specific problems. As an expression of
its unequivocal commitment to the strategy, the LEAA launched a $20
Million demonstration project in eight cities called the Crime Impact
Project to test the extent to which crime could be reduced by concen-
trating resources in programs targeted toward particular crimes.
Subsequent negative evaluations cast serious doubt on the crime reduc-
tion potential of such approaches. Moreover, the National Conference
of State Planning Agency Administrators grew more critical of being
held to crime reduction performance objectives they were unable to
satisfy, much less measure.
Saul Arrington, the second administrator of the Washington SPA
(1973 through June 1977) was among those SPA administrators who actively










" -^--e .a.-to-aa. lea.e.s.lp
.a
.a„a,«e„t of Ms own state
Planning a.enc. staff. h1s neglect of leaae.ship an. a^Mst.ative
-Pons1.nit,es
.a. two pnncipal effects:
,„ staff
.est.eness ana
derealization precipitated 1„te.-aiv1s1on conflicts and Interna,
-.ganlzatlon. and (.) su.se.uent Cose sc.ut,n. t.e Ra. ad.i„ls-
tration lead to his replacement 1n 1977.
Given both the unpopularity and ineffectiveness of crime-
spedflc Planning. LEAA placed Increased emphasis from 1975 through
1977 on the standards and goals strategy. A National Advisory
commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals was appointed in
1971 to generate recommendations to LEAA regarding ways In which the
administration of criminal justice might be Improved by providing
benchmarks by which progress towards goals may be judged. Seven large
volumes were published by the commission in January 1973. In the
following two years, the LEAA funded grant applications submitted by
the states In which a standards and goals project would be established
within the State Planning Agency. O'Connor, the first SPA administra-
tor was coaxed back to the SPA In order to initiate the standards and
goals project In early 1975. A few new staff were hired to conduct
research and produce standards for the various criminal justice com-
ponents, including Information systems. After a year of work no
standards have been produced. Instead, the staff had been utilized
by state and local agencies In ..n
"PacUy
"""^ instances, their efforts were
--te. toward
.rant preparation assistance for local project
appl icants.
The standards staff underwent a complete turnover
,y earl.
When the project finall. expired. Civen the absence of adoption
Of any standards or goals
,y the Governor's co„„ittee and continued
P-ssure on the SPA's.ythe UAA to produce concrete results,
.oth
the SPA administrator and Governor's Co™ittee
.e*ers considered a
new standards grant application as a prudent idea. This initiative
was given added impetus by Chris Bayley, a young and ambitious second
term King County Prosecutor (and newly appointed Standards and Goals
Subcommittee chairman), who saw a renewed standards effort as a way to
influence state criminal justice policy. He was particularly interested
in improving prosecutorial effectiveness and producing a tough new
determinant sentencing law which would abolish the Parole Board and
greatly reduce reliance upon a strategy of rehabilitation.
To insure that his policy interest would be pursued, Bayley
recommended that a young and able attorney, who had served briefly as
one of his deputy prosecutors, be selected as the director of the
standards and goals project. Acting on the assumption that attorneys
are a good source of expertise on criminal justice policies, two more
attorneys (with excellent credentials but extremely limited experience)
were hired over the next two months. One was appointed as an assistant
director and another was assigned to produce standards for courts and
prosecutors.
S300.000 g.ant «Mch caUed fo. an info™atio„ syst™ specialist
corrections and U„ enforcement specialists and an individual with
socal science research s.ills and expertise. The standards director
was not particular,, eager to
.apidly expand the staff to its full
complement. Por one thing it would stretch h,s limited management
capabilities and for another limited accomplishments of the prior
standards efforts dictated that results should be forthcoming as soon
as possible. Only one other staff hired was considered timely and
necessary. Thus, the author was hired in mid-April to coordinate the
development of standards for state and local criminal justice informa-
tion systems.
The standards staff quickly discovered that the rest of the
SPA staff members, particularly the planning division, were not
particularly eager to reorganize a planning and grant award process
in order to accommodate the latest LEAA measures of successful perfor-
mance. For months, the standards director was unable to make any
headway with the planning director to reach agreement on how standards
and goals would be integrated with the planning and grant award process.
Finally, in July 1976, a two-pronged strategy was adopted. First the
Governor's Committee would identify policy priorities for which meaning-
ful standards could be developed. Second, when standards were
forthcoming they would be attached as conditions of aid to state grant
awards (Brandt, 1976).
T.e activity
„, t.e Ocve™..s Co^utee an. SPA sta.f
- .ant. ana ant.ipato. as t.e
J,
-
-^-e to t.TU Z8 Pn.c. Re,.,at1ons was l™,nent was an
.ut o.sc.e. t.e
confluence o. seve.a, cH.na,
,„st1ce
,e,s,at,ve p.pcsaU w.c.
preoccupies t.e Sove^no.. Co™ittee. c.Hs Ba.,e.
.a. now p.epa.e.
a Of t.e new sentencing
,aw. p.ecee.ed a t.ou,.tfu, an. ti„e„
article published in the Univer^itv nf w u-
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
In
addition, the new chai^an of the House Institutions Co..ittee, Ron
Hanna, was submitting a Juvenile Oustice Refo™ Act (drafted with the
assistance of the standards project staff,. Pi„ali,, sPA ad.inis-
t-to. had the standards staff collaborate on a draft bill which would
convert the Governor's Co^ittee on Law and Justice into a statutory
required that the state legislature or Governor (through executive
order) provide a mechanism by which comprehensive criminal justice
Planning could be conducted on an annual basis.
The SPA enabling legislation would require consensus among
criminal justice officials as well as approval by the Governor's office
Therefore, the SPA administrator scheduled a meeting for the chairman
and sub-committee chairs in mid-December 1977 in order to produce a
consensus bill and discuss other legislative proposals. Attorney









^1 ci DIM convert the ^ranto a state cH.ina, Justice planning co-ission. However the Kinocount. Sheri„ and other iaw enforcement officials in att ^




^ p rmanent commission. TheKing County Sheriff complained that such an .'^^•^ 3" agency would constitute aprelude to the creatinn ^o of a department of justice tho cbL -- e super aqencv
considered to be a threat to fh. .
' '° ''''''"^y local law enforcement, maddition, the Governor's representativp
.t
^
e a the meeting, Hempstad (theO-ector Of OCD) indicated that Governor
,vans was not particuiar,,
-
favor in creating »re commissions and expressed his reluctance to
Preempt the views of the incoming Governor Ra, on this issue. Con-
sequently, further discussion was tabled until the new governor could
be approached about how she proposed to respond to the issue.
The meeting had nearly drawn to a close (with Attorney General
Gorton leaving early with other pressing business) when O'Connor waUed
-
wuh a Sheaf of paper. O'Connor was there to present his draft of
security and privacy legislation for review, comment and approval by
the meeting participants. Needless to say, the few remaining officials
and staff were not eager to undertake yet another laborious discussion
on an issue few understood or cared about. One member of the Governor's
committee in attendance recommended that a copy of the draft be sent to
an appropriate subco^ittee for subsequent review. Somewhat disheart-
ened by the indifferent reception to over a year and a half of Advisory
committee work, O'Connor reminded the officials that he was now off
contract. He would insure that the bill was handed over to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, but that others would have to take responsibility
for what happened to the bill after that.




- 0. state ,o.e™„t.
ca.pai.n. she had sin,,ed out
t^e Office of co^unuy Development as a „aH,„ example of how the
proHferation of fede.a, p™g.a.s had g.eat,. enlarged the state
^"-ucac, Mo.eove., she had contended that fede.a, p,ann1n,
-nts had spawned a new cUss of civil servants who threatened to .su.p
state policy making functions wUh a .ind of "socialistic" planning
alien to incremental political processes.
in late January 1977 Governor Ray appointed Blair Butterworth
her campaign manager, as Acting Director of OCD with the mandate to
'
commence a reorganization of the office in which many of its functional
act,vuies would be reassigned to other agencies. There was some irony
to the selection of Butterworth to execute this mandate, for he had
been strongly identified and intimately associated with the administra-
tion of the federal "War on Poverty" programs a decade earlier. For
example, as western Regional Administrator of the Economic Development
Administration, he had helped administer the $28 million demonstration
jobs and public works program in Oakland, California, that was subse-
quently documented in a now classic study by Pressman and Wildavsky
(1973).
The OCD division of most concern to both Governor Ray and
Butterworth was the Law and Justice Planning Office, that is the SPA.
Local law enforcement had repeatedly criticized the SPA for over
regulation and inconsistencies in grant award processes. As a special
Deputy Assistant assigned to conduct a review of the ,
Di „
'i^vie O Law and JusticePlanning Office Indicated 1n a l<iRn f <






^rocT^^eT ^a1 a"i-a? ?™^r -l-{Ledoperated autonomously^rrom Jhe o ""J *'-'-'"9tonHemstad [the previouf OCD D??ec?o?l had'n' """"t"''rein. When pressed about the SeJIiic ^''^^his staff were doing he dtdn'J. V^, ^ach of
about what they lere'doino n 1 "'"^
environment. " ""^ally a Machiavellian
As the fact-finding process progressed, the new OCD leadership
became
.ore convinced that Arrington would have to be replaced A
vacancy in the position of Standards and Goals director provided the
opportunity to Infuse new blood into the state planning agency
Butterworth's Deputy Assistant recommended that Arrington offer the
Job to Donna Schram. Schram. who holds a Ph.D. in clinical psychology
was a personal friend and former colleague of the Assistant while at
the Battelle Research Institute, and had established a strong reputa-
tion in criminal justice research and policy development. Ultimately
she became Arrlngton's replacement in early June 1977.
Schram persuaded Arrington that the SPA should adopt an aggres-
ive posture and stay on top of legislation of most concern to the
Governor's Committee. Schram was particularly interested in addressing
the serious Issue of prison over crowding, Including juvenile justice
and sentencing reform. Consequently, the criminal records privacy
legislation would nestle in the safety of near obscurity. In fact,
for the first three months of the 1977 legislative session no one knew
(nor probably cared) what had happened to th.
- - s„b.tt to se ate
^^"^^
:o b n Judiciary Committee.
S^^^J^U^^^^Jiea^^ 2608-
March, the crl™,-„a, records bn, surfaced. The
--senate en, ,SB, aaos, the
....ton State C a,
.cord:
-
d,sc.sed. standards Director Schr. assigned her
.„.or.at.on
systems specialist to attend this and other hearings held on the bill
unlike Its unsuccessful predecessors In 1974 and 1975 this
latest privacy legislation had
.uch better prospects of
.ettl^, serious
attention. An attorney and trial lawyer, the chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Co™ittee had strongly supported due process rights for
criminal records data subjects. In addition, the bill reflected an
-presslve consensus building process through the Attorney General's
Security and Privacy Advisory Co^Utee. Most relevant Interests had
had an opportunity to be Involved In the planning process and .ost had
seen and commented upon the draft legislation.
What the Senate Judiciary Committee considered most important
about the bill was that some form of policy response was required in
order to continue to get LEAA funds and the SPA had persuaded the
committee that legislation was the best method. ,n addition, since
the publication of the Title 28 regulations the uncertainty regarding
the conditions under which criminal records information could be re-
leased under the federal mandate had produced wide variations in





^Ldie or affairspecially for news media whose lifp hi ^ .
eager to aet
'^'^ therefore, the press wasg a uniform policy.
" Both the senate an. Ho.se
...ar. Co^Utees soughttest,.ony and guidance on what to do with SB 2608.
Committee members were oartimi;,^!p cularly opposed to the creation of




^•'^^'^t-^ suc a recommenda-
t.on to Governor Ra.) and suggested instead that the State Judicial
Counc,
.est approximated the commission concept,
.hile State Court
Administrator
.i„,erry was not eager to undertake added responsi.i,-
--^^
--ci, Which he statted. he reluctant,, conceded
that the audicia, Counci
,
would
.e one of several possiM, i ties. WithtMs tentative, nonco^itta, concession extracted fro. the State Court
privacy commission concept in both Senate and House versions of the
b'H. This provision remained unchallenged until increased interest
by the SPA in the status of the criminal records pr,vacy bill provided
Wmberry with an opportunity to divest the Judicial Council of an
unwanted role.
'^fte. the senate Oudlcia.,
,ean-ngs on WCRPA staff..
-
-lew t.e substance of the M„ staff .
'
a detailed analysis which identified hla ow the proposed staf» i=
satisfied LEAA guidelines anrf h- .
--ecommended some changes That
-"-nt was subsequently approved hy the OCO director an :
.to the legislature Th. . •
submitted
on^P^Mapro ed h :;s:^^^^^^"'^^"°"^^^"^^^'----
-'--
- Stale ;:;n ~^ ---^^
With new leadership at OCD. there was the pcssihil ity of greater
—
,ce
.Vision assu.e administrative authority for security
co^itteewas eager to hear from a state agency which could spea.
authoritatively ahout the federal privacy mandate and appropriateness
Of a state response. Numerous questions were raised at the hearing
-Hh respect to extensiveness of coverage, fiscal impact and the
capability of local agency compliance. The SPA was as.ed to present
testimony and announced that OCD was now willing to assume administra-
tive ownership of a state privacy law and offered multiple reasons why
OCD was the best available agency:
CoJnc'Ir^o'weve? 1'^^"^'°^'^ - the Judicial
The JudiciaTcouncil bv th^sL'r"?'''' inappropriate,
own admi ssion, does ™ 'ha e fixp'^rt^se't?'"'?^
'
^
Deve'lo ^en ' he ot"Se*;°hand''th°"'" °'
'"^"''^
»
uii tfie ner hand, the proper agency to
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administer the sprii^i + >, . ^
through its Law and ju^t?rp oV"^^ regulations. OCD
LEAA funds which'?' llTr'[V''l''' ^^--n^st'ersjustice system. Further OCD 5 ^"^^''^ criminaljustice operating agencies anVth^ 'P'"^'"* °^ '''^^r^a^disinterested and fair mplementa^ "^J^^-' ^ ^^^^Furt er, the Law and Ju tice pfann nn nl-^' requirements,regulatory function by virtue o? ?;.^ Perform ainterpret federal guide! npf.nn \? '^^^Po^sibil ity to(Dalton, 1977a). ^ ' li es and allocate federal funds
.est,-...
.
t at OCD 0. so.e ct.e. executive
.ep..t™ent . assi.ne. a.^on., to
administer the law instead of the Judicial -ij council. In addition, he
noted that the recent withdrawal of the Judiciarv fLn j a y from coverage by the
federal regulations obviated the dirert i„„„in c involvement of the judiciary in
security and privacy regulation and administration.
It was difficult to gauge the extent of support by the
legislature and Governor for OCD administration of security and
privacy. Governor Ray had made it clear that she was critical of the
cost and other burdens that unnecessary federal regulation imposed on
the states and localities. She was inclined in her administration to
-verse the state's role in perpetuating this situation. In addition
the House Judiciary Co^ittee had several pieces of legislation to
consider including a controversial Juvenile Justice Act, which was
amended sixty-seven times.
Moreover, the strong move by the Office of Co^unity Develop-
ment to assert control over administration of criminal records privacy
regulation was alarming to law enforcement interests. The Sheriffs
and Chiefs Association was particularly unhappy by the prospect of the
SPA acquiring additional regulatory authority on top of its already
awards guidelines.
,„ o.de. tothis possibility, the AssccMMso ,at,on prodded the State Patrol to take a
""-•e aggressive posture and offer tn . .






their consternation, the Chief of the
^--was onl. l„.ewar.to the Idea and his chief of the ,dent1f c,f
™s positively opposed to such an Idea
"
the Sheriffs and Chefs Association failed toreal.ewas
hinder the SPA's efforts. The Patrol had 1 . .introduced a bill early on in
'— -'^ confer the power to Investigate and prosecute
persons suspected of state felony offenses, m essence, such a law
would
.ake the patro, equivalent to a state police. The impetus for
the proposed legislation originated in the Organised Crime Intelligence
Unu (a unit begun by an LEAA grant, because Its investigative activi-
ties were continually dissipated for want of prosecution. This provided
the bas,s for a guid pro guo between the SPA and Patrol: In exchange
for SPA support for this legislation, the State Patrol would support
the SPA^s attempt to secure privacy regulatory authority. Arrington
did in fact attempt to swing the Governor's Co™ittee in favor of the
Patrol's legislative agenda. However, the patrol surely got the worst
end Of the bargain for support fro™ the Governor's Committee was not
forthcoming (Schram, 1980).
As a deadline neared for the Ho„« i ^-
reoort It.










The information systems specialist was somewhat surprised toWn b,aphc„e call toward t.e end of Ma. from William Hagens. chief
~, Of the House Institutions Committee that the hill had heen
-1ved helng transferred to the Institutions Committee chaired
«on Nanna. a young, ambitious representative of a small P„get Sound
-sort area whose career had catapulted as a result of rounding up the
votes necessary to elect the new speaker of the House, John Bagnariol
SPA Administrator Schram was perplexed why Hanna was so Interested in
seeing the bill passed. As Hagens indicated In a subsequent interview
-
1980, Hanna had been strongly supportive of creating a Department
Of Justice and was thus disappointed when the OCD leadership failed
to back the SPA'S attempt to submit enabling legislation to create a
permanent criminal Justice planning co^ission. Thus passage of an
SPA administered security and privacy regulation provided a foundation
upon which other regulatory and planning functions could be added.
Hagens invited SPA representatives over to his office to
propose language In which the bill could be amended to give the SPA
statutory authority to administer the law. A committee hearing was
pass the bill out for a floor votP . k
^
taken to
Subsequently, the next Mondaythe committee held a rstho- „ ^rather perfunctory meeting and the proposed
legislation glided through without dissent Hnw»
.
u . o ever, a difficulty
immediately arose the next dau u=y. Hagens notified the SPA that upon a
closer reading of the bill ,,n= »u, one Of the committee members discovered
an Objectionable provision in the bill-a provision supported by the
Allied Daily News Association which defined the 1 imits of privacy
invasion for the purposes of limiting the 1 iabil ity of the press in
publishing information otherwise restricted by the criminal records
Pn-vacybill. This oversight nearly cost the bill the support
necessary for passage.
Throughout most of the session the ACLU, the Allied Daily News
Association and the originator of the state's public disclosure law
Jolene Unsoeld, had been locked in conflict over a bill proposed by'
the news association to limit the extent of liability for invasions of
Pnvacy. As insurance against the possibility that the attempt might
not be successful, the Allied Daily News Association attached a brief
section to the criminal records privacy bill which amended the public
disclosure law specifying the conditions which constituted an invasion
Of privacy. The section was brief and concluded with the following
language:
f^L ' ^ ^'^^^ ^° Privacy has been violated where
vadeS rtf'^^"?] '''' unreasonab y i
individual thVn
^^^^^ations of facts about an identifiable, e publicizing of which would be highly offen-
wh ch thT?a."?.''' 'Tr^ ''''''''' ' Circumstancein ni e facts or allegations are of no leaitimatP
26S8r7977:'se'c''6)^"'
(Wash^'ngton SubstituL Senate Bil 1
The ACLU was upset the







„.„3e ana o.c.e cc.U.e. a™—,ence Of
.0. s.es
..eatene. to ,.e t.
cnminal records orivarv hm ^ y ^ ne
"°t°--^ty than expected and
threatened to prevent the biU fro. reaching a floor vote
The SPA atte.pted hut faHed to get the parties to find anotherforu. h. Which the. could settle their dispute. Instead, the Allied
Oail. News Association representative, Paul Conrad, continued to hold
the bill hostage. The News Association, however, did not anticipate
suaded a former majority leader to propose a motion to eliminate the
questionable a«nt. It passed and the Washington Cri.,nal Records
Pn-vacy Act (RCW ,0.97) received unanimous support for passage
Although the bill was now on its way to the Senate floor for a vote,
the senate version still contained the controversial a.end.ent. Even
if the bill did pass with the amendment, a conference committee would
have to work out the differences and the likelihood of a compromise
appeared si im.
It was evident to the OCD leadership that stronger measures
of influence would have to be employed to get the Senate to pass the
WCRPA unencumbered by the News Association's controversial definition
of privacy. The mechanism seized upon was the Juvenile Justice Act.
It too had passed the House floor vote and awaited approval in the
Senate where ,t was expected to pass by a fain,
Deputy Assistant to Butterworth decided to caoH.n
Of th» h-n K
capitalize on the popularity
e bill by suggesting that if the News Association's privacy
a.end.ent was not withdrawn, Governor Ray (no real fan of the Ouvenile
Justice law because of the political conflict with its proponents,
would be as.ed to consider vetoing it if it reached her des. The
gesture struc. a responsive chord and by a two vote
.argin the Senate
struck the a.end.ent and thus passed the WCRPA intact on June 10 1977
Senate passage of the WCRPA did not guarantee that it would
become state law. "ixie Lee Ray still had to sign the bill within a
ten day period which was ample ti.e for law enforcement and other
opponents to make their case for selective or complete veto. Surpris-
ingly, evidently resigned to the inevitable prospects of SPA privacy
regulations and assuming that the Governor would sign it since OCD
supported it. no objections were forthcoming from law enforcement or
the rest of the criminal Justice community. Rather, opposition came
unexpectantly from the Office of Policy Planning and Financial
Management (OPPFM).
The cost of compliance: the
Governor's veto deterred
Before any bill passed by the Washington State Legislature
reaches the Governor's desk, it must be reviewed by the OPPFM to
assess the fiscal impact on state and local government. However,
OPPFM review had rarely been confined to budget matters. For, as the




Normally, the state budget staff „ni assist in t.
fUr.i * . he preparation Offiscal notes ,f required by leaislati>,.
,
H D gislative committees. In turn, fiscalimpact estimates are used to c„»i <.
•
is i
" evaluate appropriation requests which
may accompany the legislation. Approximately si. days after the
-«PA had been passed by the legislature and only four days before
the deadline for Governor Ray. signature, an OPPPM budget analyst
until one was forthcoming the bill would not be forwarded to the
Governor. Office. I-dditio„. not content with the consensus
reached in the legislative process, the budget analyst indicated that
he questioned the appropriateness of placing administrative authority
Department of Licenses or the State Patrol
.
This came as quite a surprise to SPA staff In that as early as
March 25 they had discussed with OPPFM the need to broaden coverage
Of a fiscal note which at that time Involved only one state agency
the Department of Social and Health Services. Further, the SPA urged
that a state appropriation be considered to Implement the bill i„ the
absence of LEAA funding. Evldentlv neither „f thoa t iu iiy of these recommendations
were heeded.
The OPPFM analyst's challenge of the appropriateness of the
SPA administrative authority reflected an ignorance of the political
consensus underlying the decision. If the Governor were apprised of
these views, it might threaten to undermine the credibility of the




memorandum to Butterworth for forwarding to th« r-
„^ .
^ ^''^ Governor which attempted
to persuasively address both fiscal and administrative issues
Una.,e to draw from any precise budget data for the State of
Washington. SPA staff ,uic.,y gathered cost information from several
tion. The annua, cost of privacy administration ranged from $60
in lowa to $350,000 in Massachusetts. State implementing agency'
budgets did not exceed $100,000 in any of the states surveyed. This
information was presented sinnn .wt-kalong with an estimate of the state agency
and local government cost. In addition, the memorandum indicated the
SPA could absorb initial first year administrative costs of implementa-
tion until a special appropriation request was considered in the next
legislative session.
Along with this information a work plan was developed which
carefully itemized implementation activities to be executed by the
SPA. This was done to anticipate concerns that an unfavorable OPPFM
recommendation might create about the SPA's capability to execute
administrative responsibil ities
.
Before the SPA staff had completed the memorandum to Ray the
OPPFM staff telephoned to indicate that he would recommend that the
Governor veto the section of the bill which empowered the SPA to
administer the law. It was evident from this response that no addi-
tional data from the SPA would be persuasive enough to overturn the
OPPFM analyst's predisposition toward the dissolution of the SPA role in
the state privacy regulation. Consequently, the SPA staff recommended





him to send the OPPFM director a letter which
emanat?^rf^:ry^:r'°sT:?f\'o"thTr^"'^'^'°- »^ be
Section 9 of SSB 2608 whlcl^ to veto
implementation of the SecS^i? ^"PO^^^'^i'ity forState Planning Agency (cSrrl^H^ ?h '"e
Planning Office, OCD)
^""""^"^^ ^^e Law and Justice
has loiiiT:d:2]ii7. 7oiZ''rLT: '"'^ ^-^-"^impression that there w;,c- ^^^7 ' '^^^^ ^"der the
that the Law and JusticrP a n^^^^^^ LegislaturePriate place to house "pleme Ja^ion o^'tr'least for the time being Program-at
I understand that Tvour '<if^ff ^.i
that responsibility for SecuJuv .nH^p'"'^"'"'' P^P"^^the State Patrol or th« nf^n^ Privacy rest with
Testimony and analysis to S^'^f^Sf r"""" Vehicles,
that putting Securf ;\nd va v Tn'ttV^V"''''^'"
equivalent to having a starvIrf ^J^ ! '^^''"Ol is
fryers. The DM? s^n the ^ranl?ti?^"''' "^^hingtondata systems- certa nlv ,„ I "^P™"'^ between
burden would be cos? J to tha?^''°"'^ administrative
(Butterworth, 1977) ^ tl^^s time
The Butterworth memo had the desired effect, for the OPPFM
recommendations were never forwarded the Governor's office The
Governor's staff did receive the memo drafted by the SPA staff, and
after a phone inquiry from the Governor's office to Butterworth to
clarify some obscure point, the bill „as signed to bring the State of
Washington into compliance with the federal regulations. The timing
of the arrival of the bill at the Governor's desk was extremely
favorable. The 1977 legislative session was nearing adjournment and
produced a deluge of bills for the Governor's signature. The Juvenile
Justice Act was among those many pieces of legislation which no doubt




In late September, with a f,,ii ,
'3""''^ °f implementation activi-ties now planned and initial draft <
,
°' guidelines underway, an OCO
was assigned to assist in the development of a cost
estimate
.0. submission to t.e 3ove.no. and state legislature in
December. Subsequently, a schedule for a series of m» .meetings with state
and local criminal justice officials citv
•
"^"^ ^""^ "'^"ty associations and
others was developed in order to identify impacts and costs
state and local criminal justice agencies were presented to Eugene
Wiegman, who had replaced Butterworth as OCD Director. The memo which
accompanied these materials stated in part:
by RCW in q? fh^
P anmng Office designated
t^at^™u;?i?^e^? s*?:t:tn^LTbi
pr?:ncTe??orf'"- '° '''' i™Pl™?a"?on d' e' oT*''Pliance ff rt may proceed with maximum effectiveness
and iu"s?i e^^l^-nTof^?^: lltl ll
-"^^^^ ^^^'^^
November or early December (Dalton, 1977b)
The memo was submitted to Schram along with the explanatory
materials for her review and approval. Surprisingly, she was furious
about the process by which cost information would be solicited from
state and local agencies. Such a strategy, she felt, would invite
criminal justice agencies to submit exaggerated, unreasonable and
absurd estimates of fUr^} ^mr^ ^
' ^""^^^^-"tly it would put the SPAand OCD ,n the awkward position Of defendina an i h-
. ,
u r g inordinately laraebudget request
.etore a legislature which sought increased fiscal
--ity.
'-su.se,uent interview conducted in 1,80, schra. re-jected that She expected
- magnitude of the costs tor compliance to
security and privacy guidelines to
.e so large that it would have
robbed other priority areas siirh „
^ '"'"^ ^s prison overcrowding of sufficient
funds to solve longstanding and festering problems."
subsequent interviews with criminal justice officials revealed
that While Schram's estimate of the fiscal impact was incorrect her
Objection to a strategy to solicit cost estimates from criminal Justice
agencies reflected a realistic assessment. A records division manager
from an urban police department in eastern Washington stated it this
way :
A state-wide appropriation for compliance to securitv
w e^":?e''at1he^^•L'r^"^^" ^--"-s''
that a5d^ i?^afta^do.^s^L^TL^ iv\?^a".?r 'iz^forcement's criticism of the enormous cos s involvedin compliance with privacy regulations was j sTl dodqeto get more money to support local informato system'
e i-sca ecurit 'T'' ^o enhance
wo ni !
s y of our own information systems butwe planned to do that long before the state oHvacv lL
^rn^/'^fL '"^'^^'^ departments n this tatecould get by with an expenditure of less than $l!ooo.
Other law enforcement officials expressed similar views. For
example, an assistant chief of a western Washington police department
indicated that a file update project was initiated to obtain complete
arrest and disposition records by a temporary reassignment of field
evidence personnel. He estimated that it took approximately 500 hours
of time to accomplish the tasks. Significantly, throughout an interview
e Police
with the head of the record," '^'^ »f the Seattl
Department, additional costs were never mentioned




„h,le the withdrawal of a special
appropriations strategy did not reall„ hlu y have an advprc;p o-f^^ ^
implementation activities .
°"
nvitie , arguments about cost imn;,rfc .
to be trottpH n . ' ^^^^ continueded out as a way to cause a retraction ofi proposed guidelines
0^ .t also
.y a state law with criminal and civil penalties for
"--Pliance.
.hile the legislation reflected a consensus among
r " ---PO-c. c al Justice
were far from
.eing completely satisfied with ever,
provision and were apprehensive a.out how the SPA would dea, with these
--es during the implementation stage, m fact, the depth of conflict
(and nature of the opposition, over criminal records privacy policy did
not begin to surface, as the ne.t chapter indicates, until the guideline
development process commenced in late September 1977.
CHAPTER V
THE GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
IN WASHINGTON. 1977-1978
Fc„o„1„g the adoption Of t.e WasMngtcn CM.,„a, Rl5,tsP-ac. Act (WCRPA) ,n
..e ,977, the State PUnnIn, A.ncy (SPA,
^egan to develop guidelines fo. Implementation of the new law
°' in the guideline development
P-ess focused upon two P011C. issues.
1 Imitations to dissemination
and rules fo. Individual access and review. Given the protected
conflict over the LEAA draft guidelines on dissemination policy and
recognizing the latitude that LEAA provided to the states to develop
their own policies, difficulties could be expected to surface In the
development of state and local procedures. Conflict was especially
Hkely since the Washington law enunciated a dissemination policy
Whose ambiguity encouraged uncertainty and competing interpretations.
As indicated in Chapter I, LEAA gave the states discretion to
determine the restrictiveness of regulations for dissemination of
conviction and non-conviction Information. Although the MCRPA adopted
a more restrictive policy on the dissemination of non-conviction data
than required by LEAA. the policy for dissemination of conviction
information was stated in somewhat equivocal terms: "Conviction In-
formation may be disseminated without restriction" (PCM. 1977: 10.97.50)
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It became evident shortly after Da<;.;,no ^ .uy dri p ssage of the WCRPA that agreat deal of uncertainty prevailed as to what thi. .
loci 1., . ' P^''''^ ^'"^Pl^ed for
Because t.t
.cena.t.,
7 -7--- one so.ce 0. ...... on ......
- PolK.ste^e.
..o.t.e use of the
,,,,,, ^^^^the release of conviction Info^atlon could be restricted The
discretionary
•'^r instead of a mandator,
"s.all" prompted
.an.
cn.1nal Justice agencies to for.ld disclosure of any criminal nistory
record Information until the SPA guidelines had clarified this and
related statutory matters.
While difficulties with regard to dissemination policy were
expected, the extended conflict over rules for Individual access and
review were not anticipated. The LEAA guidelines for Individual access
had attracted little attention and almost no controversy, with the
exception of some co^ents by the FBI. Perhaps this was because of
very general language used to characterize the procedures states could
employ to Implement these rights. Also, as Chapter III indicates, most
subsequent state laws exhibited little variation in how they construed
an effective and non-burdensome process to enable data subject review,
access and challenge of criminal history record Information. Therefore,
staff were surprised at the intensity of concern by both civil liberties
and law enforcement Interests about this issue.
Developing and Implementing guidelines for MCRPA Involved two
different committees. First, dissemination policy provided the only
on-going policy and decision making role for the existing Governor's
177Committee on Law anH inc^-;^Justice. whKh was the body required by LEAA tocoordinate criminal justice Dolirv . h
,
'"^""'""'""""O" Of grant funds andto which the SPA reoortPd Th„
^--ons regarding dissemination had to be made by a Governor.Co^Utee With
,itt,ee.perience in or desire to requiatecrimina,
justice processes. Second, the SPA cre.t.H .
p
^ "^^'^^^ ^ special Ad Hoc Advisory
Co^nittee broadly representative ot criminal justice and ncn-c aljustice interests to increase con™unication with affected agencies and
to advise the SPA on drafting implementation guidelines. This latter
co^iittee was the effective wording group i„ which controversy emerged
and had to be resolved over such issues as individual access and
review of files.
What follows in this chapter is a close examination of the
factors and interests involved in development of guidelines with respect
to dissemination and individual access in order to deepen our under-
standing Of the political Significance of state guidelines in policy
implementation processes.
Gauging Responses of StafP ^nd Local
Criminal Justice OffiTiTu
No sooner had the SPA acquired administrative responsibility
for implementation of the Washington Criminal Records Privacy Act than
a wholesale turnover of leadership occurred both in the Office Community
Development. Law and Justice Planning Office (SPA) and Governor's
Committee.
CCD Director Blair Butterworth was replaced by Eugene Wiegman,
a longtime friend of Governor Ray. Like Ray, Wiegman had had previous
experience at fe.e.a, positions;
,e was also a Wco„e
--™
----e t. .3 L r
-
--t,e OCO an.
..lop a ne« 1™. o. t a enc H
r^ni
u'^came a new division of the StatPSec.n. Oepan.ent a„a plans










-xpecte. resignation of t.e
.ea. o. E.p,o..ent Securlt,.
.le,.a„
— OCO as wen as E.p1o..e„t Sec.1t.
.o. Septe..e. t.ro,.
«ove.no..s Co^lttee to ass^e a pe.anent appointment as Co„™iss1one.
of the State Employment Security Department.
Before leaving, Butterworth persuaded Wiegman to replace
Arrlngton with Oonna Schram as acting administrator of the Law and
Justice Planning Office Srhram'c ;a TT . c s impeccable criminal justice research
credentials and demonstration of forceful policy leadership with the
standards project had been Impressive. However, the law enforcement
community was wary because she was an unknown quantity to their ranks
and thus suspected (correctly) that the grant award process would be
tightened and brought within the ambit of her special policy Interests.
As noted earlier, the policy areas of ™st Interest to her were prison
overcrowding and sentencing reform.
Schram recognized the special administrative responsibilities




-pon ,.„u,es competing for he. I.edlate attention. Thus the
--^ was appo.nte. PH.c. A...,st.to. an.





- a „e« appo.tee tohe 3ove.no. s Co.Utee, Oeo.,e Mattson, a
..tn-ct ccu.t ,..,e an.
head of the State Maqistrate'c: ;,c^n.^.^-g strate s association. Other members of the
privacy subcommittee included ^ c^t^to ci a state supreme court justice, the Chief
Of the State Patrol
,
the chief of a small eastern Washington police
department, an assistant superintendent of public instruction and
Pierce County prosecutor.
Because of the ti.ing of the passage of the law, neither the
old or ne« meters of the subcommittee were familiar with the details
Of the new law when that committee was reconstituted in September 1977
Thus, it took several meetings over the next few ™nths to come up to
speed. Moreover, their intimate involvement in policy matters was
probably more crucial and timely when draft regulations had been
completed for their review, comment and ultimate approval.
With the selection of a judge to oversee the security and
privacy implementation effort, appearances would suggest that the
judiciary was willing to exercise a supervisory role in the adminis-
tration Of criminal records privacy. However, Judge Mattson had some
reservations about the appropriateness of the Governor's Committee and
the SPA assuming such a policy operational role. Mattson, now a
superior court judge put it this way:
records privacv l^w ^nT ? ^"^P^ement criminal
Agency
.LT/e "r iltl^J^'"?" ''^'^ ^^-ningbody. The Governor's Co^mp! ^^^""^"9 «nd monitoring
viding consistent po icn " ?1on%o°i."P'^^^ P^°-
staff. The committee was more 0? . nnf>-^''? ^''''^ywhich different points of 7i2 .L P^^^^^^^ g^oup in
met to consider security and n.f ^^'^ "'"^ ^^"^^ they
Governor Ray didn' really pu? '?n^ 'Vl''' ^^^ition,
or solicit its advice tn crimLi ^"''^ ^"^ ^he group
sides these concerns a? TrnJl ^'"^ matters. Be-
didn't realir?eercom?or?ah?f Judiciary, I
essentially ^n
ex^ecS^^v'rfSnJtio'rj^aJJL^illg^?)^^^^
the privacy guidelines required of criminal Justice officials nor
indicate what its impact on the courts would be.
Evidently skepticism about the SPA role was shared by the SPA
administrator Schram:
expertise in the administration of criminal iustiro tLaw enforcement community was frustrated by the PA'qulde
nk L SpTst'a??' rT''%"^^ The;'did*no'
f :ctN ni a^^: ^jo\^fe::^ t:iuiroi^?h?3^!ih^rw:?err^^"*
"e":me1hi^arS:'"r^ '''.LT'' --ply continu o dotne sam th ngs they always did (Schram, 1980).
In the meantime, the new Privacy Administrator established a
series of informational meetings with other state criminal justice
agencies and associations. The purpose of these meetings was to
explain the law to top administrators and determine the extent to
which the law would affect their record handling and administrative




,a„ enforcement, p.osecuto.s an.
courts we. contacted o.e. to en.st tne. „on ,„ cea.,





Of criminal justice system. The results of th.cthese meetings suggested
t«o tMngs: most a.enc. ad.nUt.ato.s
.ad little
.no«,ed,e a.out w.at
WCRPA requirements entailed but the. were very anxious as to the extent
Of the impact Of the law on their record management practices The
«Uh specific answers did little to relieve that anxiety. But the
meetings also indicated that the SPA would have to contend with two
extremes of reactions: hostility over disputed territory and
indifference.
The State Patrol leadership expressed their concern that the
WCPRA overlaped with their own powers established under a 1972 statute.
For example, that legislation had established a Policy Advisory
Committee whose function it was to advise the Chief, among other
-natters, on policies regarding the dissemination of criminal history
information. In addition, the head of the Identification Division of
the State Patrol complained that the Central State Repository would not
be capable of meeting the WCRPA's January 1, 1978, deadline for pre-
dissemination inquiries. The implication was that unless funding was
forthcoming from the SPA or state legislature, the Patrol would dis-
regard compliance to this aspect of the law. Several other criminal
justice agencies mentioned costs as a constraint to compliance and thus
had to be a factor figured into the implementation process.
In contrast to the State Pai-.-ni n,
''^"-"l. the executive director of
the State Prosecutor's Association indicate, that his «..ership
considered compliance to criminal record privacy one of its "least
important concerns... According to him,
..local prosectors had at
time or inclination to observe privacy requirements... Further it
«as evident that criminal history records infor^tion was not con-
sidered a critical factor in prosecution. The receipt of timely and
complete criminal record information is not considered essential to
effective prosecution; how the police construct the crime is more
Important. It was also indicated that prosecutors rarely disseminate
information to other criminal justice agencies or the public and thus
would have little need to maintain
'.burdensome audit trails... I„ fact,
in a 1980 interview the executive director of the Prosecutor.s
Association estimated that only three jurisdictions in the state had
made any attempt to develop audit trails.
Strangely, the leadership in the law enforcement community
did not openly express its attitude toward the WCRPA until after
several months of participation in the rule making process. Initial
meetings with the Executive Director of the Washington Sheriffs and
Chiefs Association were cordial and cooperative. Plans were discussed
to address regional meetings of law enforcement personnel and to
organize a state wide training effort.
There were several reasons for this reticence and seeming
cooperation among the leadership and ranks of state and local law
enforcement. Although
..law enforcement had to dislike the law because
It was a mandate by the Feds " ;,c: . c ,
were wniinc to . •,,l,„g nsk jeopardizing continuation of LEAA ^ ,









-Pan.ents for a st
Those Who had participated in preparation of a state privacy'
I
" T - - - effects,there was also wide spread uncertainty, particularly a^on, s.lier
departments, ahout what was required hy the iaw and this
.ade it
ta.ty ,ead .any departments to impose a moratorium on the dissemination
Of any information until they got a firmer grip on what was legally
permissible. Importantly, the law enforcement leadership saw participa-
tion in guideline development as an opportunity to get what they wanted
-
terms of regulations. For all of these reasons, a consensus, at
least among the ran. and file, emerged which involved a presumption in
favor Of getting something done through participation in guideline
development and implementation activities.
The Governor 's Committee in a Policy Role-
Dissemination Policy '
As noted before. LEAA had initTally advanced a restrictive
policy regulating access to non-conviction information. That policy
limited dissemination of arrest records for "the purposes expressly
and specifically required by statute, federal statute or federal
executive order" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1975: Sec. 20. 2. (b)(2))
.




executive order, court order or court mi.
state .r 1 , appropriateS o local offici^^U" (w c n°' als (U.S. Department of Justice, 1976d: Sec
20.21(b)(2)).
The WCRPA established dissemination policy comparable 1n
restrictiveness to LEAA's initial
,974 regulations. That policy
involved the following language:
c^^n:ic?!on'^'dat^m:rbe^'d]sIra":3-b"^^'^^ '"'""'^^
conduct or other non'rSnv^^t? ""^/I'^aations of criminal
be available or acce^5?M I f "'"^ that it
1977: 10 97 80). ' P'"-P°^e (RCW,
There were two problematic aspects of this policy which required
additional regulations. First, there are a wide variety of public and
private agencies which conduct investigative activities but such
agencies may not necessarily fit the definition of criminal justice
agencies. Secondly, in many instances, the legal authority which
authorizes non-criminal justice access is vague as to purpose and fails
to make reference to non-conviction data.
The SPA adopted a way to deal with the first issue which had
been suggested by LEAA in its planning instructions. A criminal justice
agency was defined to include agencies which allocated a substantial
portion of their annual budget to, and had as its primary function, the
administration of criminal justice. But this definition was unhelpful,
SPA staff thought, because it failed to distinguish subunits of larger
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agencies dia execute cH.„a, justice functions. e..p,e,
""""" Boards p.ncip. funct.n was „censin,.
the enforcement division did have the power to prosecute violators
Because of these problems, the SPA staff proposed that a subunit which
conducts functions associated with the administration of criminal
justice could gain access to non-conviction information. However, when
an opinion was requested from the Attorney General he rejected this
approach as improper since it would leave the legislatively imposed
condition of the budget test
"superfluous."
Nevertheless, there were two alternative paths an agency coulo
propose to resolve the issue. The agency subunit could either establish
a contract of services with a criminal justice agency in order to secure
access {a potentially cumbersome approach given the number of criminal
Justice agencies Involved), or the agency could apply for certification
by showing that a statute, ordinance or other legal mechanisms speci-
fically enabled access to non-conviction information. Most applications
for access to non-conviction information were handled in the latter way.
These problems posed difficult matters of judgment which the
SPA staff did not feel secure making on their own. Further, the SPA
was being pressed by requests from a whole variety of federal, state
and local agencies to make quick decisions about matters on which there
was little in the way of formal policy. In addition, many local law
enforcement agencies experienced dramatic increases in requests for
criminal record Information. The Seattle Police Department indicated,
for example, a 200 percent Increase in requests. Consequently the
Privacy Administrator decided to enlist the Governor's Committee in the
asions
development 0. a s.ste™at1c P0,1c. wMc. woul.
.„.o„e t.e. ,„
decision making role.
TWO regulations were subsequently drafted to establish
fra.ewor. within which the Governor's Co^ittee could
.a.e deci
as to access to criminal histor, data which included non-convictiol'
.nfor.ation. One regulation set up a process b. which an agenc. could
apply for certification as a criminal in.f.v.justice agency. The other
regulation established a method b. which the SPA could determine those
non-cri.i„al justice agencies which had legitimate access to non-
conviction data. The agency would be required to identify the purpose
for Which the information was sought, the legal authority, and how the
need to know this information related to performance of official
duties. Approved agencies would be identified and a listing published
by the State Planning Agency.
Surprisingly, the Governor's Committee members, particularly
the Chief Of the State Patrol and other law enforcement officials.
Showed a much stronger interest in decisions regarding certification
Of criminal justice agencies. Such decisions were not taken lightly
because acknowledgement of an agency as a criminal justice agency,
even if it was only for the purpose of obtaining criminal record
information, was considered tantamount to recognition and acceptance
in the law enforcement community. For example, entities which per-
formed investigative activity for a social service agency such as
Child Protective Services or the Welfare Fraud Division of the Depart-
ment of Social and Health Services were rejected by law enforcement
committee members because of "do good" philosophies alien to the law
was not
the A^ed Forces were certified wit. little discussion
PoHcy decisions regarding non-criminal Justice agency access
-sed controversial issues wit. potentially volatile political results
consequently, t.e Oovernor's Co^ittee largely deferred such issues to
the SPA staff. 3iven the restrictiveness of the state law, it
surprising that few applicants for certification tc receive arrest
information were approved. One federal applicant particularly ranged
by
.ejection was the y.s. civil Service Co^ission. They argued that
conviction information. But a dose reading of the executive order
Showed that arrest for non-conviction information was not listed as
"material for which they were authorized access. This was also the case
with many other federal and state agencies.
LEAA policy makers had expected that a tightening of access
to non-conviction information would prompt federal and state agencies
to seek legislation to revise outdated statutes in order to secure
information now denied them. These actions were expected to subse-
quently render criminal records privacy a more visible public issue
and generate increased public scrutiny of the way criminal records were
used. However, in spite of these expectations, there has been no great
sense of urgency (by non-criminal Justice agencies) to secure adequate
statutory authority bhcause not only are multiple avenues available to
circumvent the regulations, but policy custom continues to dictate who
















.stance co.pan.s an. a
...t. o, e.p,o.e.
depen. upon t.e st.en.t. o.
.eUtlons cuUlvate. wU. Uw enforcement
agencies.
Moreover, after the State Patrol undertook administration of
the law in 1980, certification guidelines have 5een relaxed to allow
substantial discretionary departures from the rules. One local law
enforcement official who was interviewed in 1980 about how dissemina-
tion policy has been handled by the Patrol observed:
en^orcemenfat'tltuSl: V'.lllf'' '''''
cops so they can'^tell us o Hn "°"!J^^tent. They aren't




It was evident from initial reactions of many criminal justice
officials that implementation of the WCRPA was not going to be easy.
SPA staff suspected that ignorance of the requirements of the law
exaggerated its actual effects. If some mechanism could be employed
to enhance communication processes between the SPA, Governor's Committee
and affected agencies, perhaps the pockets of opposition and more wide-
spread grudging acceptance could be gradually replaced by dutiful
compliance. The mechanism chosen was the appointment of an advisory
committee, broadly representative of both criminal justice agencies
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and non-criminal justice interests Tho •
^''"^''y e Of the Ad HocAdvisory Committee was to provide a forum for review andlu comment on
regulations drafted by the SPA staff to i™p,e„„t the WCRPA
The co^Uteewas expected to provide the SPA „Uh
.„u,-p,e
perspectives fro. which a consensus Interpretation of the Intent of
the law could emerge, to anticipate the Impacts of proposed rules and
compliance could be more carefully calculated Th« ,'y . The explicit attention
wUh Which a special appropriation request could be presented to the
Governor for submission to the upcoming special legislative session
This would help remove what many viewed as the central obstacle to
compl iance-the lack of sufficient resources. In addition, such an
effort would help the SPA to acguire the resources necessary to conduct
a state wide audit. Only an audit would provide the SPA with specific
baseline information necessary to make judgements about progress toward
compliance. Moreover, the audit authority would lend credibility to
the seriousness with which the SPA took its enforcement responsibility.
The absence of a formal appointment process of committee members
by the Director of OCD appears to have contributed to ambiguity in the
line of authority for administration in guideline development. While
persons designated for appointment were recruited in a variety of ways,
a letter authorizing appointment originated neither from Wiegman nor
Schram but from the Privacy Administrator. Evidently the Deputy
Director of OCD and Wiegman were reluctant to give the Ad Hoc Advisory
Committee a status that would associate them too closely with the
-pressmen that the. had
.o.e than J„st an advisory
.o,e
NevenheUss. seve.a,





in a 1981 interview:
We knew someone upstair? was t=ni
the rules but we Just didn't It "'^ ^f"* t° <^evelop
charge. ' exactly who was in
in fact, there were multiple
"authorities." Schram was one
authority as administrator of the SPA. The Governor's Committee had
formal supervisory and final decision making power so they were another
authority.
,n fact, the WCRPA only mentions the SPA as the administra-
tive authority for the law; no mention is made of either the Governor's
committee nor the OCD director but the fact that the OCD director was
both head Of the agency and chairman pro tern of the Governor's Co.ittee
spared conflict on this point. Perhaps because of a careful avoidance
Of an association with something potentially controversial as the WCRPA
guidelines. Wiegman ultimately delegated the job to Deputy Director
James Frits whose signature appears on the final version of the
regulations.
As indicated in the list of participants in Table 13, the
membership of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee consisted of representatives
from a wide spectrum of state agencies, criminal justice organizations,
a variety of state associations and an assortment of non-criminal
justices interests including the ACLU, Public Disclosure and Human
Rights commissions, city, county and business associations. Selection
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Institute of Public Se^-vice
i>eattle University
Public Records, Liquor Control Board
Parole Board
Washington Association of Counties
KING Broadcasting
State Human Rights Commission
House Ways and Means Committee
Licensing Liquor Control Board
DSHS, Research
Senate
Board of Prison Terms
Liquor Control Board
House Institutions Committee
Washington Association of Cities
Washington State Patrol, Organized Crime
Intelligence Unit
Superior Court, Pierce County
Prosecutors Association
Public Disclosure Commission
Snohomish County Criminal Justice Agency andState Association of Law and Justice Planners
City of Seattle, Law and Justice
King County System Service
Bothell Police Department
Association of Washington Businesses


























Senate Constitution and Election Committee
DSHS, Adult Correction
FBI, Special Agent in charge
King County Sheriff
DSHS, Data Support
Assistant Attorney General for WSP
Washington State Patrol (wsP)
Administrator for the Courts
State Gambling Commission
Department of Licensing
Prosecuting Attorney. Yakima County
Job Therapy
Spokane County Sheriffs Department
Independent Citizen
- Public records interest
Washington Association of Sheriffs and
Pol ice Chiefs
OCD
SOURCE: Washington, Law and Justice Planning Office, 1977a,
1 93processes for committee membership varied- ..n
idPnt.-f-.- A . ^




.eco-ended byve agences or associations while a few requested kflu-t,^ u ^,
i
membershin





.a,or co.pone„ts 0. cri.ina,
,„3tice were
represented and that the selertinn „
^"^""^ maintained a continuity
" -™'ved in the legislative process and included partici-
pants involved in the development of the 1976 state privacy plan.
Several subcommittees were rroat^j ,
.
^" "rder to address each of
Shown in Table 14 as requiring further clarification
through adoption of administrative regulations.
,n addition to the
subcommittees, the Privacy Administrator created five wor. groups whose
assignment was to produce a work plan which would identify specific
steps agencies would take to achieve compliance. Needless to say
«h,le there wasn't much enthusiasm for the development of work plans
several agencies submitted such plans with the expectation that the
appropriation would be forthcoming in the near future.
The Privacy Administrator had not anticipated that the Ad Hoc
Advisory Committee would be as large or potentially unwieldy as it had
gotten to be. The WCRPA had become more than a curiosity and interest
spread far beyond law enforcement to include many other non-criminal
justice agencies and associations. Each interest had different motiva-
tions for participation: the ACLU sought guidelines which provided
extensive leverage to the data subject to inspect and challenge the
contents of his file; the Human Rights Commission was concerned that






REVIEW AND THAI i rj^
for resolution of disputes, and
'
inSi?S„^"^ ^i"-inaticn^S? S^rected
B. DEFINITIONS: Criminal justice agencv
C. See Section 8.
D. See Section 6, providing for deletion of
nonconviction data after two or threeyears under certain circumstances
n. SECURITY OF RFrnpnc;
securltvlfi''' ''l''''''
fu^^r ^ ^ P'^Qtection from fire,theft, loss, destruction) and for pro-tection from unauthorized access.
B. SPA to establish standard for personnel
employed by state and local criminaljustice agencies, who are responsible
tor maintenance and dissemination of
criminal history record information (e qlevels of security clearance).
C. See Section 9 (1) and (2).
ni. DISSEMINATION
Effective 01/01/78, no criminal justice
agency to disseminate arrest information
unless record also states disposition;
agency must check with identification
section of WSP if record pertains to
felony or gross misdemeanor. (Section 4)Conviction records, and information per-
taining to matter currently in process
may be disseminated without restriction




This portion of law








Section 4 goes into
effect on 01/01/78;
















Records must be keot of P^rh ^-i. • ^.
(Section 5 (7)) dissemination.
DEFINITIONS: Criminal history record information; nonconviction data; convict on
COMPLETENESS AND Am ipy-^
C^h'^^rJl^RfU/r^'?'"'''^ 2608 (seeLn. 4J 43 CW), but are crucial to imole-
mentation of law. Records are not
^
complete" without dispositions. NeedIS to assess existing problems in reportingof dispositions and desirability of changes
B SPA Zf"'l'' ''^'''''^ suchVeporttng'a. b has duty to provide for audits of









SOURCE: Washington. Law and Justice Planning Office, 1977b,
''''' ^^^^^^^^^
-
work of the open records law. Needlp,.ess to say, these and other agendas
™de a collision with law enforcement Inevitable.
one Of the
.ost consistent complaints expressed hy law enforce-
representatives Interviewed s..se,.ent to the ,1del1„e development
-ess was that law enforcement agencies were
.nderrepresented on the
Ad Hoc Advisory Committee.'
Regardless of whether the concern was well founded or not the
perception of being outnumbered had two principal effects: it drove
law enforcement participants into a highly defensive posture favoring
a "narrow interpretation and substantially weakened law enforcement
support for the final version of the guidelines. Co^ents by a sergeant
from an eastern county sheriffs department best captures the reasons
for law enforcement's defensive posture:
Where [the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee! ant out v. a
was that it was taken ove^ by vested in?ere L n."?. h
Se houfd^a^ri:? '""V
^--e1n\"Jbit":?ion^ r"'
r he n^=r:::^:e^!:^^l^?.,^^:;^n^^ t
inter s 'of 'V.
'''' profecting'lhee t cops with the votes we had, we would havpnever gotten what we wanted.
f;.r thP Ilci^
'^^""^"^
^ surprising criticism for law enforcement had bv
e memSe in'alV ?wo'^ '.^'V' ''''' groups. ?he.e wer^nin o rs n an. t from the state patrol, two from the SP^ttipPolice Department (added later to the list in TablVlsrthree othersfrom po ice departments around the state, the eLcut ve d reclor heWashington Sheriffs and Chiefs Association and an FBI age t?he countshad two representatives, as did prosecution.
adopted 5, t.e SPA „e.econsi.e.ed
the p.od.ct 0. „on-,aw e„.o.ce.e„t
.nte.ests and faned to
.enect t.e





.ot. TUWS and t.e
WCRPA. As a consequence, as a records manager fro. a large western
Washington Police Department observed- "Wh™ th^ ,
•
t^'e fules were published
we basically ignored them."
The Ad HOC Advisory Committee met six times from August 6, ,977
through January 20. 1978. The interest level and thus attendance was
'
underwent substantial revisions. However, the November through January
period was marked by a substantial decline in attendance, especially by
non-criminal justice interests. Public hearings held in Yakima and
Seattle drew attendance from mostly law enforcement and other criminal
justice personnel
.
The months of December and January were spent
focusing on legal issues which necessitated several opinions from the
Assistant Attorney General. In fact, advisory opinions had to be
requested several times in order to resolve disputes over interpreta-
tions which threatened to postpone final adoption of the regulations.
Defining Rules for Record Access and Ins pertinn
The debate over the guidelines for regulating individual access
and inspection of criminal history records was symptomatic of the level
of conflict between different interests which emerged in the Ad Hoc
Advisory Committee's deliberations. This discussion consumed an in-
ordinate amount of meeting time, compared with issues pertaining to
record quality which probably should have received more attention.
a resuU of
,-.p,en,entation. What distinguishes the two processes 1s
that Wl1ct ove. the te™s on which assent is gi.en o. withheld "
-
What "is crucial to the implementation process" (Bardach, 1977a- 43)
Fro. this perspective. Bardach advances two reasons „h, implementation
'
is best characterized as defensive politics:
participants who favor ?hrpolicv aoaU nTT l^'^
the exi^tPnro nf i-tl
'-''^ PO'" y g als of the mandate use
Bardach's notion of policy implementation is indeed serviceable
to those who seek to understand the forces that shape the execution of
the policy. But. it needs to be qualified in two important respects:
agreement on what constitutes the policy mandate is frequently prob-
lematic and expectations about what will happen turn in part, upon how
the mandate is understood in relation to legislative intent. Expecta-
tions about potential effects of the law can have a reverse influence:
anticipated impacts may produce interpretations of statutory requirements
and objectives which, although consistent with predispositions of
implementors are inconsistent with legislative intent. Stated in
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a
-other way, the meaning of words and thus the stated
the conte. «
"
eas.y support aUernatlve Interpretations of a UgisUt.e
.ntent
--dera.t' ns. These contexts support different and. frequent,., contested
interpretations of statutory Intent. Each contestant advances Inter-
pretations Which not only originate fro. their perceptions of the
effects Which determine the extent to which features of the context „ay
be altered. The fact that neither adverse consequences feared hy
opponents of an Interpretation nor the desired effects of an alternative
-terpretatlon actually occur as a result of Implementation of guide-
lines have relatively lUtle influence over the duration of support
by proponents of favored positions.
Just such a juxtaposition of belief, attitude and policy con-
sequence was involved in the development of procedures designed to
implement WCPRA provisions for Individual access and limitations and
dissemination of criminal record Information. Both policies were the
focus Of intense conflict between criminal and non-criminal justice
Interests to advance favored Interpretations of statutory intent, to
achieve expected performance and to realize ultimate effects. In
particular, regulations to implement procedures to enable inspection






seeking to advance liberal construction, ,nH ,
tion, „ w
" s and law enforcement organiza-s seeking to contain such attempts.
The efforts by non-criminal interests to secure the „ost
Pe^lssive rules on access were animated b. the assumption that these
procedures constituted the
.ost effective way to alter the that
criminal records were managed and disseminated. The threat of inunda-
cH.1nal and civil penalties for refusal to follow guidelines for
access and other due process requirements would constitute a sufficient
deterrent to unlawful police dissemination and an incentive to secure
other important statutory objectives. In contrast, law enforcement
interests were equally assertive that such permissive procedures not
only substantially exceeded the intent of the WCRPA but would constitute
an intolerable administrative burden and would adversely affect in-
vestigative activities.
Although neither position has been borne out by the actual
events, a moderately permissive policy of access, promulgated by the
SPA in 1978. has now been replaced by guidelines originated by the
State Patrol which have significantly modified the thrust of these
earl ier rules
.
Interlocking laws with con-
flicting definitions
One area in which LEAA guidelines reflected some confidence
from prior policy was that of provisions for individual access, review
and challenge of the contents of a data subject's file. The Menard
201decision was conspicuous in enunciatino
^ unambiguous doctrine th.t
z::r - -to t.e.a.c.nen,e infc^a.on cons.e..
,.cc.ate
rights. The language used in the federal requlation, .
to balance the concerns of ad •
^
'
administrative efficiency against due
process
;
to either the crim? a ' „s?icT
'"^"'"'^
''"'"den
any criminal justice nformatLn^l"?^"' *^ t*^^ individual
"dividual and mai^ai'n T he f^'Z T"'the purposes of challenge or co"ert?on fn\ n"'""^of Justice, 1975: Sec. 20.21(g)O)) Department
The apparent even-handedness of the LEAA regulations provoked little
controversy in the criminal justice co^unity. These provisions created
little controversy because they lacked the degree of concreteness and
specificity necessary to energize alternative interpretations and
expectations. Instead, the states were delegated responsibility to
develop detailed procedures to implement individual access and dissem-
ination provisions. Importantly, the way the states have chosen to
develop these procedures depends to some extent upon how they define
key concepts associated with criminal history record information.
Instead of parroting back the LEAA guidelines (as so many
states have chosen to do) the WCRPA framed access policy with the
following language:
wJo Jr^n""^ J'k^^'"
^9encies shall permit an individualh is or who believes that he may be, the subiect of acriminal record maintained by that agency to ap eaJ ?nperson during normal business hours of that criminal
justice agency and request to <;pp th^ • •
TWO divergent posUlons e.e.,e. a.out
.cw tMs polic. s.c.,a
.e ,.te.
Preted and translated Into su.se.oent
...deHnes. Representatives of
the law enforcement argued that the provision should be given as
lueral an interpretation as possiMe. A
, 1tera1 interpretation held
that a cri.ina, Justice agency was onl. obligated to per.it inspection
Of records originated
,y tj« agency. Any other cri.lna, history
material pertaining to the data subject which originated fro. another
agency, including information from central repository files, the FBI
and other criminal Justice agencies which may be in agency's possession
was exempted from access. Therefore, for example, if the individual
wanted to inspect a criminal history file maintained by the central
state repository then he would have to secure that file in person at
the central office. Significantly, this position was not based upon an
interpretation of statutory intent but rather on predictions of the
organizational consequences which would ensue If the policy was not
adopted. As an assistant chief and former Governor's Connlttee member
acknowledged in a subsequent interview:
liLl^"^ to be inundated by requests from in-
to rues lotT. ''T''- 'f^^t
an alrLdv H?ff? '^f^ "f" ' ^"'^ worsenrea y difficult situation.
This approach troubled the ACLU legislative coordinator for it
failed to treat disclosure of a record to a data subject as a dissemina-
tlon. Under the law the dissemination of criminal record information
required that a pre-dissemination query be made to the State Patrol to




--p,ete. Thus, a second posUion. advanced pHncipan. t.e
D,>ecto. 0. the Pu5l1c Olsclosu.e Co^Us.on (POC). st.on,,,
supported the ACLU and others, contended that a .ch
.oa.de. inter-
pretation was warranted hy reading of the state p.Mic disclosure iaw
The efforts to convince the SPA and others of the superiority of this'
-terpretation exhibited cleverness and legal shrewdness.
In essence the PDC director contended that the word "record "
left undefined in the WCRPA. had a technical meaning already well
established by the public disclosure law-a law which preceeded the
WCRPA by several years. Public records were defined by that law to
include:
Any writing containing information relating to the cnndurt
A definition of records included in the proposed rules was indeed con-
sistent with this definition. Criminal records were defined to include
that information
"collected" and "raintained" by a criminal justice
agency to include:
IPrtpf h!;^'h°r
information directly generated or col-
lunctfont. .nH
performance of its officialf i s; a d (2) records or information properly
obtained from another agency but retained by a criminaljustice agency in the normal course of its business and
obt inPd ?/t:''' '''''^ ''''' '^'^'^ fro^whe era e If they are in the possession of the agency(Washington, OCD, 1977). ^
The SPA staff had framed the definition of records in this way in
recognition of the fact that interagency exchange of records enabled
204
a




^hich pertained toparticular data subject. Accordingly the thinki^ ^ ng was that if a datasubject was given access to all record. . •
pertained t .
"laintained by an agency which
-
hi.self, would be provided a better opportunity to
from other criminal justice agencies.
31ven these ccndUions the Integrity of the information re-
organization and conscientiousness of records personnel
. The SPA
guideline writers considered it important not only to carefully
enumerate material approved for dissemination under the law
.ut wanted
to insure that the infonnation the agency disseminated was the same
-formation about a particular data subject each time that information
was released.
The SPA initial approach to this issue was to propose a rule
Which listed the types of files searched for the purpose of identifying
cr,m,nal history record material. Law enforcement representatives were
opposed to this approach because it appeared to make other criminal
history information available to data subjects for inspection. The SPA
consequently gave up this strategy and fashioned an approach which both
acceded to the concerns of law enforcement and showed greater promise
Of increasing the accuracy and completeness of criminal history records.
This approach permitted the agency to separate criminal history record
Information from other files when responding to a request to review the
files or for other disseminations.
Anop..on.s so.cU.
....... O.s.os.e Cc.ss.n
SPA. The op.n.on presented the following findings-
w|r:jp^i^rs
"i^rt^i^r^^^^ t^^^ t^edefinition includes wrUinqs used ^^""^^ ^he
well as those which are prepa?lf^ ^^ency, as
agency, criminal history rPrnrHc f/^^^^ned by thatby the Washington sLt7pa?rnl TH"^?';'^^°" maintained
a public record of any cHmnll ^^^^^^^^^^^^ion Section is
such information. Te PuM c ii r nc" 'P"'^ ^^^'^^ ^^^^
agencies, upon request for dPnJ?f ^^"^ requires
to make them promptly avail ^Mfr '''^^ P'^^^^ ^^^o^ds,
also requires agenc es ^o ldoit ^he law
sistent with the rh^ntJ-c ^""^ ^'^les con-
access to the pub ' eco ds''Shl'h°' '''T'' '''' Public
assistance to inqu ?ers ' ?hp p^m''^^ ^^^^^^t
states that its proves ons are tn\J'^^l'' ^ J^^^^^^e Law
and that in the eveni of con^i.? ^^^^^^^^^^y construed
this act or any otheJ
between the provision of
govern.
. . Ce^Linly L ^^l''"" °^ ^hall
State Patrol-Off ce ^ oart of'Eh''''
'''' ^^^^ '''''
the criminal histo"; Record must Inlr^t"''
maintaining
8 accept and process reaue.t. tn °^
^^^^^'^^
1977).
l^''"ces q s s to see such records (Tuttle,
The Attorney General's opinion had two principal effects; it
robbed law enforcement of the support necessary to defend a more'
restrictive position and greatly enlarged considerations involved in
proposing rules which adequately facilitated the exercise of the right
to inspect and challenge the accuracy and completeness of criminal
history information. For example, the ACLU representative proposed
that since police precincts and branch offices of the state patrol were
criminal justice agencies, such offices could handle or facilitate
request for records inspections.
.aUnce in.via.l n'^.ts an. convenience a.a.st a..-nUt.t,-ve




tive burden. Neverthpl pqc no« • .ne ess, non-cnminal justice interests were not
persuaded, it was evidprn- th^-i- . .de t that computeruation had created the con-
-U1cns, in at least so.e jurisdictions in the state, in which c a,
history records stored in a regional repository could be readily
Obtained through a remote terminal. Under these conditions, it was not
considered burdensome to utilize these capabilities to facilitate such
a request. The resulting regulations strove for a middle ground:
2ac165-m42o'(5) (ITtL'tl set forth In
branch offices of tilKl t ' '""^""^ <•egiom^ or
agency
^n'c'iSdlnftJe^w: n^SSn^^^^le^^i^^Sr '^^^
Z^^l' "^'""^^ °' bran*ch''o???c -do' 0
'
criminal justice agency havj g' uch ac i ° 'caoa'"'
r"Ju:sr(«;s;ig?s-"^^s:5^?^;ir"^ '^^^'^
In addition, another administrative rule specified a procedure by which
the agency responding to the request would obtain and furnish the
requestor with "a copy of an^ criminal history information in the files
of the Identification Section of the Washington State Patrol relating
to the requestor" (MAC, 1978: 365.50.070).
An Ad Hoc Advisory Committee spokesman for the law enforcement
position, Jim McMahon (a small town police chief and a respected and
dominant voice in the state law enforcement leadership), clearly unhappy
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«nh the ruling, increased the intensity of his .tt.n






--)- -ahonur,e. attendance 0. association
.e..ers and others atP-'C hearings on the proposed rules scheduled
.or late Nove.her or
early December. The letter exhibited a tone of urgency:
Jhoro"5ghi; fa™i:?lHzr?h»s^,'" '''''' ^^^""s
prepared L atiend Jhe oumI "''^ "^^^ be
The impact of th s aw Jo?nS ?o"Kf l""'"- ^'"P"^*-L.E. aqencv in tho ctr^^ ? ° tremendous on everv
(McMahon? l97?) '° '•'^ "^^y smallest
^
Among the issues specified in tho i^tt„„ .e letter as critical was that pertaining
to inspection guidelines:
lee' h?f"recoM't?'n''^"''" desires to
^o"rs^ltS^cZKil^e"co'rdT^ ?r ^ '"''"^organized effort tn ri^p^+i- / ^^^^^ an
This characterization had clearly misinterpreted the thrust of
the procedure proposed. The agency which responded to the request for
inspection was onl^ required to reveal criminal record info™tion
(other than those records maintained by the Central State Repository)
which originated from another criminal justice agency if it was
currently in the possession of such records. Whether intended or not,
this misinterpretation helped reinforce perceptions of greatly exag-
gerated impacts.
When a public hearing was held in Seattle by the SPA staff, a









.0. u ca.sed postponement of tne adoption o. t.e
,.,e„-nes
ana t.us p™v1.ed anot.e. opponunUy fo. enforcement
,„te.ests to
P-^ for revisions. Howe... t.e conten.in, s.es of t.e iss.e wo.,
not budge in either direction. Consequently, t.e SPA staff offered
to Obtain an opinion from the Attorney General's office about this
issue. Both sides agreed to "^u,^" .^-^t, .a live with the decision and let the
adoption procedures go forward.
The resulting opinion appeared to vindicate the non-law
enforcement point of view by reinforcing an earlier Attorney SeneraVs
opinion provided to the Public Disclosure Commission. The opinion
included the following observations and guidance-
St Eu e^lrfi^ ^jszt ru^L:;%^nM:^^indeed we questioned whether they su t n a y a"^ended '
It ^eJdia'i oi.'fk"' ''l'''''^' re.]!^s'int c .
iTkI JT^'"^^^^' leg slation which provides that it beliberally construed. As a general principal then in
n'wJRpW records specif] ly' de ified
continup'tn h ^T''''^'
°f the Public Disclosure Law
a?:a;s"be'?av'ored"'^'
consequently disclosure should
VecL''whpl'!;f "conviction record" andrecord_ wherever used in the statutes or rules be inter-
Pub I lur^n":''T ^'''r '^'^^^^^on Of records thelic Disclosure Law. To the extent that any such record
L^^^k"^^^ maintained by a criminal justice aqencv i?
a 0? ZT/ ''''''''^ regardless oTtheorig n of the information actually contained therein
of t^e Pub?ir^ni.7?nc'' 'f^'
disclosure policy and objectives
?hP WfRPA n n
°^^^^°^^'^^Law relating to records generally,t e C provision for individual inspection can only beinterpreted to mean that any individual is entitled to
appear at any office of a particular criminal justice agency
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to request information on himself Th.-c iburden of discovery and producinnthi actual
entity upon which L?ion 8 p^ace^ °" thedisclosure (Carr, 1978) obligation for
T.e opinion represented a substantia, defeat fo. ,a„ enforcement
-terests. T.e enforcement leadership considered t.e SPA adminis-
trative rules to have overreached the ,aw. especial,, as they pertain
to the ru,es on individua, inspection. A sheriff fro. an urban eastern
Washington department characterized the response this way in a ,980
interview..
..Nine-nine percent of ,a. enforcement in this state did not
consider the SPA administrative regulations
,eg1timate. Most of us
thought they went far beyond
,egis,at1ve Intent."
The impac t of InsDection provisions
In interviews conducted in ,980 and ,98,, I sought to determine
What effects the SPA inspection provisions had upon po,1ce departments.
Respondents Interviewed InCuded off1c1a,s from both sma„ and ,arge
urban departments. Contrary to expectations, none reported a deluge
of inquiries. Sraa,, departments have processed ten to fifteen requests
a year while requests to large urban departments have numbered between
I'ifty and three hundred a year.
The most frequent source of requests was from inmates in prison,
particularly persons convicted of serious offenses who sought appellate
review of their cases. Another probable reason for this source of
request would be that the criminal history record is utilized in
decisions pertaining to parole. It is obviously in the interests of
inmates to insure that their records portray an accurate and complete
profile of arrest, charges and dispositions.
Another common but sinnifir;,nt
tions for inspection of
""""
^ , records were frequently submitted under t.ePubnc Disclosure Law instead Of t.e WCRPA.
„ot onW did





record requests filed under a different statute. Such




.as been 1 ittle awareness
'
and understanding about data subjects rights under the WCRPA
contrast to these Observations, which suggest negligible
-s^-bilit.and utilization of the law b. individual data subjects
defense attorneys and public defenders (at least in two of the largest
court jurisdictions in the state of Washington) have demonstrated an
increased willingness to use the procedures available in the WCRPA as
a tool in Plea negotiations, trial defense and as a ™eans to influence
sentencing decisions.
In light Of the turmoil surrounding the development of inspec-
tion provisions, it would not have been surprizing to find a great
deal Of non-compliance. To the contrary however, there has been far
»re acceptance than anticipated. What the WCRPA did. similarly to
Mam and Miranda, was to structure the discretion Involved in the
administration of criminal justice. Structuring discretion does not
necessarily entail adverse consequences for existing practices and
routines. This fact was not entirely lost upon those with responsi-
bility for compliance. For example, an eastern Washington records
manager put it this way:
we didn't want it Me hidn"? 4.1?^' f therefore
about our records hand! ng proce .^''^''^ """'^"hhad to address it by mandate ?a?her than
""f'?'-t""^tely we
the TOst beneficial Dart r.f til ^ " desire. However,
us reorganize ou" ec ds pro Lses 'r„"" '''"'^made^records more i^Ponanr^^lL^entf^rc^-^^JIi
•j:s\ice
A records chief fro. a large, urhan Puget Sound police department re-
marked that:
One of the most important effert-; nf fhn ^ i
was it suggested to urthJ ,! ^^^^ ^^^^^^9 process
with our ?Icords It m.Sf ^^^f^^^n^^ne what we we?e doing
were managinr'nd using" r^re o ds^ u'?[ima?el'
'^^'^
streamlining our procedures.
lt tely we ended up
Some interviews with law enforcement personnel suggest that
expected negative consequences have been overdrawn. In this regard
two respondents interviewed for this study provide some interesting
insights as to how experience with implementation increases the
willingness to acknowledge distinctions between expected and actual
results. A western Washington records manager for example, welcomed
the WCRPA in these terms:
Law enforcement agencies should be eager to adopt theseguidelines since they provide structure and ce?taintv asto the circumstances under which discretion ma/be usedin the release of criminal records. The law gives usinanswer to queries. In fact, the WCRPA provide gideleswhich could serve as department-wide procedure for the useOf any information pertaining to law enforcement matters
An eastern Washington records manager chose to draw interesting par-
alels to Miranda when asked to evaluate his experience with the WCRPA
in light of original expectations:
h.r.nf/li-'"''^'^ "^l^ "^^"^ 9°^ ^i>anda decision
wf f/^!'."^' f 9 to impact us to-th^int wheree couldn t do a damn thing. And this was the attitude
we were taking on the WCRPA. I was the first one to say
and to some degree it was acce^ied * '"P'-""*'
up til Tooslf?p^:r:^tituie'?hat"^ T'^'"'' ^^---9
Justice which was that by saJfnn w^^'V^''''" criminal
no one can tell me w a to do'w h ]\t''l "J"" ^"^
needed some discipline in tMs regard!
When asked to state more specifically how the two policies compared
in terms of effects on law enforcement practice, the respondent
provided this elaboration:
It [the WCRPA] compares only to the extent th^t if w;>c
expected to impact us so we couldn't do our job Sirandarequired us to warn a person of his right be?o;ehim in for questioning. Similarly, we could have been^mpacted by the WCRPA to the poinVthat we were suppo ed
What Miranda made us do was clean up to make^IiTi^ehad the right guy and we had to go through these procedures
P?i"c^ n 'J°''-r'
"'^'^ '''''' 90in any ?ur
"
riva y a d security gave us the same type of obligationWe had to make sure the record was clear and make sure ?herecord was available. Prior to the WCRPA, crimna justice
kelpin'g' function.""' ' ^^^^^^ '''''''' ^ --^^
n.nK^Ji^^^ ^^"^ preceded the Miranda decision, weprobably wouldn't have had that de^Ti^ Miranda came
about in part because an officer acted on the basis of priorknowledge that the suspect was a known criminal in the
community. Because of that knowledge, the arresting officer
acted in a totally disrespectful manner, failing to acknowl-
edge his rights. If there had been an environment conducive
to accuracy and completeness, abuses of this kind may havebeen less likely to occur.
Communicating the Rules :
Law Enforcement Training
In a review of studies of the effects of the Miranda decision,
Wasby (1974-1975 and 1978) found that in-house training can be an effec-
tive source of communication and thus likely to increase the level of
understanding of Supreme Court decisions In .
,
. turn, increased under-
standing may have a positive effert r,n *
°" acceptance and thereby Increase
theme,ihoodofco.pI1ance. For example. Mil ner. study of the
efforts Of Uw enforcement Jurisdictions in Wisconsin to transmit the
iliranda decision indicated that an four police departments surveyed
rated conference and training as the best source of information
('971a:324).
"^^e the professional i.ation of the department did not
increase police contact with ncn-ia„ enforcement sources of information
't did increase utilisation of intradepartmental lines of communications
However, while Hilner's study also determined that professional uation
can have positive effects on the way court decisions are communicated
and received, he acknowledges,
"there was no real hierarchy through
which binding directives regarding the implementation of the Miranda
decision could flow" (1971a: 52). The upshot of this Important fact,
Milner concludes later, is: "that Miranda did not basically change
the decentralized and often unsystematic communication processes used
to Inform police departments about innovations" (1971a: 226).
In this regard, what makes the communication process noteworthy
in the case of criminal records privacy regulations is that extensive
and well coordinated training sessions were conducted by law enforce-
ment leadership immediately after the SPA rules were adopted. Nearly
one thousand law enforcement and other criminal justice personnel
attended sessions conducted in four different locations in the state.
It was indeed surprising and salutory to see such a strong interest
taken by law enforcement to increase awareness of a law and somewhat
unusual that the staff and resources of the Washington State Criminal
th>s process because it a^.ded an oppcn.nU. to advance t.ei.tetn^ Of «.at t.e
.emulations
.e.ui.ed ana .o„ tHe^,,
.e
implemented.
Each Of the principal instructors for the sessions had been
act,ve participants in the ru,e
.aking process. The. included the
Chairman of the Sheriffs and Chiefs Association, the chief of the
Division Of the Seattle Police Department, and her deputy assistant
It was Obvious that they had ta.en the tas. seriously for the sessions
reflected organization and effective use of training aids and graphics
In addition, a short test was included at the end of each session to
certify that the trainees had received credit for professional
development.
The chairman of the Sheriffs and Chiefs Association (perhaps
the most outspoken opponent of the SPA ruling making process) began
each session with a brief overview of the law and explanation of key
definitions. He also used this as an opportunity to editorialize
about the law, injecting his opinions about sections of the law and
regulations he considered questionable if not illegitimate. One
issue he chose to dwell on at some length was the necessity to log
dissemination between criminal justice agencies. He promised that
the law enforcement community would be only temporarily limited by
this and possibly other provisions. He promised that the Sheriffs
and Chiefs Association would introduce several amendments to the WCRPA
during the 1979 legislative session. While he didn'tn t urge open defi-
ance of this and other Provisions
.
the i.pl ication was
.n.ista.ahle
;
^7""^ °' — ed the law enforcement
leadership.
The other instructors relied less
.pon overt criticis™ and
mvective and
.ore on emphasis to advance their interpretation of the
'aw. For example, dissemination requirements were considered to apply
only to written exchanges of criminal record material, thus exempting
the frequent oral exchanges of such data between detectives or the
routine phone exchanges which often involve reference to records of
criminal conduct. In another instance, provisions pertaining to data
subject access and review were construed to mean that the right to
access applied only to conviction information. Access to non-conviction
information would be permitted only if the data subject would demon-
strate that his record was in some way inaccurate or incomplete.
In addition to these examples, the State Identification Division
director encouraged the utilization of exceptions in the law which
pertained to dissemination of criminal records. He indicated that the
central state repository did not have the capability to provide timely
responses to a flood of inquiries. Moreover, he suggested that it
would be erroneous to assume that the central state repository files
were current and accurate.
To be sure, the training sessions were an effective device to
greatly enlarge awareness of the operational aspects of the regula-
tions. Systematic exposure to the law made it far more difficult for







.e,ui.ed. n.st, co.plemy an. a.MguUy
.einfo.ced one
-t.e. to ceate a sense of
.ncena.t. an. caution a.out a.^anCn,
-co..ect" interpretations of t.e ,a„. The typical records c1er.,
unlike the seasoned detective or the self ...m.ohn -assured cop, often lack the
se1f-conf1dence necessary to exercise discretion. Host records Cer.s
work best in an operational environment structured by clear guidelines
and procedures. This te.npera.ent was demonstrated in training and
frequently was exhibited In the efforts by a wide variety of criminal
justice personnel to determine what the "SPA" Interpretation was prior
to the implementation of procedures.
Second, unlike court-originated decisions regulating adminis-
trative procedure, in which the remoteness of the policy source
insulates police personnel from receiving information about the decision
outside the law enforcement community, the SPA had close and continuous
linkages with the recipients of the policy. Whether they liked it or
not, the law enforcement community had grown accustomed to having to
respond and comply to the numerous LEAA-originated and SPA-interpreted
conditions of aid. The SPA rule-making process simply brought law
enforcement personnel into yet a closer interaction with the SPA and
thus dependence for guidance. This fact may explain why the law
enforcement leadership made such persistent efforts to gain "ownership"
and control over training and other avenues of transmission (e.g.,
association meetings, panel discussions) because of the effect it might
have of legitimizing the source of the regulations. Respondents in
subsequent Interviews Indicated that t.e SPA c.e.1M1
.ad .een
9^eat„ enhanced as a
.esuU of assu.m,
.eg.Uto., authon'ty Po.U demonstrated an unexpected
.nowledgeabn Uy of U„ enforcement
practice and a co™it.ent to get something done regardless of the
magnitude of resistance.
CHAPTER VI
LEGISLATIVE REVISION: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF RECORD QUALITY PROVISIONS
IN WASHINGTON, 1979-1981
An examination of the factors involved in the development of
SPA guidelines to insure the quality and integrity of criminal records
instructive about political constraints which limit attempts to
regulate the administration of criminal justice. As was the case with
inspection and dissemination provisions, interpretation of key terms
such as audit, purge, delete, query, and transaction logs dictated, in
part, the substance of the resulting guidelines. It was evident that
law enforcement interests had technical applications of these key terms
which ran counter to those definitions considered pertinent to criminal
records privacy policy. In addition, policies involving controls on
the exchange of data between criminal justice agencies were expected to
have burdensome and unjustified impacts upon investigative functions.
The preoccupation with the effects of dissemination and access
policy discussed in Chapter V obscured a primary objective of criminal
records privacy which is to increase the accuracy and completeness of
criminal history records utilized in the administration of criminal
justice. There is some evidence to suggest that neither law enforce-
ment or other criminal justice officials considered improvements in the
integrity or quality of criminal records an important policy goal in
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^nte.,e„c. e,c.„,e passes ~. to .a,Ue
.ese o.:e«.es
enfo.ce.ent. T.1s uneven aistH.ution of
...,ens ten.e. to p.od.e
political conflict between police and the courts.
The difficulties encountered by the SPA in securing cooperationfo. the courts and prosecutors originated, in part. fro. the federal
-ndate which had exempted the judiciary and failed to prescribe a
positive role for prosecutors. Although the courts originate records
regarding the outcomes or Jisoositinn^; of ..^a posu ons of cases, they are not required
to cooperate in furnishing that information to law enforcement
Although prosecutors could assume a role of information intermediary
for disposition information, LEAA did not write regulations which would
accomplish this end. With the state law tailored closely to Title 28
specifications to the SPA had to develop creative solutions to these
'
challenging and politically volatile problems.
The Investigative Function: The
Limits To Police Reform
One of the factors which contributed to SPA staff difficulties
in getting law enforcement and other criminal justice officials to
modify record keeping practices was that almost no one recognized
accuracy and completeness as an important and central objective of
both Title 28 and state law. Almost everyone interviewed by this author
as a part of the documentation of this study considered limitations on
dissemination of criminal history record information to be the primary
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Of" single policy objective Thi^ „This perception was also shared by non-
cnminal justice interests (e.g ACLIl th«
Co^ission),
'••^^"•^^e press, the Hu»an Rights
The political environment and circumstances which prevailed
at the time that Title 28 was passed probably contributed to this
perception,
^he anti-Vietnam War protests, revelations oT domestic
surveillance and the Watergate scandal had become permanent fixtures
Of public consciousness and the police were no exception. A couple
Of respondents made occasional references to public concern about
surreptitious FBI investigatory practices as a factor which precip-
Uated regulation of police records management and exchange activities
These Observations were generally framed in the context of seeing
privacy regulation as a form of retaliation against the cops for
excesses of a federal agency.
The SPA and its Privacy Administrator were mindful of the
controversy and divisiveness which surrounded criminal records regula-
tions, and thus, they consciously avoided discussions focused upon
the deslreability of the mandate. Such discussions might invite an
endless debate, sidetracking the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee from the
more important and critical tasks of guideline development. The
absence of a clarification of the intent and description of objectives,
especially by state elites and other criminal justice officials in
positions of recognized authority, may have forfeited an important
source of cue-giving to the criminal justice community.
In some respects, this failure to acknowledge positive features
of a policy was comparable to the police responses to the Ma££ and
enfo.ce.ent te^s o. ne.at.e ,e.,
.
int™..cea a new set of consideration, an. conditions w.c.^e
pe.ce.ed effect of co.p.o.lsin, tools consider, essentia, to effec
t've ,aw enforcement. «.at has
.ade the protection of due process
ri9hts so repugnant to law enforcement Is that they are considered
-consistent 1f not contradictory to the IdeCogy of crime control
«Mch views the crimlna, Justice process as a means of esta.lshing
the 9U1U Of the accused (Pacer. 1968). In addition, cri.e control
emphasizes efficiency, routine, timeliness and finality. The presump-
tion Of gum is the operational expression of confidence that police
have 1n the Integrity, effectiveness and finality of fact finding and
Charging processes. Thus, the Ma^^ and Hiranda decisions were perceived
to introduce considerations about Individual rights and due process
Which limit the likelihood of effective prosecution and conviction.
Demand for utilization of accurate and complete criminal
records in criminal justice decision making, like civil liberties due
process guarantees, puts pressure on the police to exercise care In
the utilization of information in the fact finding process. For example
utilization of prior records of arrest is not sufficient to establish
guilt nor does it justify taking shortcuts in the investigation of
crime.
In this respect, then, there are some close parallels to the
Ma£R decision. The ruling places a special responsibility on law
enforcement officers to justify an invasion of individual privacy to
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a
obtain evidence considered likely to establish . ^ .^° a linkage between d
suspect and a criminal ;^rf c- .act. s,.,larly. cH.inal history records are
«y.n.e..yt.epo,.eas..^^^^^^^
criminal records may also be utili,«H =
„
" ' """^ °f identifying suspects
potentially i^ol.ed in the emission Of a crime. Alt.o,Menera,ly
-c.no«led,ed by police, the reliance upon past records as a .eans to
-nd up potential suspects can play a significant role in the police
-vestigative process. A Seattle detective remarked to the author at
one time that approximately three hundred individuals in th. City of
Seattle were responsible for 60 percent of all crime. His estimate
was based upon the fact that these individuals all had prior criminal
-cords. He assured me that the crime rate would decline substantially
If the habitual offender statute were used to imprison even a third of
these persons.
The WCRPA, like the Ma££ and Miranda rulings, regulates the
conditions under which criminal records may be acquired for utilization
in investigative, pre-trial, charging and other proceedings. Signif-
icantly, however, the attempts to place restrictions on the flow of
criminal Information exchanged for the purpose of investigative and
other uses has proven exceedingly difficult to achieve. What has made
regulations in this area problematic is that law enforcement considers
investigation exempt from any outside regulatory control. {In this




The WCRPA and subsequent administrative
.u,es place two
1.ponant conditions on t.e e.c.an.e of cH^inai
.co.d i„,o™aticn
bet«een c.i.ina, agencies, including tne interagency exchange of data
for t.e purposes of intelligence „or. or investigation. Bot. these
condUions were consistent with the Title 28 mandate. First all
exchanges require a pre-disse.ination guery to the central siate
repository to obtain the most current disposition information. Second
a log must be kept on each dissemination which includes the following
information: (1, identification of the agency or person to whom the
information is disseminated; (2) the date the information was dissem-
inated; (3) the individual to whom the information relates; and (4) a
brief description of the information disseminated.
While law enforcement interests are willing to acknowledge
that the provisions generally apply to routine exchanges of criminal
record data, they feel that the exchange of such information in the
conduct Of intelligence and investigative activities should be exempted
from such controls. Such regulations are considered onerous because
Information shared in an investigative context does not lend itself to
audit or predissemination control. For example, concerns were expressed
that these requirements would impede investigations and infringe upon
the freedom needed to exchange information on known offenders. The
timeliness of the exchange of intelligence information could be
jeopardized, it was argued, if detectives were prohibited from exchang-
ing Information on records of arrest, without first attempting to gain
the most current information prior to the exchange.
Z " - spec...subject had a right to inspect his file tHp .The section contains the
following wording:
The individual's riqht to ^^rro^^
history record informatiSn^Li? t '"'^'^ °^ ^^^'"^^^^l
tained in intelligence ?nves? L;°^
''^'""^
^° ^^^^
files and shall norb^conc^rnL^ ^^^^ted
other than that de^inL as ch'^.? l^'l'"^' information
mation by this chapterVRCWri'^y :^S:97°8^):''°^'
The language found here was not sufficient to allay the concerns
expressed by law enforcement that investigative activities not be
regulated. Therefore, it was recon^ended that an additional sentence
be added to the list of definitions which stated:
'Criminal history
record information does not include information contained
.n intelli-
gence and investigative files." Subsequently, this phrase was modified
some more to state: "Criminal history record information does not
include intelligence and investigative information."
This rewording seemed innocuous to the SPA staff for all it
appeared to mean was that intelligence and investigative information
would not have to be divulged if it also contained criminal history
record information. Nothing in this phrase implied that criminal
history information was not accessible just because it was contained
in such files or that the information exchanged in the course of in-
vestigation was exempted from regulations on dissemination. Evidently,
law enforcement interests did not understand it in the same terms.
What prompted the attempt to specifically distinguish the two
kinds of information was that it had strategic value as a tool to
Police Oepa.t.enfs1„te,n,ence and investigative
.nes. The plain-
tiffs contended that intonation collected and maintained in these
files pertained to political beliefs, co^unity organizational
affiliations, sexual preferences and other personal information which
was both irrelevant to effective law enforcement and unrelated to the
coenission of any cri^e. The plaintiffs also argued that such practices
violated their first amendment and other Constitutional rights In
response to their clai.s, the Seattle Police Department argued that
the WCRPA specifically denied access to the contents of investigative
intelligence files. This tactic however was ultimately unsuccessful.
The Seattle Police Department's argument was unpersuasive
principally because the state public disclosure law (RCW 42.17)
generally made intelligence and investigative information accessible
to data subjects unless it could be demonstrated that disclosure would
undermine effective law enforcement. The plaintiffs contended that the
WCRPA did not amend 42.17 nor was intended to regulate the conditions
of release of intelligence information, because that was not the
intent of the privacy law:
The entire chapter is concerned with the accuracy of informa-
tlTfTrl^lV"'" ' enforcement agency which flows from
jHi/l K an arrest, whether or not convictions result.This fact IS clear from the definitions of criminal history
record information and non-conviction information. The actIS not about investigative and intelligence information
r»n„=^^J"K^^^r''\'^°".2°' "PP'^ *° t*'^ twe of information
'
requested by the plaintiffs in this case. This act creates
no right of access to this type of information and it need
not do so, since such right is created by RCW 42.17 (Gibbs
and Douglas, 1977)
.
-e Se.„, Pence Oepan.nt s.s,.e„t,. appea,.
.ec..„ to
and t..s ena.ed su.se.uent passage of a Seattle c.1„a.ce wMc.
..ea
the f,.st attempt a ,cca, ™nic1palUy to
.eguUte the ,-„fo™tio„
collected and maintained 1n police Intelligence and Investigative files
Although the outcome of this important court ruling denied
ponce a means to categorically prevent public access to intenigence
information, it had little effect on their predispositions to exempt
material collected in the conduct of investigative activities. That
predisposition, born cut of custom and Ideology of effective law
enforcement, holds that an^ information utilized or exchanged as a part
Of the conduct of an investigation Is beyond the reach of regulation.
Consequently, as interviews with those responsible for compliance bear
out the exemption of investigative activity becomes an exception which
swallows the rule. One records sergeant, an experienced consultant
with over a hundred police departments in the state described in a 1981
interview a widespread method of evading the logging and predissemlna-
tion requirement this way:
There are great loopholes in the law. I can tell you howviolations occur. They are happening every day. The cops
hPm''°i''w"l'' ^/ disseminations without ogg ngt em. Hundreds of them happen on telephones and elsewhere
nltuZ "."r T''^''' '''''^ '''y investiga^: nature and under investigative work we don't have to recordIt as a dissemination.
Aside from the obvious aversion to regulations which entail
documentation for the purpose of an audit, many law enforcement agencies
have unnecessarily compounded administrative burdens. For example, it
was estimated by a recat-ds co..„„, ^ •or sergeant in a western Washington police
department that eo to 70 percent of iaw enforcement agencies have
established separate ledgers b. „Mch disseminations ot criminal histor.
record information are recorded. Instead, a far less cumbersome and
less expensive approach could be employed by which disseminations are
recorded direct,, on a particular criminal history record. When as.ed
to account for this widespread phenomenon, a perceptive records manager
Of an eastern Washington sheriffs office gave the following explanation-
legil?a"?u"?rand Zr^Z^^l^^l^T
criminal justice area the wor "W ha T'^'-
ioS:r?n\r^-.i--^ro^i:?ihaiTi-
s=n-n-?Lri d u ?
€5 hn:^
and this means maintaining a record seoaratP from
cnminal record files. tI WCRPA do^L^' ^X' at' og""should be a part of the record. I made an effort tnexplain this to the Ad Hoc Committee tharthi I was the
T^lTfu'rr'.''. enforceme ow er
tr!il . suggesting that we wereying to avoid establishing a logging process and con-sequently I dropped further efforts to clarify this problem.
In addition to the difficulties posed by custom and predisposi-
tion for effective regulation of record dissemination practices, the
status of files collected by regional information centers also presented
some inconsistencies in the interpretation of dissemination guidelines.
The WCRPA specifically exempted exchanges of information between
criminal justice agencies which "jointly participated in the mainte-
nance of a single record keeping department as an alternative to
maintaining separate records" (RCW, 1977: 1 0 . 97 . 030(8) (a ) ) . The idea
Involved in a joint records center is that all transactions involving
a-st, Ca^ges and convictions would
.e




^^-'es in „se. departments. But
:o,nt panidpation does not necessaH,. l™p,,
,,,,
center serves as a repository for criminal history records.
The Eastern County Information Syste. Is one example of a
syste™ Which assumed the role of an ad hoc records repository. Offend
ers fro. five surrounding counties are booked Into a central county
Jan. Since jail records are maintained within the Eastern County
Information System, it necessarily contains arrest record information
on individuals whose arrests originate from surrounding jurisdictions
iniportantly, cases from surrounding jurisdictions are still adjudicated
by the court found within the originating jurisdiction. Thus, the
local law enforcement agency still has responsibility to maintain the
record of arrest and ultimate disposition. Yet the Eastern Washington
Information System freely disseminates non-conviction Information to
"ser jurisdictions with little observance of pre- and post-dissemination
rules,
In a 1980 interview, an eastern county records manager charac-
terized the practice in these terms:





disseminations between members of the
center. My interpretation of a member of center is ifyou keep data which is relevant to the WCRPA. We house
criminal offender information for eighty-four agencies
nn^v"t!iJ ''^ J'^^ SP°^^"^- And since we'reo ly talking about arrest histories as the record regulatedby security and privacy then my interpretation is that
under the law-which I know we are twisting to beat hell-
IC.lrV. IZlMTll T7 uses
I don't think they fo a tMnn ,'™' t''It's right. '° because I think
iiEravijaR^
ot Judicia l Non-Cocipp7^77^
As indicated before, close cooperation between courts and law
enforcement agencies is necessary in order to insure that criminal
history record information contains current, accurate and complete
disposition information prior to dissemination. Vet studies by OTA
(1982a). MITRE (1977a) and others noted in Chapter HI, indicate that
the lack of complete disposition information continues to be the most
Significant deficiency of records maintained by federal and state
records system. In addition, MITRE (1977a) discovered wide variations
in the quality of criminal records maintained by local jurisdictions.
Unlike the use of state records by the central state repository, the
availability of local disposition information tends to be uneven,
compliance appears to be primarily dependent upon local tradition,
priorities and commitments; the adequacy of resources; and the quality
of interagency relationships among local components of the criminal
Justice system (MITRE, 1977a: 4). There are numerous instances in
the state of Washington in which effective cooperation between local
law enforcement and trial courts can and has occurred with respect to
furnishing disposition information. However, the chief source of
opposition to the development of more effective mechanisms for dis-
position reporting in Washington has stemmed principally from the State
Court Administrators office.
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It should be recalled from Chapter in that .t.t.^ ^^^^ s a e court admin-
--.^ t.e Nation. Cente.
.0. state Co.t., „e.e
.cce...
t-ns. T.e i™,e.. of an
.nconstUutiona, violation of a separation of
Powe. and executive invasion of Judicial administration was sufficient
to th«rt an. efforts UAA to require oudicia, compliance wit. the
security and privacy regulations. But more than principles were at
stake in the attempt to maintain independence from executive or legis-
lative regulations: executive regulation constituted a potential
source of interference in the effort<. hv cf.^-ne rrorts by state courts to implement a
unified information system.
The significance of this factor became quite evident almost
from the start of the SPA rule-making process. Phil Winberry, State
court Administrator (and as noted in Chapter IV, the chairman of the
Attorney General's Advisory Committee on Security and Privacy which
helped to draft WCRPA) was aggressive, ambitious and politically
astute. He was a strong advocate of state judicial reform and had
distinguished himself with involvement in national conferences aimed
at advancing the cause of court modernization and unification. During
his tenure as State Court Administrator, Winberry undertook two related
initiatives to advance state court unification. One initiative was the
development (through state LEAA assistance) and implementation of a
state court management information system (SCMIS). The other was the
passage of legislation amending the state constitution to enable re-
structuring and administrative unification of trial and appellate
state courts.
60,000 ,.ntf..t.e SPA,. Wm.e.. t.e ,.„„p
to produce a consensus
.lU.wMcn.s, as .e su.se.uent,, c.a.cte.-
U: "the ™ost comprehensive piece of Judicial
.efo™ ever1n« in the state" (Win.err„„s0:i53,.
The proposal involved
a substantial consolidation of existing trial courts, standardization
Of Judicial selection, tenure, compensation and retirement, a procedure
for discipline and removal of justices- ;,nd i . ,, and, importantly, the consolida-
t^on of all administrative authority and rule-making in the state
supreme court. While the proposal garnered substantial support from
the legal community, it was most strongly opposed by superior court
justices who stood to lose substantial administrative and fiscal
autonomy. The bill was ultimately defeated by an extremely narrow
n.argin in the 1977 legislative session. Since that time, there have
been no new initiatives to undertake state judicial reform on the scale
contemplated by the 1977 legislation.
Although this defeat constituted a major setback for judicial
reform it did not however adversely affect efforts to develop and imple-
ment a state wide judicial information system. A substantial LEAA grant
awarded by the SPA of $500,000 made it possible to test the feasibility
and mount the necessary political support required to fund and imple-
ment SCMIS. While it has taken several years for many technical
problems to be ironed out (especially those defining the court clerks'
data collection role), support has gradually increased for an enlarge-
ment of the number of court jurisdictions participating in the system.
AUhouoh t.e state cou.t was t.e
.ecip,-e„, 0. one 0. t.elargest state grant awards, the SPA was ,arae,„
.
l g ly unsuccessful in itsattempt to both insure if th= .' , the system was compatible with the compre-
enforcement data system an. capable of providing the
With the disposition information necessary
Horeover. the development and gradual expansion of the state court
syste. has helped increase centralisation of state administration
«1thout formal unification between trial courts and local police
wh,le undermining effective cooperation between trial courts and'local
pol ice
The passage of the state Criminal Records Privacy act in 1977
court involvement in the implementation of record quality objectives
Although it was clear that both the Title ZS and the WCRPA legislation
exempted court records, at least as they pertained to limitations on
dissemination, it was, nonetheless, necessary to require trial and
appellate courts to furnish disposition data to the central state
repository. The method chosen seemed eminently suitable: define the
courts as criminal justice agencies. The following wording was in-
cluded in the first draft of the regulations circulated for Ad Hoc
Advisory Committee review and comment:
The following agencies shall be considered criminal iustir»agencies for the purposes RCW 10.97 and ?hese regu atlonCourts at any level, if they exercise criminal jursdction
While law enforcement interests were obviously extremely
supportive of tMs provision, tbe State Court A*1n1strator was Hrmly
opposed and anxious to remind the Privacy Administrator that federal
exemption of the courts precluded such a rule. Nevertheless, law
enforcement Interests did not consider It unreasonable to expect the
courts to comply „lth the provision. Subsequently, the State Court
Administrator mobilized support of the Judicial community to get the
proposed rule withdrawn. He selected a rather dramatic way to Impress
upon the Privacy Administrator that the courts could not be regulated
1n any way by SPA regulations. The Privacy Administrator was invited
to a meeting attended by a state supreme court justice, a superior
court Judge, an assistant Attorney General and a clerk of a large
superior court district. After a brief lecture by State Court Adminis-
trator Winberry. punctuated several times by reference to the judiciary
as a separate branch of government, each participant in the meeting
expressed concurrence with a recommendation by the State Court Adminis-
trator that the regulation be withdrawn.
Needless to say, their collective recommendation was reflected
in a subsequent draft of the regulations. Nevertheless, the problem
of the courts' need to gain access to criminal record information had
to be stated in a way that did not also imply that they were subject
to regulation. This problem was handled with new language under the
general applicability section of the regulations:
The courts and court record keeping agencies have the right
to require and receive criminal history record information
from criminal justice agencies (WAC, 1978: 365.50 010)
Thus, judicial interests had not only successfullv tH. b t y eliminated
a-9uUt1on (wMc. a«tte.l, had 1 Ut,e 1e,a, purchase an.way,
..t
maintained the burdens of compliance on Uw enforcement. The effect
Of th,s action created a sense of defeat and resentment within the law
enforcement community. Subsequent interviews with law enforcement
offKMls indicated that many police departments have simply refused
t^on until satisfied that the courts are making a substantial effort
to furnish disposition information, m other instances, police are
Simply refusing to disseminate information (especially for individual
records requests because of the added burden to secure complete dis-
positions. An eastern Washington record manager's remarks are
illustrative of the resentment of regulations considered to be less
than even handed:
out lrr?.f'nr J^r'-'?^
''''' °^ ^^^^'"9 can't givea est o conviction information because it isn't
laJn'^t.'r ^^l'^^ the source of accur te RecordsAgain that may be challenged in the courts esoecianvwhere it involves data subject requests But riqhiowapparently it is a good enough reason becau e te courts
?hp Vl""^ ^'^^ ^^^^^e^t amount of eve^h ngt e courts do-criminal cases-is the information ?hey
shiDs ^ T? ^hl"""^ ""'^^^li^ ^'''^ 900d working relltion-
Th^t-; i . ^^u^^fr^
mandated by law, they would do it.
[l EAAl pJhmSIh
'^^'"9 so ridiculous when theyLL j excluded them. In our county, it is less than 1600dispositions a year that they would have to give to usWe re on y looking at three to four transactions a day thatthey would have to give us.
The courts won more than we ever expected. The develop-
!"rL
regulations was going to be the one place where we
cou d get the information we needed. But throughout the
whole process, we were the bastards that had legislation
placed on us. We were the bastards who had criminal
liability placed on us because of infractions, but yet wehad no control over court records, so how could we be
wrong? So we felt utter frustration when the committee
exempted the courts.
What's even sadder is that » ,
county wanted to panic Da^e tJ» '^^ """"'^ [my]in getting disposition rfo^"' „"^ "'"'"^ '° ^"^^t
IS that we let a State CoTtZ^J"- unfortunatefor the courts of lll^lZ^ftTt^lllZ: '"^ ^---n
in
'98,, (in the wake of approval of a state appropriation)
the State Supreme Court issued a court rule which mandated participa-
t-n Of state trial courts in the state court
.anage.ent information
system. The rule has further reduced opportunities for informal
cooperation between the lower courts and police In fact one .K i>-c. i T , superior
court Judge indicated that he is not even certain that such information
«ould be collected by an information system designed primarily to
satisfy internal court calender, case control and other management
information needs.
"Getting disposition information to the state
identification section Is", the judge noted, "just not an issue for
superior court justices." m counties in which there are multiple
court districts cooperation from the courts is uneven and sporadic.
For example, a King County records manager characterized the diffi-
culties this way:
traJor'in wh^rhVn^'''"^'."' ^^'^ "^''^'''^ adminis-t i ic they send a disposition to use and we update
lin^n'r°'?'i'"^''"^ '^'"^ ""tral state repository
courts do It, and then not all in this case. We are ores-
nr^/r tn l^j' "^^^ ^ourt Administrator ino de to make these records more complete.
In other instances police have been able to cultivate coopera-
tive relationships with offices of prosecution. In Pierce County, a
large jurisdiction south of Seattle, the sheriffs department and county
prosecutor have established an effective working relationship in which
the prosecutor takes responsibility for return of court disposition
patterns. But such cooperation th.P ,s the exception rather than the rule.
to federal and state privacy regulation, the exemption „. the courts
fro. the regulations provided the
.ey Impetus to pursue legislative
amendments In the 1979 legislative session. That effort resulted as
we Shan see, 1„ an amendment designed to mandate court Involvement 1n
criminal record privacy at the local level.
Law Enforcemen t Interests Preva il- Redistrlh,,iM^JurdeHTonMlI^^
The adoption of the privacy rules and regulations In late
February 1978; the conduct of well-attended state-wide training ses-
sions; the development of draft security and audit provisions; and
increased policy Involvement of the Governor's Committee contributed to
a sense of growing momentum towards substantial compliance. The
Privacy Administrator now looked for ways to strengthen the law during
the next legislative session; to secure carryover funds from the
Governor's Committee to support administrative staffing; and, perhaps
to explore potential strategies for finding a more secure administra-
tive home for the WCRPA. Neither the future of the LEAA program nor
the SPA appeared very secure. Yet the WCRPA assured that some type
Of administrative mechanism would have to be fashioned to Insure
continued efforts to bring about compliance. However, several factors
conve,. to dissipate the SPA ™t™,
„Ui.te,v paving the wa. for
the assumption of administrative authonty over the WCRPA hy the State
Patrol
Perhaps one of the most important factors to seriously weaken
the Privacy Administrator's control over rule-maMng and implementation
activities was the unexpected departure of tenna Schram as the taw and
Justice Planning Office Administrator in late March. Schram's resigna-
tion was prompted in part by her disappointment over her inability to
utilize the SPA to influence state criminal justice policy. Specific
recommendations by the Governor's Co^ittee to resolve prison over-
crowding and develop new sentencing policies were not given much
attention by the Governor. In addition, substantial reductions in
LEAA assistance made the allocation of that money a more painful and
contentious process. As a consequence, the SPA was increasingly locked
Into support and continuation of existing projects rather than initia-
tion of promising new innovations.
The replacement of Schram by the deputy administrator was not
particularly encouraging for the health of the privacy and security
program. Deputy Administrator Keith Weaver had never really been
supportive of SPA control over privacy regulation. It put the SPA in
the awkward position of having to say "no" to criminal justice agencies
who had grown accustomed to getting whatever they wanted. Although they
did not have a great deal of confidence in Weaver's ability, the law
enforcement leadership finally found an individual sympathetic to their
concerns about the burdens of the WCRPA. Furthermore, given his
tenuous position as acting administrator, Weaver was eager to please a
constituency which had a great deal of clout on the m°" Governor's Committee
Thus, one of Weaver's m;iin^ +orimajor tasks was to somehow contain the aggressive-




indeed, the ru.e-making process had not been completed; draft
regulations were
.eing prepared for administrative and physical security
and audit process. The security guidelines involved numerous special
considerations because of the diversity of agency contexts in which
criminal record data was collected and maintained. For example, the
adult corrections division of DSHS stores its criminal record informa-
tion ,n a computer which serves the data needs of all the divisions of
the DSHS. Thus, regulations had to be devised to somehow li.it access
of non-criminal justice personnel to criminal record files. Procedures
were devised which ultimately created overlapping management control
between criminal justice and non-criminal justice personnel. Further,
the State Data Processing Authority contended that its authority to
control standards for operation of computer systems had been preempted
if not usurped by the SPA regulations. Needless to say. these and
many other issues involving security in non-dedicated joint computer
operations complicated and slowed the development of rules in this area.
Vet. surprisingly, most problems of this kind resulted in compromises
which appeared to satisfy competing interests.
However, there was one area of regulations governing adminis-
trative security which produced much opposition from law enforcement.
Title 28 regulations proposed that criminal records only be directly
accessible to employees responsible for control of the information
system. The SPA staff internrot«H t^- .
' '° t^^t not all personnel
;
—nt„. the SP. staff propose,
that cnmmal Justice agencies esta.Hs. a s.ste. of security clear-
ances „Mc. „oul. n.U access to those individuals Who have aW
a V1,ht" to .now the information. The SPA reasoned that re-
stricting access in this way would increase the likelihood that an
effort would be made to determine the accuracy and completeness of
the material prior to release to agency personnel (such as patrolmen
or detectives, and limit the avenues of secondary dissemination of
dated or otherwise incomplete criminal record material
.
Law enforcement members of the Ad Hoc Advisory Co^ittee
expressed strong opposition to this proposal. They argued that it
«ould be impossible and inappropriate to control internal access to
criminal record materials. They reasoned that while it made some
sense to restrict individuals authorized to maintain and modify such
data, it would constitute an unreasonable burden to centralize access
for utilization of criminal records in an environment in which remote
terminals had been designed specifically to decentralize and, thus,
facilitate access to central files.
Evidently, the law enforcement leadership decided that they
had had enough of the SPA's regulatory efforts. Consequently, the
Sheriffs and Chiefs Association decided to use the obligatory pre-
adoption review and comment period as a strategic time to express their
dissatisfaction with the overall thrust of the SPA rule-making effort.
On May 18, 1978, the Privacy Administrator received a mimeographed
lette. (evident,. „l,e„
..stH.uted a™., t.e state copies aU
sent to t.e 0..1ce of Pinancia, Management (OPM,
.>ecto. to „.o. t.e
A now
.eponea a„a t.e SPA a«nUt.ato.,
... st.on,,. cHtic.e.
the latest proposed rules and urged postponement of adoption
The letter requested t.at the SPA postpone, for at least sixty
days, adoption of what the Association termed
"amendments to the
Sheriffs and Chiefs Association on your Ad Hoc Co^lttee view these
actions as a steamroller attempt to rush through amendments further
handcuffing the criminal Justice agencies who must live with this act
from hereon." The letter wpntwent on to express their attitudes more
bluntly:
lei da;s"w"?h':fpr'el::L?i:°r?r?K '^^t =Pend a
agrelmen bfa ag c es°il:ved'\r''\"''"'''"3
The letter provided the OFM director with his first exposure to
how politically volatile the implementation of the WCRPA had become.
It was evident to the Privacy Administrator that the OFM director was
hesitant to assume responsibility for signing off on regulations which
did not command solid support. In addition, the OFM office had in-
vestigated the fiscal impact of an annual audit and discovered that by
state law, local government had to reimburse the state auditor for 25







It was also evident to the SPA ^rtinn .an 5 ac g adimrn strator Weaver
that the PHvacy Ad.i„,-st.ato. was
.eco.ing a polUica, ,ia,„Uy fo.
himself 1„ t.e a,enc.. Vet. Weave, was
.naMe to effectively control
the privacy activity because the Pn'vacy Ad.in1st.to. had ca.efuHy
cultivated a policy-making
.ole for the Governor's Co^ittee which
was not easily overridden. Nevertheless th» ^ •. Ln i , e SPA administrator did
have management control over SPA staffing and over matters Conse
quently, a timely lapse in the funding for the Standards and Goals
project. Which ended the Privacy Administrator's position, provided
the avenue by which his Involvement in security and privacy regulation
could be terminated. Thus, on July 1
, 1978. the Privacy Administrator
was released from the SPA. along with several other employees as a part
Of a general reduction in force necessitated by the loss of LEAA funds.
Although more direct control by the SPA administrator was
encouraging to law enforcement, the SPA and Governor's Comittee con-
tinued to be drawn Into a regulatory process they could not avoid. The
Governor's Committee was responsible for decisions regarding the
certification of agencies permitted access to criminal justice records.
As indicated before, this was an area In which controversy abounded.
Requests for Governor's Committee certification continued to pour into
the SPA office during the remainder of 1978, posing some difficult and
potentially unpopular decisions.
One such controversial decision by the Governor's Committee to




^"on ™.a.-enate. State Pat.o,
, „.„
-
st^ongl, oppose, to t.e
.ecislon. Decisions n.e tMs
.a.
.ave
Prcptea t.e State Pat.o, leadership to
.econsi.e. opposition to t.ei
administration of security and privacy, w.at was particularly
,a1,i
about the certification process was that the Judiciary was over-
represented and. thus, able to dominate the decision-.aMng process
Th,s only exacerbated the resentment the police felt towards the courts
" was Simply another manifestation of the judiciary exercising super-
vision of regulations they had successfully eluded.
As the 1979 legislative session approached, the Sheriffs and
Chiefs Association decided to ta.e action. The State Patrol leadership
was persuaded to give up its resistence to the administration of the
privacy regulations. In addition, the House Judiciary Cor^ittee had
some new members and was chaired by a conservative Republican sympa-
thetic to the law enforcement community.
The Association undertook a two pronged attack to include the
courts within the regulations and to transfer administrative authority
to the State Patrol. That strategy was stated succinctly in the House
Judiciary Committee report:
to obtain\hp'Hr^ ^l'' ^^^^V'^' ' ''^'"^"^^ J^^tice agency
If.fto . disposition of a case from the court (or
t^P r..f.n^ ^ iJ-"" ^''^ information about
the courtf.rp^no?' S^'"' ' °" P°1^'^^ because
thP .nZ J t:equired to give the disposition data toe agency which initiated the criminal proceeding; thusthe agency must spend time and money to obtain suchdispositions
.
The current law places too great a burden on law
enforcement agencies to obtain dispositions, especially
when the information is required by another criminal justice
agency who has no real need for the disposition data
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Dispositions are oftpn h^^n
suming. The State Pa rorshouiH^a'" '"-^ ^""^
Judiciary Committee, 1979).
""^'^"t (Washington, House
The Sheriffs and Chiefs Association proposed two important
amendments to dea, with the difficulties involved in obtaining court
dispositions, first, a new section was added co the law that' required
that Whenever a court reached a disposition, that information would
have to be furnished by the aapnru "w^,.• • -x-o n ge cy which initiated the criminal history
record for the charap" /'i o r^^i • \C ge (i.e., police) as well as to the Identification
Section Of the Washington State Patrol.
But, in addition to this section, the Association proposed
another amendment which exempted criminal Justice agencies from
satisfying requirements for completeness (e.g., pre-dissemination query
to the State Patrol) if the court failed to provide disposition infor-
mation in a timely way:
^l^^s^^^^ ^^^r^- -.uested
w ich are otherwise within the d^? c \n w d e ' e
If a quick witted staff counsel to the House Judiciary Committee
had not recognized the implications this amendment would have of
virtually gutting the WCRPA of its central objectives, it would have
probably sailed through the February 5th hearing of the House Judiciary
Committee with unanimous approval. The implications of the amendment
were that it would permit dissemination of conviction and non-conviction
— ^° -^^y criminal or non-crimin al justice aoencv . without initiating
co-Utee ,,cM.
.te.ene. s,,estea t.at t.e AssocU.on propose
the Cannes su..Uted to the cc^Utee t.e assistant Atto.ne. 3e„e.a,
on .e.a,. the Association
„e.e stn,
.nacceptaMe to t.e co.Utee
Staff
Evidently, the chairman of the House Judiciary Co^ittee did
not Share the staff concerns about the proposed amendments. At a sub-
sequent hearing two weeks later (February 22„d). Chairman Irv Newhouse
scolded the staff and committee for taking so long to come up with a
solution. Newhouse advised the co-ittee that the "staff had dragged
their feet on this bill; that the sponsors hadn't had a fair shake in
getting it heard and that he wanted It through the Rules and on the
floor for passage tonight" (Cheal, 1979).
Although the language finally adopted specified that the excep-
tion applied onlj, to the exchange of Information between criminal
Justice agencies, It still involved the implication that the courts
must take the initiative to supply disposition Information to law
enforcement. The new section reads in part:
Whenever a court or other criminal justice aqencv reaches
a disposition of a criminal proceed ng, the court or Sthercriminal justice agency shall furnish the dispos t?on datato the agency initiating the criminal history record forthat charge and to the identification section of the
(RCw!"l980: fo*97^Mr^
"""^^ ^™ 43.43.745
Presumably this provision would now make the court subject to
penalty and civil liability if it failed to provide disposition
information to law enforcement agencies. However, such an Issue would
new provision of the WCRPA.
We have basically ianored it i , .
Of regulation of cour? act Jitil^ "Ij; legitimate form






a^tate_Patrol Takes Over- Regu-laturv Revision and iittprt^-^
In contrast to the controversy generated around the reporting
Of disposition information, the legislature found no opposition to
transfer of administrative authority from the SPA to the State Patrol
Thus the most important element of law enforcements' success resided
not so much in the few strategic amendments secured in the law but the
opportunity that administrative ownership provided to make wholesale
Changes in the SPA regulations. Reference has already been made to SPA
regulations which were strongly opposed by the law enforcement leader-
ship in community. Briefly, they tended to focus upon rollback and
tightening of provisions pertaining to individual access and review;
rules Which, required cooperation from the prosecutor and requirements
that local agencies adopt written policies to implement the law and
regulations. Therefore this section focuses upon the reaction of
criminal justice officials and others to legislative and regulatory
changes and their aftermath.
Unsurprisingly, one of the most striking differences between
the SPA and the State Patrol rule-making processes was the number and
n.„omcUU, an 0. „.o™ 3e.e. on t.e SPA . Hoc
«v,so. Co..„ee. A
..n
...on o. .e a...,.,,,
""'^
— an. a p... .eaH, Ma
-
~.,..o.tenpeo.e-..,.e.esen...es
Of law enforcement agencies. Bot. the Pat.o, an. the ,aw enfo.ce.ent
co^nlt, „e.e anxious to avo,. the cont.ove.s. which s...ounde. the
development of the SPA guidelines which had proceeded the.. ,„ fact.
as one eastern Washington sheriff ^,hr. u ^igT^on S , who had participated in the SPA
process (although excluded from this late.t Pff..^rii s effort), remarked in a 1981
interview:
-ed i^^iBf^S r
Another record manager from an urban western Washington police
department expressed her disappointment that the law enforcement
community did not use the opportunity It had to clarify and/or revise
key definitions In the law such as non-conviction data, criminal history
record information, and dissemination. She contended that much of the
difficulty that criminal justice agencies had with understanding the
restrictions on dissemination stem from a lack of a clear distinction
between arrest and conviction records. As a participant In the State
Patrol rule-revision process, she had urged consideration of these




state prWacy Uw The aJoun wL''""'"'"?'""*^*^'°" t^e
they wanted to e" minate^S^ovi^tLr'""!;"^ '"-pact-oriented;
status Of arrests more hen o e ear f "^IV"""^ ^''^or provisions requiring that ll ^''^ Prosecutor
data subjects by forwa d o record .hin'"'"' ^^^^^^of origin. Procedures 1 k» It^ challenges to agencies
suming and prosecutors llfJ-H """'^ ''^ time con-
anywa?.
and other agencies wouldn't cooperate
This respondent however, questioned the real value of taking an
-pact orientation towards the revision of the regulations. According
to her. the WCRPA has not really created substantia, change in record
management practices because law enforcement agencies continue to he
considered and used as "information intermediaries in the criminal
Justice process." She also acknowledged that a routine practice,
mostly untouched by the MCRPA, has been the utilization of police
agencies as intermediaries to obtain data from other police departments
to satisfy requests by private users. She observed that it may have
been a big mistake for the State Patrol to strike a "need to know-
criterion from the SPA rules, for the department which unwittingly
serves as an intermediary may be making itself liable for unlawful
disseminations. She continued by saying: "The law is thus having a
chilling affect on interagency exchange practices precisely because
someone ultimately is responsible for a dissemination log."
In addition to this appraisal most respondents interviewed
concurred that the WCRPA had a negligible effect upon the ability of
police officers to detect, apprehend and convict offenders. Thus,
unlike Ma££ and Miranda where mistakes or violations in evidence
gathering or post-arrest warnings may result in unsuccessful prosecu-










™ore c1.cu.spect a.o.t the exchange of cH.ina,
.ecc. data an. ex-
t-n,e,. cautious In the
.Ind of 1„fo™at1on disseminated to the p.ess
Although the amendment of the MCRPA to require court reporting
Of dispositions was expected to increase court involvement in satisfying
accuracy and completeness requirements, court cooperation, especially
.
larger urban jurisdictions has not measurably Increased. Both the
State Patro, Identification Section as weU as police in large urban
ounsdlcticns have retaliated for continued failure of the courts to
furnish disposition information. For example, if a court requests
non-convlctioh information on a subject whose file fails to contain
disposition information, it will not be provided to the requesting
court. The hope is that by withholding records, courts will be more
likely to discipline each other for impeding the sentencing process,
but there Is little evidence to warrant this expectation.
When the State Patrol acquired administrative authority for
the WCRPA in 1979, LEAA stni had authority to monitor state Implemen-
tation activities and enforce compliance. LEAA control was exercised
primarily through its power to require periodic reports identifying
progress made towards ccplunce. The state of « h-
sati.fi«H . Washington had
-.--ents undated 5. federa, or state ,aw except onevery important element- a nl.n t
audit Th .
'
'°~ ^ systematic statewide
- - -
the Patro, to implement what U« considered to . the
The SP. Privacy Administrator had contacted the State Auditor
-.two and a ha. years earlier to develop an audit processJ
eless. the State Auditor. o.tice undertook followupe^orts with
e Patrc, to see if a new effort could
.e undertaken. Eager to get
LEAA Off its .ac. the Patrol reluctantly accepted the auditors'
-commendation that an audit plan ,e developed and pretested.
,f the
State Auditor were successful in getting the Patro, to accept the
Plan, it would, Of course, constitute a new source of revenue which
could Justify an increase in its budget. The Auditor estimated that
n would cost approximately $260,000 to conduct an audit which involved
one third of 310 agencies each year for three years. A total of thirty
staff would be assigned to twelve regions across the state to conduct
the audit.
The plan submitted was thorough with respect to verification
Of procedures, documentation of record quality and inclusiveness of
public agencies involved in the criminal justice process. The plan
was not submitted for approval by the Patrol until a sample audit had
been conducted to pretest the audit instrument. Four county jurisdic-
tions were selected for on-site visits including the State Identification
250
juris-
Section, and the sheriffs' nf^-;
diction) <; . .
^" ^'"3 C-"ty (a Urge urban, Snohomish County fa mpHinm • •
, ,
"^'"^''^^"^^^^^J^^i^diction), and MasonCounty (a small, rural jurisdiction).




-"P^e 0. a.ests to aete™ine acc.ac.
r 7 -1" Objective was to test t.e
^eas,.,u.o.conauctin, an audit. Neven.eless, n.e.o.s de.icien-
c-s were uncovered in records
.ana,e.ent procedures in a,, threejurisdictions surveyed. One rer„r^o„t j ^- .deficiency common to all juris-
-ions pertained to t.e quality and accessi.i, ity of dissemination
109S. Dissemination forms frequently failed to specify exactly „Mc.
Charges and related dispositions were disseminated, they were often
-accessible and, in some instances, did not employ standardized
elements of information.
The Snohomish County Sheriffs Office had the highest rejection
rate for incomplete, inaccurate or misleading criminal history records.
This is a surprising finding in that the county has a sophisticated
Offender-based infor^tion system linking police, prosecutor and
county record files. In contrast. Mason County had more complete and
accurate documentation of criminal record information. The difference
appeared to stem largely from the extent of cooperation by the courts
and jurisdictional complexity- the greater the number of courts and
larger the prosecutors' office, the greater the use of inconsistent





evident from the response that th.
"'facials, it „as
P e proposed audit involved a far morerigorous review of records oiMlit, .
,
^"""^^"""'^"^a^ent practices thanlocallaw enforcement officials expected x.
the audit fn .
^^'^P^^ ^^- The principal Objection was thatU focused too heavil, upon record
,oal it. (accuracy and
completeness) and dissemination controls n
'"""'^
expressed the concerns this way:
wuhi';*°:co^:^^:^oTw:°°ec:?Sed^"?j^^^-^ T"completeness of our files SI ^f,;'.^"" ^""'"^'^y and
inappropriate. What would h^L k emphasis was
survey to generally assure that tTl ^PP^P^'ate was a
procedures to carry' cut"Jh\Xc??!;ero'?'=^,r?a:'°^'^'
Not surprisingly, the Patrol rejected the audit plan and since
that time, no new plan has been developed or approved. A records
manager from a large, western Washington urban jurisdiction observed
that ,f an audit were to be conducted it would definitely renew the
"Visibility that the WCRPA once had when the SPA had administrative
authority."
(CHAPTER VII
EXPLAINING STATE AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION
OF LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POLICY
This stud, has sought to identify interests and factors which
^--ine the politics of state implementation of federal guidelines
-
criminal Justice and what that implies for an understanding of
policy implementation processes. Chapter I presented a number of
POl.tica, factors to be examined in the development of state guidelines
t° provide a potentially useful foca, point hy which to explain state
performance and thereby contribute to our understanding of political
factors which limit the regulation of criminal justice.
In this chapter we return to the conceptual frameworks for
explaining policy implementation processes outlined at the end of Chapter
H as potential sources of an explanation of what happened in Washington
and nationwide, and why. Although proponents of these conceptual fr.ne-
works present their explanations differently, they generally agree with
respect to the significance of statutory clarity and minimal change as
conditions of effective implementation. Thus, we follow the logic
implied by these factors to develop an overall explanation of the lack
of compliance and limited change resulting from the federal criminal
history records mandate, using the nationwide data from Chapter III and
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and co„c,us,o„s





success. The.efo.e, accepting the explanation
.esuUIng f.o. these
f.a.ewo..s
.e,u,>es concurrence wUh conceptual underpinnings and
assumptions incomplete,, formulated and perhaps incapable of being
tested with any degree of scientific rigor.
When performance may result from the confluence of a number of
political factors, an alternative explanation is needed which gives more
next draws together the data and findings from the Washington case to
form a more complete explanation, since case material presented in
Chapters IV through V. is based upon only one state's response, which
™ay be unrepresentative of other states, the explanation advanced must
be considered limited. However, the evident uniformity in state perfor-
mance described in Chapter III may support some limited inferences as
to factors which may account for similarities in state performance.
Thus, While this study cannot generate a conclusive explanation, it does
suggest a plausible interpretation.
Finally, this chapter broadens the explanation to suggest how
the factors which affect the state implementation of federal regulations
compare with those which shape responses to two important court-
originated decisions (i.e., Map£ and Miranda) which regulate the admin-
istration of criminal justice, also. In particular, this investigation
examines common factors oertinonf ^„ jp e t to understanding state implementation
Of nat,ona, mandates and determines what this tells us about the
efflcac. Of efforts to implement intergovernmental regulatory policies
1n criminal Justice. The analysis concludes with a discussion of what
these common factors imply for a »re general understanding of policy





Of the factors considered conducive to effective policy imple-
mentation discussed in Chapter II, policies with clear goals involving
little institutional change are considered by some to be key factors
in explaining policy outcomes. First, policies which are clear in
purpose and provide specific guidelines minimize distortion and evasion,
and therefore make enforcement possible. Second, policies which minimize
the amount of change which institutions, organizations and individuals
must undergo in order for implementation to be effectuated are unlikely
to generate opposition from elites having authority and influence with
respect to the compliance of subordinates.
If we accept this conventional wisdom of effective policy imple-
mentation, then nationwide patterns of compliance with the federal
criminal records privacy mandate could be explained without recourse to
the details of the Washington case. In fact, at a superficial level,
the Washington case might be used to further corroborate the importance




underenforcement of record an^Mi-
' dissemination provisions
other responses producing actions falling short of st t .
An explanation of patterns of . •
'





-gulato., po„-c, «ni depend upon «.ethe. t.at ,oUcy U
"——™nce. T.e. o.e.e t.at t.e e..cac.
.e,,ato.
- -ava.aM,u.„,™o,.to
a.9et ,.oups 0. o.,anUat.o„s
„.c ™.st co^p,, statute., mandates
Difficulties with implementation and thus .nrr. . .a, , successful performance may
be compounded U po,1c. Involves
"technology
,„.clng provisions" In-
volvlng extensive change as the
.eans to achieve desl.ed chjectlves
As Chapter I Indicates, the attempt to develop a national CCH
-volvlng regulator, refer™ has been dependent upon the efficacy of
parallel efforts to influence the Implementation of Information tech-
nological reforms. I„ order to reduce these technological limitations,
LEAA advanced a strategy by which It could achieve Its regulatory
Objectives. That strategy Involved the attempt to promote Information
innovations in criminal justice in order to change organizational
structures, and interorganlzational patterns of coordination in direc-
tions which make them more amenable to uniform regulation.
However, LEAA simply misjudged the extent to which system
constraints constitute formidable barriers to attempts to use regulation
256






,„ 3hows, the ejects
V " ^-ovations have heen ai.erentlal
--orce.ent
—.n technclo. has great,, increase, the e7^;°^-^-"-—~
.ecor.sinthecon.cto,pol,ce
pa ™l,,n,„ir, an. investigative functions. Vet the application ofinformation technology by offices of prosecution and t.
,
. .
he courts has not
ticn systems have been primarily employed to satisfy day-to-day case
management information needs rather than those pertaining to charging
or sentencing processes. police organizations, the functions of
prosecution and adjudication do not lend themselves to information
innovations designed to Increase the utilization of criminal records as
an additional aid or substitute for highly idiosyncratic and discre-
tionary decision-making processes. Moreover, while state repositories
have been substantially upgraded, many still lack technological
sophistication.
Second, because of the dynamics of decentralization, LEAA
surrendered direct regulatory control over State Planning Agencies-
a medium through which it could influence and exert leverage over state
policy making processes. The fact that less than half the states have
adopted dissemination policies, which vary from LEAA's recommended
dissemination policy is indicative of LEAA's limited capacity to in-
fluence state policy through the SPA.
By this account, LEAA's theory about the connection between
the development of a uniform method of record keeping, organizational
257





could not possibly be effectively implemented if thpHi i a e organizational
preconditions to regulation have not been effectuated.
jUl^eleaated discreBoF"^^
It 1s also contended that statutes which carefully structure the
>.ple.entat1on process Increase the lUellhood of successful performance
Factors or variables considered to have strategic significance as
leverage points over Implementation processes Include maximizing hierar-
chical integration among agencies responsible for compliance; minimizing
veto-clearance points Involved in achieving objectives; biasing decision-
rules ,n favor of statutory mandates; and maximizing participation by
interests supportive of the mandate, who are external to the implementing
agencies (Mazmanian and Sabatler. 1981). I„ addition, guideline develop-
ment must bring about congruence between goals, terms and procedures and
problems they are designed to address. Given the complexity of problems
associated with Improving record quality, a period of "administrative
learning" must occur prior to final adoption of any rules and regulations
(Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein, 1976: 401).
There has never been a sufficient Congressional consensus to
adopt comprehensive criminal records privacy policy. In the absence of
comprehensive legislation, LEAA had the slenderest of mandates from a
substitute amendment both vague in wording and intent, and spare in
detail with which to establish guidelines ,t .




atte.pted to i^ legislative intent. Vet .™ s.uande.ed the0P~. to achieve POlic. u„i,o™it. and to advance its own pol ic.
-Wees Yielding to interests which sought state nexi. 1 i.,
discretion, especially with respect to dissemination polic.. The fact
that states have adopted several different dissemination policies
each paralleling one of three versions of the federal guidelines is
indicative of the problems inherent in the ambiguity of LEAA's regula-
tions and deleHitioa of policy interpretation and adoption to the states
Thus, u would be reasonable to argue that the LEAA's Title 28 regula-
tions lack the Clarity of intent, unity of purpose and finalU^ to
insure uniformity in state compliance.
But clearly, political feasibility was a central consideration
in LEAA's guidelines on limits to dissemination. I„ the absence of a
congressional consensus on dissemination policy LEAA clearly had to
fashion a policy acceptable to diverse and competing interest groups,
including the press, employers, civil rights groups and local govern-
ments. The guideline development process therefore served as a surrogate
legislative process in which the attempt at a uniform and precise statu-
tory interpretation gave way to the ambiguity inherent in the politics
of negotiation and compromise. Although this result is not inconsistent
with the philosophy of the "new federalism." the devolution of policy
making to state and local governments accentuates the power and influence
of bureaucrats and special interests closest to policy implementation
processes (Van Horn. 1979). By this account then, issues pertaining to
explaining the patterns of state compliance.
Next, c.a.cten-st.cs Of the cH.nal Mtice s.ste. 0. aecU,on







wh. the attempt to Increase the clarity, specificity and uniformity of
oWectlves through guideline development proves Ineffective, as Berman
Observes, In a policy system We the autonomy of local organizations
is well established" (1980: 219)
Moreover, because of these reasons, LEAA has been able to
exercise only negligible enforcement of performance standards The
fact that most SPA privacy plans have given way to administrative control
by state law enforcement suggests that In the absence of precise speci-
fication of a state administrative authority to implement criminal
records privacy, LEAA has been unable to enforce compliance.
The Washington SPA guideline development process, and perhaps
those processes employed by other states, merely constituted a replay
Of the federal rule-making process because state law continued to reflect
the ambiguity of the mandate and language of Its federal precursor. The
SPA overspecified procedures for compliance because of the need to
compensate for two important deficiencies: the lack of a precise mandate
including clearly ranked objectives and the need to anticipate and mini-
mize the Impact of a statute involving substantial change.
to
-
on,, cun.. n„es 0. J
7"""" . a ..ect.n cons.te.
... Us
......on o. .e
tunu.to pamcpate 1n ,..e, i„e development as t.e case
.eveals
a presumption prevailed 1n favo. of a n.e.a, interpretation of pro-
'
cedu.es to protect t.e
.,.ts Of in.viaua, data subjects. ,„ ,,,e of
these advantages, however, experience in Washington state differed
little from national patterns.
Thus, this explanation
„ou,d suggest that implementation of the
federal criminal history records policy was limited because guideline
development only exacerbated problems of ambiguity in the original
legislation at both the national and state levels. Also, the delegation
Of discretion to the state and local level Inhibited the development of
a uniform criminal history information system and contributed to state
underperformance in terms of record accuracy and quality.
Explaining the Absence of Sionifi.^n. r^,
Ihe Politics o t structural rn;;fTi7;r^
Our preliminary explanation has stressed the ambiguity of the
federal statute, uncontrolled administrative rule-making, lack of goal
consensus and insufficient technological capacity as significant factors
in explaining state responses to the federal criminal records privacy
mandate. While taken together the factors help account for some of the
differences and similarities in state adoption of federally mandated
procedures, important features of state responses and performance
attributes remain unexplained.
Regardless of the problems of ambiguity
,„ the federal regula-
tions, the u„,fo™Uy Of state plans and extensive procedural compliance
suggests that state officals have responded In ways required by the
federal regulations. In another respect, if state officials (e g the
governor, legislature and state criminal justice officials, utilized
the discretion inherent in LEAA regulations to develop state dissemina-
tion policies consistent with state priorities and preferences, then we
Should expect effective enforcement to originate from state rather than
federal officials. Moreover, in those areas of federal regulation in
«h,ch there has been substantial state procedural compliance (e g the
development of central state repositories, individual access and controls
for accuracy and completeness), why has there been relatively little
change 1n record quality or management practices?
If deficiencies in technological capability have largely accounted
for the failure of some states to improve the accuracy and completeness of
criminal records, then why is there so little variation between all
states, as the OTA survey indicates, between the frequency and consis-
tency with which records management procedures (e.g., monitoring,
delinquent disposition reporting and record quality audits) are conducted
and the overall Integrity of criminal records utilized in administration
of criminal justice?
In another respect, a comparison of the LEAA regulatory develop-
ment process with state guideline development (albeit in one state)
suggests that they involve different policy focuses. The focal point of
conflict over the Title 28 regulations gravitated around the extent of
limitations placed on access to criminal records by the press and private
-








"^'^ P<"i<=y area was controversial is H, .
to the f;,rt .1, »
>Jversi i due primarilyfact that state guidelines SDecifi»H •
„f .
sp ed, in some detail, the extentOf responsibility law enforcement and other criminal if





administration of criminal justice. Finally altho Kthe comfnitment of state offiriM • • '
, .
'"^''^
'"-P"--*^"' to the development and
cementation Of policy and enforcement
.ven the indifference Of state
r^'^" :
- - ahle to adopt
.ide-
subsequent implementation activities?
The explanation of implementation processes as solely a function
produce a profound misreadin, of the importance of the expectations and
attitudes Of implementers, elite support and enforcement as factors in-
voked in the state implementation of federal mandates. M the ensuing
analysis suggests, such a focus fails in crucial respects to penetrate
appearances to uncover the political realities which limit change in
due process protections, management practices, and the use and exchange
Of criminal records.
The extent to which state and local elites support federal
policies involving regulation of criminal justice processes may have
an important bearing on whether such policies result in institutional
change. The interests and priorities of state executives, legislators,
and state court judges determine in .inn-if
to federa, policies Por
*^->
-ponse
. licies enunciatinq clear .mh
w--c^ ^ai, to invoke crediMe c
""""^^^
or substantia, benefits for
"
P^d-e reactions of in-
-ePo,ic. responses tot. supreme court ci.,..erties decisions
t.ereare,i.e,. to be few costs to forma, ratification of po, icies
T"^'^"'"^
—aps, substantia, pci.,:,
benefits for comp,iance. especial,, if these are tbe on,, types of
changes upon which federa, and state enforcement is based
to federa, pCicies are a,so conditioned
-
-Portant ways by their perceptions and attitudes about the scope of
their supervisory ro,e and extent to which po, icies addressing this
™le might disrupt the poiitica, status guo between state judicia, and
law enforcement officiais and ,oca, criminal justice officia,s. Federa,
and state po, icies which seek to strengthen enforcement powers of state
organizations which ,ac. e,ite co^itment and local politica, support
win probably be unsuccessful regardless of the extent to wh^ch addi-
tiona, powers are spe,,ed out.
State eli te indifferpnrp a nri
problematic enforceiiipnt
It is not evident that having the jurisdiction to enforce law
will guarantee that aggressive enforcement will occur. Effective
implementation requires that policy originators and officials responsible
for impiementation demonstrate a strong co^itment to statutory goa,s.
,^'^^^""^^^^^^^--^^-^-^-.ton state Official
^the Governor, the Attorney General and n.h
.nH H . '
''^"^^"'^ J^^tice officialsa d department heads) reacted to the federal n.-^^ e'^^ privacy mandate with
unme ,„U.,
..cons to especUn. H^^,
-
WasMngton, no. fo. that
.atte., 1n an. othe. state, CH.,na,«e Officials did not puMiC, a.gue, as they di. in decisions
^si^ned to
.eguiate evidence
.at.e.in, and post-a.est inte.o.ations,
that cH.1nal
.eco.ds p.ivac. would unde^ine effective ,a„ enforcement
Pe-aps the fact that the
.eg.lation was treated as a routine condition
'
Of a,d .ay have contributed to this reaction, but there is also son,e
evidence that cri.ina, records privacy has not constituted an issue of
major concern to state and local elected officials.
LEAA structured the state Implementation process in a way that
reinforced the perception by state officials that criminal records
privacy was just another condition which had to be satisfied in order
to get federal a1d. The linkage of compliance to preparation of a state
Plan enabled the Washington Governor for example, to delegate the task
to the SPA and the Governor's Co.ittee and, thus, avoid having to
enunciate a policy response. Since the Governor's Committee was domi-
nated by state and local criminal justice officials, there was little
concern and every reason to expect that criminal records privacy would
be given the same perfunctory response as other guidelines. The state
planning process had to result in some form of concrete action and draft
legislation would be a persuasive response to the LEAA guidelines. The
fact that the Attorney General' <: ah,, •y (^ener s Advisory Conimittee was unable topersuade the Governor to suDoort tho • .pp the independent commission concept
;
-e-tin. state agencies to assume administL
-
the reflations made the prospect o. passage o.legislation extremely unlikely.
Pnont. Of state officials
.ut because it was ,nst.u.enta, to t.e
achievement of ot.e. a.en.as. see aspects, it was a Cassic case
Of log
.Oiling. The State Pat.o, supported passage of the WCRPA in
exchange for Governor's Co^ittee support for expansion of Us law
enforcement powers. The State Court Administrator was willing to
support passage if that would help free the Judicial Council fro™ an
unwanted administrative role. The House Institutions Committee chairman
supported it because it was linked to the creation of a Department of
Just,ce. Finally, a majority of legislators voted in favor of the bill
because the SPA staff had persuaded them that LEAA mandated a state law
and that the Governor (through OCD) supported this avenue of compliance.
What is most conspicuous in this enumeration of reasons for
eventual adoption is the relative absence of focus on the substantive
aspects Of policy. Other then the News Association's aborted attempt
to hold the WCRPA hostage for its own privacy amendment, there was no
real controversy regarding the purpose of the law's dissemination policy
or any other aspects of the legislation. What is surprising is that the
WCRPA became so controversial long after passage.
In most instances, states have insured that criminal records
privacy regulation is housed in an agency with state-wide policy
e„.o.c™e„t aut.oHt.. T.at t.e states
.ve not
--M.so..so.s,„ent.sc.s.„„nMn.cate,
.oes „ot neces-san,, ste. fro. an1„ade,uate aut.on'ty o. J„n-3.ict1on.
Unlike most other 5t;itoc w^.u- ^Washington initially chose to lodge




make this possible, the reasoning
which prevailed ever since the Attorney General 's ah.g Advisory Committee
proposed an Independent secuHt, and pn-vac. co..,ssion
.ad been
accepted by the legislature that regulatory authority for crl.lna,
records privacy should not be lodged In an operational criminal justice
agency. I„ fact. Its initial accomplishments were Indeed l.p.esslve
State guideline development resulted In regulations more forward loo.in,
than most states in areas such as inspection provisions, record guality'
dissemination controls and audit. Also noteworthy m Washington was
the conduct of extensive, state-wide training sessions involving law
enforcement leadership and participation of nearly one-thousand criminal
just,ce personnel. Regardless of leadership attitudes towards the law,
its legal requirements were being disseminated widely in the criminal
justice community.
There was, however, slippage In leadership support and political
environment conducive towards SPA implementation. OCO reorganization
and transfer of the SPA program to the state budget agency combined with
a gradual dismantling of the LEAA program, a turnover of Law and Justice










,..ess an. a.o.t to ac..e
added entc.ce.ent powe. through the conduct of state-«,de audU
The ,.adua, dissipation and e.oslon of leadership co^it.ent
-PPort 1s said to constitute a significant reason for ineffective
regulation (Bardach, i977a; Maz.an1an and Sahatler,
,98,,. Perhaps
this factor alone explains what happened in the case of the SPA's
atte.pt in Washington to i„ple.ent the WCRPA. Perhaps-but there was
no overriding co^it^ent to see the regulatory process through-state
Officials had typically been Indifferent to .ost federal conditions of
aid; but What they were not indifferent to were regulations which In-
volved controversy. Criticise and pressure fro. ,a„ enforcement cou,d
not be ignored for they were a significant block on the Governor's
Co^ittee and had captured a substantial percentage of LEAA allocated
funds
It is to the source and role of this criticism that we now turn
to establish the importance of the linkage between elite support and the
beliefs, expectations and attitudes of Implementers closest to policy
execution.
The political realities of
anticipated change
An Important recurring preoccupation in the history of social
and political throught is to somehow penetrate the appearances of social
structure to reveal the reality to observers as well as participants.
con-
Such an endeavor continues to be a difficult f.., k
Observes "hn, .
^^t task because, as Connollyuub , bound up with thu - ^-
,-d.oln
^'st,„ction are those between theory andIdeo ogy, thought and action, the actual and thi-'is the possible, and
scousness and self-consciousness" (,981.- 63).
Since the discrepancies between appearance and reality
.ay
^
--ty 0. .or.s, the distinction between necessary and
.erely
gained understanding
.ay require theorists and agents to reconcile or
-1^ reliefs and revise their interpretations and expectations
to confor. with newly discovered social necessities; or, alternatively
transfer, social structures in ways which wil, satisfy real interests
'
The images of institutional structure, capacities of role-bearers with-
in the. and perceived possibilities of change are sustained by political
interpretations. These interpretations, although both plausible in
ter.s of the .oral ideals and/or fears they underpin, are typically
undersupported by available evidence. Nonetheless, as Connolly suggests,
they seek
in thTh*oir'':a?"'as1t'""'^^r^"''"5 ' "^-"t^-^^lar way
will help to so ?d??v fhfr"^'.''' articulation
Appearances play an important strategic role in political con-
flict involving policies and their consequences. An essential purpose
of politics is to strike an acceptable relationship between the distri-
bution of power and affected interests. Importantly, the results of
political conflict may both redistribute power among the participants
and result in a differential distribution of burdens and benefits,
responsibilities and opportunities.
I ncen-
Part.es to a political dispute t.e.efore have important i,.,
tives to trade upon pu.poned discrepancies between appearance and
-my in ways calculated to advance thei. favo.ed policy positions
contending interests involved in a policy issue a.e unlikely to reveal
their real interests or power positions in order to gain leverage over
consequences of policies they favor.
A recurring theme in the literature on law enforcement and
criminal Justice reform, replayed in significant ways in the attempt to
Implement policies in Washington to regulate criminal justice informa-
tion systems, is that attempts at reform fly in the face of reality.
Wilson's analysis of the futility of prospects for change is asserted
unequivocal ly
:
The patrolman is neither a bureaucrat nor a professionalbut a member of a craft. As with most crafts, his ha o
P sc°r pHSns" slo'h^rT^^ ^ se?"fttail ed
theory no^ ^ules. °'
'° behave-U has, in short, neither
no./"^ ^^^"9^ ^ ^^^^^ I'nto a bureaucracy will beperceived by the members as a failure of confidence and awithdrawal of support and thus strongly resisted effortsto c ange It into a profession will be seen as ?;releva
and thus largely ignored (Wilson, 1968: 283).
Yet Milner, acknowledging serious attitudinal and structural constraints,
suggests a pivot upon which change may turn:
Changes that are necessary to make the exclusionary rule
unnecessary may be so basic as to require adoption of a newparadigmof criminal justice administration, a paradigm
emphasizing the values and norms necessary to gain police
restraint. ... At the very minimum this would seem to re-quire that groups outside the police organization more
actively encourage police restraints. Existing reference
groups might advocate this goal more explicitly, or new
groups might become a more integral part of the process. In
any case such exchanges in police behavior are unlikely
unless other changes in the criminal justice system take
place.
m l'VZ°[lTsZ:lelT ITK' ^"-P'^ " police restraintThough the Court's o^e^to de^e,::;'''* ''''' p'^^ so™ ?ofe *program seems effect'lve^y*?,-^?^^ °P ^."""'p^s and expl? ft
still influence attitudes anH hfS' ^ institution miqht
™y act as a cataly t fo? chan„! k"?' "^ys- It
certain values and"^ hus encouZin^ Prestige tofrom others in a better no,?^^^^ interest and support
to implement these v'ater^i^l^^.J^^-^I^PgP-g-^'necessary
The case study Of one state's efforts at implementing a federal
mandate highlights the Dnlit,v = i
^J'lT a
regulatio / -gmficance of police opposition tom n Of information utilised in the conduct of pol ice in.estiga-
ons an the significance of state court support of and involvement inimplementation of such regulations. What is significant about law
enforcement's reaction to criminal records privacy regulation, even
-ough it differed in important respects from prior Supreme Court civil
liberties decisions, is that the policies were considered equivalent
This is surprising because there are two important objective differences
between the Ha£, and ^iranda decisions and criminal records privacy
First, improvements in record quality resulting from accuracy and
completeness guidelines are designed to enhance police identification
Of repeat offenders and therefore to increase their influence over
decisions made at subsequent stages of the criminal Justice process
including bail, charging and sentencing. This would appear to constitute
an important incentive for compliance.
Second, unlike its civil liberties predecessors, sanctions for
failure to comply with criminal records regulations do not affect case
outcomes. The effects of inaccurate or incomplete records are not
equivalent to illegally seized evidence or improperly administered
warnings. Cases are not dismissed or reversed if problems surface at
271
tna, in the integHt, of cH.lnal
.eccds used In fact fin,.,,
P-ecuto.s. cha.,inMecisicns an. success in p,ea
.a.,ain,n, a.e
'
greatly influenced the nu..e. of p.io. a.ests and convictions
(Oaco.y.„80.Wei™e..,,80).
Given t.ese differences it is not o.ious
Why police anticipated cn'^ina,
.eco.ds pHvacy regulations to Have an
adve.se effect compatible to t.at expected wit. and Mi^,
Why state prosecutors cared so littip ;,hn,.^ .nttle about the implementation of state
guide! ines.
However, law enforcement interests were not alone in mis-
characterizing the point and exaggerating the consequences of the
federal mandate and state regulations. The ACLU, representatives of
the Washington Public Disclosure Commission and other liberal interests
accentuated and exploited the due process dimensions of the regulations
because they believed that the inspection provision constituted the
strongest mechanism to secure enforcement and compliance. No doubt
similar perceptions by police reinforced their views. On the one hand,
proponents of strengthened due process rights fully expected liberally
construed procedures for records access to instigate needed reforms in
the records management practices. On the other hand, expecting such
procedures to inundate law enforcement agencies with records requests
and time consuming challenges and appeals, law enforcement interests
steadfastly, although initially unsuccessfully, resisted these attempts.
The paradigm popular among students of criminal Justice policy
which explains outcomes of policy regulating criminal justice in terms






anes of how the path to„a..s
.efo™ ,s conceived an. repudiate.
Thereby, the process of .e.c™ ,eco.es a caHcatu.e of itself
„hich
the proponents and opponents of change act out thei. beliefs in self-
fulfilling ways.
cast in these terms, the conflict between opposing interests
over state guidelines has paradoxical results. Although attempting to
thwart efforts to create burdensome guidelines imposing due process
protections, law enforcement interests found themselves drawn into an
ever widening spiral of interpretative regulations as a defense against
having alternative interpretations of due process rights imposed upon
them and as an offense to contain efforts to enlarge regulatory access
to intelligence files. Also, the single-mindedness with which due
process proponents carried their efforts all but obscured the path
toward real reforms which lay in the improvement of the quality of re-
cords used in the entire criminal justice process. Unfortunately,
record quality provisions are not self-enforcing but necessitate elite
support, permanent administrative mechanisms, enforcement and long term
oversight.
Law enforcement's political agenda was revealed in another way
as well. Under court sanctions resulting from community activists-
pressure to end the collection and maintenance of information resulting
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from political surveillanro i„" n ce, law enforcement interests were intent
P-ervin, discretion perceive, to





.e .e. as a too,den. access to material accessible t.rou,. ot.er state law. w.en
s-cess in t.is effort was t.warted an
.favorable S.p.eme Co.t
-Pliance to provisions w.icH re.ulatea interdepartmental dissemination
Of investigative material „hic. included reference to criminal records
Finally, therefore, what the Supreme Court civil liberties
decisions and Washington implementation of the federal criminal records
mandate suggest is that expectations about policy consequences, re-
gardless of whether they are well fn.mjoji-ne founded, can be an important political
factor in explaining responses to external regulation. Perhaps it is
not surprizing then that when appearances have been successfully severed
from political purposes that police are willing to acknowledge, as an
eastern Washington records manager did in 1981, that expectations were
not only greatly overdrawn but that had the WCRPA preceeded Miranda it
would have obviated the necessity for that decision. The WCRPA made
clear to at least some law enforcement personnel what Miranda had clearly
failed to do, that the integrity and accuracy of information used in
investigation of suspects of crimes is as important as securing an actual
arrest and possible conviction. In this way, reforms in record manage-
ment processes have been viewed by some as an asset rather than a
liability.
These insights underscore the importance of law enforcement
investigative practices as a political factor limiting effective
--lation 0. cn-.,na, Justice 1n.o™at,on s.ste. an. Us ,.p„n .0
^
understanding the Interests fo^atlve In the uU1„ati n Ultima e outcome of ^urh
"^^^^^^''^"-^^^----'---s.ct^
-
the space In „h1ch to
..the.
.n.e.stan. the ,ap hetween p.:
cedural compl lance and actual change.
Judicial IndependPnrp,
...H^rrn
burdens of compTianc? ~
Almost Immediately after LEAA published Its initial draft
-9Ulat1ons 1„ 19^4 the National Center for State Courts challenged
the
.ustlce Department and LEAA^s authority to regulate the Judiciary
Wh>le strenuously arguing that the separation of powers doctrine pro-'
hibued such an effort, state court Interests chose to case their
Objections In broader terms. The National Center contended that LEAA's
actions
..indicate a clear departure of LEAA from Its traditional and
Often stated policy of not Imposing federal regulations on the
states.
. .
(1974: 2). Moreover, the LEAA draft proposal was criticized
for exceeding Its statutory authority by requiring state plans.
This criticism is somewhat surprising and inconsistent for
judicial recipients of generous LEAA grants have complied with all other
conditions of aid before and after the Title 28 regulations. Why this
mandate should be any more onerous than other forms of executive regula-
tion is not obvious.
The National Center also challenged the desireabil ity of the
creation of new state organizations to implement plans.
planning entity tS carrv ouJ ^h^ „ ^'^P^'""^
gulations or whethe"an ex stlno ItT/T' '^"^
What evidence of tMs
.ina suggests therefore is that state judicial
-terests challenged the attempt to create new sources of state policy
making authority which invited jurisdictional conflict.
While these efforts were underway to force LEAA retraction of
these onerous aspects of the regulations (between February 1974 and
March 19. 1976. when LEAA's revised regulations were published,, the
Washington State Court Administrator assumed a leadership role in
producing a state privacy plan. In fact, as minutes of the Attorney
General's Advisory Committee indicate, a motion was passed which made
the Clerk of the Courts (an elected official in Washington) subject to
the management and control of the Superior Court for the purposes of
the state plan (Washington Attorney General's Advisory Committee on
Security and Privacy, 1975: 2). The idea was that if state and trial
courts were included under the regulations, then they should assume a
supervisory responsibility over court record keeping functions. Thus,
whatever the outcome of the final regulations, the courts stood to
advance their organizational interests.
Even after LEAA regulation of the courts was withdrawn in 1976
the State Court Administrator continued to be heavily involved as a
sponsor of state legislation. The State Judicial Council was proposed
in initial legislation, and seriously considered until replaced by the
Office of Community Development, as administrative authority for WCRPA.
While it is not altogether clear why the state court leadership should
continue to pursue an administrative role
Z I state court-n..ator.s o.ice
....... it possi.e to use testate
^^'-^
-
^ - -^"ce state court a.inis-
-"-1-ation denied previous,, t.rou,. other
.eans. The atte.ptto implement a state court
m
, , , ,
'"'°™^*^°" P-ving difficult and
federal mandate requiring coordination of records processes between
cn.inal Justice agencies could help remove some organisational Carriers
moreover, acquisition of state regulator, authority was consistent with
'
existing state court policy authority and may have offered an attractive
-y by Which to at least limit further executive encroachment on Judicial
organizational interests while increasing administrative control over
trial court activities.
We have already noted the commonality of police perceptions of
the supreme Court civil liberties and criminal records privacy as policies
-posing due process considerations on the conduct of law enforcement
Officers, interestingly, unlike the police, the courts have not inter-
preted criminal records privacy in due process terms. Remarks made by
Judge George Mattson help explain this interpretation while providing
additional insights about police reactions.
with^jL"'^"^* received by either courts or police
1 bert es decisions'" ^ °' ^i^^- l^^ile the c 1
convicJionf Jhi wrppf '"'P'"-*^"* °"r attempt to secureu victions, t e WCRPA poses more of a civil liabilitv
icaScTiollt'h'^r '"r''
P-Pose a"e o;1:ch*iignif-n e to eithe us or law enforcement
The essential purpose of the WCRPA is the protection ofpolice agencies from having to divulge a lot of data they




influence the development oJ thf Ti'''^- ^ ^^'^ try to
system because it Sw c^eaLVJlf'^f information
ments that are either ZTnlT ^° court docu-
but we have been nabl o e^c ^'0%^ confidential,
access to court records withn .
agreement on how to control




.eal,. separate, couns an. po^ce
was not so ™uch objective differences in the i.pact of the law on func-
tions and routines (although there are so„e important differences in this
regard), but the impact on organizational Interests resulting fro.
differential burdens of compliance.
As the Washington case documents, therefore, the problems of
enforcement of record guality provisions and compliance largely reflected
political-organizational conflict between police and courts. Thus the
eventual efforts by law enforcement interests to redistribute the burdens
Of compliance (by lifting civil liability sanctions imposed on police
for failure to furnish complete dispositions) unmasked institutional and
organizational conflicts underpinning a policy involving overlapping
jurisdictions with uneven responsibilities for compliance.
There was widespread resentment by law enforcement officials
about the inequity of Title 28 and. thus the WCRPA. in exempting the
courts. Moreover, reactions of state elites reinforced the view that
since police were the primary custodians and intermediaries for the
documentation of all transactions related to the compilation of criminal
records, their compliance was what was necessary. Perhaps these factors,
combined with the SPA regulatory authority, provided law enforcement
--e.Ut1o„s an., t.e.e... to unae^.e an ,.p„.an. p.pose o.
"sed and exchanged
,n the administration of criminal justice
Ever since the Menarl decision Implementation of criminal
.eco.ds
Pnvacy Involved a collective
.espons,h11 it, fo.
.eco.d ,„al1ty-a
^esponsl.llU. that Implies Interagency and 1ntero.1sd1ct1ona, coordina-
tion^ all components of the criminal Justice process. The exclusion
Of the courts fro. that ^ndate and ambiguous
.ole fo. prosecutors has
re,nforced. as we see In the Washington case, a sense of Inepulty of
burdens-a„ unegual shouldering of responslhll Ity hy law enforcement
That the courts eluded the mandate and continue to fall to provide com-
plete disposition information has been an Important factor 1n Justifying
non-compliance. If the state court has not considered Us participation
cruical to satisfying the criminal records privacy mandate, then It can
hardly be expected that police would take their own responsibilities
seriously. It may, by this account, then be unsurprising that the most
serious problem with the quality of criminal history records continues to
be the lack of complete dispositions.
Thus, the politics of regulation of criminal justice is bound
up in a system in which differences in organizational capacity, power
and intergovernmental and interorganizational relations work to inhibit
rather than support the accommodation necessary to facilitate change in
the management of criminal history records.
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for the li.ited success in achieving performance objectives The
difficult, wUh this explanation is that it is hoth misleading and in-
consistent: what is misleading about it is its overemphasis on technical
factors such as statutory intent and content which underplays the ro,e
Of politics in dictating outco.es. Explanatory inconsistency is the
ultimate result for we are unable to reconcile wide variations in state
policies (particularly between states with comprehensive policies vs.
states lacking such policies) with the nearly universally poor perfor-
mance and lack of change among all states.
The importance of each of the factors accentuated in the second
explanation (i.e., elite indifference, anticipated change and differen-
tial enforcement) help remove these inconsistencies in interpreting the
national data. There are several state responses which suggest sub-
stantial indifference of state executives (and substantial opposition
by local elected officials) as a significant explanatory factor.
First, with the exception of the Governor of Arkansas (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1974a: 4) who expressed mild criticism of the
regulations, neither other governors nor their national association took
the opportunity to comment on LEAA's initial regulations in 1974 or 1976.
" e,ecte. ofnc.U. t.o.,.
association of Counties exercised strong criticism of dissemination
P-isions and cost implications fo cipa, information systems
second, few state executives demonstrated a willingness to
assign administrative authority to an independent agency (only four
states). Clearly, most state executives (and/or legislatures) showed
deference to state and local law enforcement interests as to the
appropriate administrative entity. With few exceptions, state law
enforcement agencies have assumed administrative responsibility. A
significant number of these also have statutory powers sufficient to
impose a uniform policy for dissemination of records on local law
enforcement agencies.
Finally, given the small number of statewide audits conducted
by 1982, it is evident that state enforcement and executive and legisl
tive oversight have lacked aggressiveness.
The Washington case also reinforces the importance of law
enforcement practice and federalism together in contributing toward an
understanding of national patterns. First, police demands for the
independence of investigative activity stems not only from a common
ideology of crime control but from opposition to federal and state re-
gulation. Intelligence activities, as the Washington case indicates,
often include surveillance of political activity currently unregulated
by most states and localities. Thus, there are strong incentives for
individual departments to resist controls in this area because of the






two.. t.e Law En.o.e™e„t Intem.ence UnU (O.o.e,
,,.8,When ccnf1de„t1a,ny1s breeched
.eguUtc. intrusions.
Second, not only is credulity of the likelihoodUK iKeii of aggressive
enforcement stretched
.y state ,a„ enforcement administration of federal
and state mandates, but it is evident from the Washington case that
acceptance of Jurisdictional authority is woefully lacking, state level
law enforcement is Just not recognized as a legitimate source of regula-
tory authority by local law enforcement, and state police or highway
patrols are probably not eager to risk the political conflict of
aggressive enforcement.
Moreover, conflict over state jurisdiction contributes to the
relevance of Judicial independence in explaining evident problems in
state enforcement of federal mandates and state policy. What was
conspicuous about state court opposition to LEAA guidelines was the
usurpation of existing lines of state policy-making exercised by state
courts. As the Washington case clearly suggests, state court justices
clearly supported the principle of privacy while trial court judges
were largely indifferent to what was perceived to be a police adminis-
tration issue. State courts clearly have their own administrative
problems to work out with respect to exercising policy and administra-
tive jurisdiction over lower courts. Federal and state regulations
involving administrative reform have evidently overlooked the importance
of judicial power in determining the viability of record management






So far we have begun to construct an explanation of certain
recurring performance features of the state implementation of the
congressional privacy mandate. Importantly, state response patterns to
TUle 28 exhibit a contrasting portrait of extensive procedural adoption
yet underutilization of procedures; and expansion of the regulatory
jurisdiction of state law enforcement but limited evidence of actual
enforcement. There are similarUies between these state responses and
performance attributes and the consequences of the Ma££ and Miranda
decisions. There has been extensive procedural compliance and newly
emergent organizational practices but little evidence of actual change.
The Washington case provides insights into why this has occurred. In
so doing, it contributes towards our understanding of policy implementa-
tion processes and the political factors which impede as well as
facilitate policy innovation and regulatory reform in criminal justice.
There is an important dimension of policy emerging from this
study which has a bearing on explanatory frameworks seeking to identify
relationships between factors shaping implementation processes and
outcomes.
fede.a,poncy
.a. define the substantive mandate and goal:
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Is of theimplementing organization by specifvinn tK .
treatment ohil .
°' '^''^'^
p osophy or rights and the specific kinH. .
Hni,- .
^ cin ds of services to bedelivered or regulations to be administered second fed i
influence the structure of . •
'''''''
an organization, for examnlp k
or ;,ftomn^- .
p e, by prescribing
attempting to change its locationy with respect to state or local
government, its governanrp nv^ce or decsion making structure, the actual
funct,cns it performs, or its position within the policy s.ste.
aspects Of how an organization perfo^s. particularly how employees
conduct routine tasks and exercise discretion in applying procedures to
individual situations or clients.
Most studies seeking to explain the politics involved in imple-
mentation processes treat the substance of the policy as a aiven or
unalterable feature of the context. However, there are to important
reasons why policy should not be treated as an independent variable.
First, as this study suggests, the policy which actually gets implemented
IS largely the product of the actions of state and local rather than
federally mandating institutions. Second, we have found a problematic
relationship between policy objectives enunciated by policy originators
and the expectations of implementers. It is probably misleading to
assume that implementers' responses are governed largely by their under-
standing of the policy intent. Implementers may respond instead
according to expected political consequences of compliance. Thus,
adaptive behavior resulting from such anticipatory reactions may not be







.ot. st.ct.ra, ana p.ocea.a,
c aracteristics of i.p,™enting organizations as we,, as wit. t.e s„..
stantive approach. Thus, federa, po, icy-.a.ers have expanded their
-tervention through mandates and conditions of aid which prescribe
the structural and procedural
.eans
.y „hich they expect policy to he
MPle^ented as well as the ends they desire to achieve.
So, the policies we have compared involve dual objectives
Procedural policy provides guidelines for decisions and actions, and
standards by which to appraise their appropriateness (Davis, 1975)-
structural policies are designed to alter organizational roles and'
functions or intergovernmental relations. These types of policies are
not always carefully distinguished nor acknowledged by either policy
originators or implementers. Nevertheless, they have important implica-
tions for the efficacy of policies designed to structure the discretion
criminal justice officials have in executing their functions.
What our analysis of criminal records privacy and Supreme Court
civil liberties policies suggests is that attempts to reform the criminal
Justice system necessarily entail both aspects of policy. The structural
aspect of policy consists of formal relations between components con-
stituted by differences in organizational structure, authority and power,
mission and function in the criminal justice process. At another level
there is a layer of procedural relations (both formal and informal)
involving policy interdependence, common value systems (e.g., the
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.escn^.e as t.e "settle., c.a.acte. o. cH.na,
justice and Us capabHit, to absorb policy
.efo™s and li„it the
possibility Of Change. Tbus, policies advancing
.efo™ based on p.p.
cedural change alone a.e H.ely to be derailed by the i„fo™a, aspects
Of the syste..
,n contrast, policies which promote structural change
are .ore mely to sharpen conflict between cri.ina, Justice components
than procedural ones by triggering a dialectic process by which com-
pliance burdens may be absorbed, deflected or redistributed and power
shifts avoided, reconciled or redirected towards a new political
equil ibrium.
Given this dimension of policy then, the connection between
the Washington case and Ma2£ and Miranda now becomes clearer. First,
state officials are unlikely to treat federal regulatory policy with'a
sense of urgency unless organizational interests are either threatened
or advanced by compliance. Federal policies which seek to alter inter-
governmental relationships create the conditions in which organizational
and jurisdictional conflicts are likely to emerge. Therefore, state
official responses and actions are conditioned by the opportunities
created and limits imposed by such alterations for existing organiza-
tional strength, responsibility and interorganizational relations.
Federal policy may provide opportunities for expansion of state power
while imposing new responsibilities and constraints which make that
expansion politically unrealistic and unfeasible.
286
-'^ no. exc.sivel. 1n te™s of o.,an,.atio„a, powe.
The,> sense of priorities 1s mnuenced In important ways t.e
'
attuudes and behavior of those with the
.est i.edlate and direct
-ponsl.nit, for compliance, state officials, whether state Justices
administrators or legislators search for evidence of the wa.s the po11c;
win affect existing custom and practice. The responses and the guide-
lines Which eventually emerge will necessarily reflect the compromise
Which must Ultimately 5e struc. between satisfying policy objectives
and maintaining organizational prerogatives while limiting their dis-
ruption of existing practice.
Third, It is more difficult for state and local criminal justice
Officials to evade policies predicated on structural reform because they
are likely to produce contradictions in interorganlzational relations
which put one or more of Us elements In a bind. Structural policies
are likely to create such effects partly because of functional inter-
dependence Of the components of the criminal justice system and Its
sensitivity to disruptions in power relations. As Dolbeare and Hammond
(1971) have noted elsewhere In their study of state implementation of
the Supreme Court prayer decisions, "style issues" provide greater lever-
age to state elites and lower level Implementers to dictate responses
largely because they do nothing to alter existing structures of power
and preference.
As we have shown, procedural policies with structural implica-
tions have a different character: they seek to alter underlying patterns
of power and preference making non-decisions (or non-responses) more
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transparent and see ll.Ued co^lance neaH. unavoidable, w.e.e
policies impose une.ua, burdens and disrupt power relations between
organizations who ™ust i.ple«nt the. and co.ply it is n.ely that the
organizations affected will attempt to redress the imbalance and restore
the political equl ibrium.
others (Bynum, 1982; Zal.an. 1982) have noted in studies of
sentencing policies the significance of anticipatory reactions to laws
specifically designed "to be broken." What they discovered is that laws
predicated on so.e expected degree of non-co.pl iance ™ay be better able
to achieve desired goals then those requiring universal compliance
Their studies show, for example, that determinate sentencing legislation
designed to li.it judicial discretion may actually increase prosecutorial
discretion. Thus, leverage over case outcomes is simply shifted from
one set of officials to another rather than eliminating it altogether.
As zalman hypothesizes in his study of sentencing reform In Michigan,
the legislature perceived this to be a desirable state of affairs because
it feared that imposing a law with no options would exaccerbate prison
overcrowding. Thus, the legislature may have expected that the law
would be "mandatory" only when the prosecutor intended it to be mandatory
Implications for the American Political System
These findings also raise Important issues regarding the struc-
ture of accountability involved In state implementation of federal
guidelines. It is at the state level where the connection between
executives, legislatures and bureaucrats appears most tenuous and
problematic. Given a complex intergovernmental policy involving criminal
justice information systems 5t=t<> „, state executives and legislatures have
sown a surprising lac. of interest in the organizational
, social ana
a*.n,strative consequences of the ,ro„t. an. utilization of information
technology in criminal justice.
Moreover, the ever-expanding and deepening complexity of the
national network of criminal Justice systems may actually outstrip the
present capacities of federal, state and local officials to either
control its growth or insure its accountability. This is evidenced
.y
the fact that there is no uniform national policy, but rather fifty state
policies which are underenforced. Federal regulatory policy as imple-
mented by LEAA. according to the profile of national performance
presented here, has had regressive effects on representation processes
More specifically, the combination of grant-supported proliferation of
information technology and state-based regulatory policies has reinforced
local control over informational relations in criminal Justice. These
relations continue to be dictated by law enforcement custom and practice
and local public values. Similarly, as the analysis in Chapter II
indicates, the Supreme Court civil liberties decisions in Ma££ and
Miranda, while increasing political visibility and policy-making by
state courts, have nonetheless produced wide variations in policy and
enforcement while at the same time reinforcing local police practice.
From this perspective, then, in contrast to Van Horn's (1979)
contention, federal block grant programs do not necessarily increase
the involvement of state and local elected officials nor increase
accountability to the public with respect to these issues. Nor is it
clear that the aftermath of the Supreme Court civil liberties decisions
^as resuued in incease. state cou.t enforcement of ConnUutiona,
protections (Poner and Tarr.
,,82). „,at t.ese e.a.ples of federal
1nvc,ve.ent do indicate 1s t.at federal and state officials are una.le
to determine the „a. in «Mc. federal and state policies are actually
Implemented. Instead, a ver. powerful coalition of federal, state and
local law enforcement interests, combined wit. institutional power
conflicts, have dominated both policy-making and implementation, thus
dusolving the distinction between the powers and roles of state
Officials and bureaucratic implementers suggested by Maz^anian and
Sabatier (1983).
Tarr concludes his study of state court responses to Supreme
court establishment cases with the comment that a major benefit of non-
compliance is that It avoids the disruption of long-standing and
widespread state practices that compliance would entail. Tarr sees an
important implication of this for understanding the governance role of
State courts:
Such programs could not exist, of course, without broadpopular support. These findings, in turn JomDel one ?oacknowledge the vital importance of thrS^mocra? c "oVponents of judicial role: state court judges Save
consistently decided cases in such a way as to reserve
(?ar?! 1977''?33) sentiment in the state
Of course, the risks of reversal tend to make non-compliance
ineffective, as Tarr points out, so that the advantages must lie else-
where. Instead, the advantages of non-compliance consist in enabling
judges to avoid the criticism they face by invalidating programs,
especially those strongly supported by public opinion. Such a response
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pom,-caWo.es a. poMc.val.es. t.e state.
Glick and Vines (197?- ^/ln^ ^ •
their investigation
Of the state judiciary in state politics .t.t«
^ ' a e court judges generallydo not associate the
"interests" involved in 1-tin..- •"i ui a 1 .tigation with interest
fo^a, Jud1c1a, process is strong,, condemned „st state ccun
J"<'9es. ^--stMs analysis suggests, state co.ns as „el, as state
executives exe.dse an Important Influence eve.
.o„ legislative policies
get implemented.
Policies intended to refo™ the administration of criminal
justice must be sufficiently Important to state executives and legis-
lators that they would accept the political ris.s and conflict with
state Judicial and law enforcement Interests which would be necessary
to achieve policy change. That this intervention may therefore reguire
compromise between branches of government over policies which Involve
overlapping jurisdictions between executive, legislative and state
court functions may be an unavoidable but necessary consequence. The
separation of powers doctrine, enunciated long ago by James Madison
was not intended to prevent but to encourage a vigorous interaction
between branches of government so that the public Interest might be
better served.
Surely there is overwhelming public support for crime control
through law and order. Courts and legislatures draw upon this public
sentiment to justify an aggressive posture toward law enforcement.
ponce and prosecutors have ovpr th. n
hand! H .
''''' ''^'^
led and resulting outcomes. The factors in. .
iu.t.v. .
^^'"'^
^° criminalj s ice system contributinq to thP.. n ^^ g ese outcomes i„volve maintenance of
organizational autonomy, and stability of political nn
pytprn.i . .u
0^ P Ui power. The factors
ex e al to that system involve the sen.r.t.- .ui in separation of powers and pre-
ponderance of public sentiment fnv^ i.for law and order compared to the
.e,at1ve,. wea. intensU. of .e.a„. fo. t.e protection of ™i„o.U. H,.ts
What 1s problematic therefore about legislative and judicial
-terventlon In tbe criminal justice policy s.ste. to protect Individual
Hghts is t.at the state and local Implementation of a federal mandate
necessarily reflects primarily the Interests and pr,or1t1es. beliefs
and attitudes of state and local criminal justice officials, and other
-terests secondarily, m this Instance, the Interests In the mainte-
nance Of the organizational status quo In criminal justice merges with
majority preference. There Is nothing rationally Inconsistent with
this posture, only that the neglect of minority rights may often be the
concession extracted for this consistency.
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